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Abstract

The Doi Moi policy (economic reform) launched in 1986 has resulted in
economic boom for Vietnam. The nation with a population of around 95 million people
recently joined the middle-income nation group and became a “major development
success story”. In the land sector, while the land ownership is controlled by the State, the
privatization process of land rights has brought Vietnamese people five fundamental
rights over land. To meet increasing demands of economic development and urban
expansion, the central government of Vietnam (CGV) has implemented land-taking
policy from early 1990s. The land acquisition policy, on the one hand, has attracted
numerous investors with cheap land access that fueled Vietnam’s rapid economic
development. On the other hand, the policy has also unleashed resistance among affected
landholders. As manifestations of policy noncompliance, disputes and conflicts over land
acquisition across country have become a highly complex and dynamic challenge for
CPV - the only ruling political party in Vietnam. Over the last three decades, land
acquisition policy literature in Vietnam has been dominated by economic, institutional,
and good governance approaches. These theories offer alternative explanations and a
range of policy recommendations for noncompliance with land acquisition. However,
these approaches tend to largely ignore process/action aspects of policy implementation
that importantly contribute to policy success or failure. Many recommendations for
policy reform are not realistic in Vietnam’s current context. This research, thus,
contributes to land-taking policy literature by focusing on policy tools used by local
implementers to change target groups’ behaviors.

i

This dissertation study applied a multiple case study design to explore linkages
between policy tools and noncompliance with land acquisition. The researcher selected
three land-taking incidents in Bac Ninh province and Hanoi capital city in the North, and
Ho Chi Minh City in the South for a cross-case analysis. To get real experiences with
land-taking policy implementation, the researcher conducted fieldwork in Bac Ninh and
Vinh Phuc provinces. Research participants included land officials and managers,
government leaders, and affected landholders. Qualitative interviews, focus groups, and
web-search were three major methods used for collecting data. To analyze qualitative
data, the researcher adopted techniques of coding, thematic analysis, and document
analysis. Common themes emerged across three cases were used to construct a cross-case
analysis of three land-taking incidents.
Research results suggested a linkage between implementation tools and
landholders’ noncompliance with land acquisition. Vietnamese implementers were
required to employ direct government organizations, authoritative tools, and informationbased tools while giving less importance to the role of financial tools in executing landtaking projects. The researcher also found inappropriate tool choice and combinations
that encouraged implementers’ abuse of public authority. Types of preferred tools and
patterns of tool choice and use defined coercive interactions and relationship between
implementers and affected landholders who had no choice but giving up their land. This
qualitative study revealed that tool mixes preferred by implementers might ensure policy
effectiveness and efficiency but reduce policy responsiveness and legitimacy. Study
results supported research prepositions that economic, institutional, and good governance
factors are insufficient to explain noncompliance with land acquisition in Vietnam. This
ii

tool focused study showed that landholders’ resistance was related to characteristics,
strengths and weaknesses of each tool and how tools were combined in tools mixes used
in policy implementation.
This case study offers tool-based policy implications for reducing noncompliance
with land acquisition. First, at the central level of government, Vietnamese policy makers
should consider indirect government mechanism of policy implementation. Non-State
actors should be allowed to take part in land acquisition serving economic development
purposes. Market institutions need to be recognized in order to balance land related
interests among three key actors, including: the government, landholders, and land
developers (investors). Second, for land-takings serving public purposes at local level, the
use of direct government organizations should be limited; BCGCs need to include more
non-state actors in order to operate as an advisory unit. The government should replace
land price regulations by a land valuation formula that implementers can flexibly use in
land-taking projects. Authority of district governments in issuing executive orders for
executing land acquisition needs to be controlled. To minimize disputes over landtakings, instead of relying on propaganda and moral suasion, the government should
provide landholders with clear information through group meetings that consist of
affected landholders who share the same land claims.

iii
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Glossary

Agenda-Setting: the recognition of public problems that require further government
consideration, attention, and actions.
Bottom – Up Approach: A way of studying policy design and implementation that
considers the abilities and motivations of the lowest level implementers, and tracks policy
design from that level to the highest levels of government (Birkland, 2016: 337).
Circular: The term refers to administrative instructions issued by the central government
to manage policy implementation.
City/Provincial Governor: public officials with authority to govern the executive branch
of city/provincial government, ranking under the premier of the central government.
Decree: The term refers to administrative instructions issued by the central government
to specify the enforcement of regulations stated in laws.
District Mayor: public officials with authority to govern the executive branch of district
government, ranking under provincial/city governor.
Directive: The term refers to administrative instructions issued by the central government
to manage law enforcement process.
Executive Order: The term refers to administrative rules issued by the head of
administrative authorities such as Premier, Provincial/City Governors, Mayors of DPC.
Governance: The rules of collective decision-making in settings where there are a
plurality of actors or organizations and where no formal control system can dictate the
terms of the relationship between these actors and organizations. The concept of
governance can be understood in terms of structure and process. As a structure,
xii

governance refers to formal institutional arrangements, including laws, rules, regulations,
and organizations such as state, government and non-government agencies. As a process,
the nature of governance is understood as the ability to steer society or coordinate sectors
of the economy/industry, and how various actors control economic activities and produce
desired outcomes (Pierre and Peters., 2000; Chotray and Stoker., 2009; Bevir., 2009).
Institutional design of public policy: the term refers to formal institutions such as law,
rules, regulations, and organizational structure used by the government to put a policy
into effect.
Land Governance: The rules, processes, and structures through which decisions are
made about access to land and its use, the manners in which the decisions are
implemented and enforced and the way that competing interests in land are managed. A
land governance system often consists of land policies, processes, and structures – an
emphasis on both land governing processes and institutions (Palmer et al, 2009: 9).
Land Regime: The term refers to two forms of land ownership: public ownership and
privateownership (Ellickson, 1993; Reale and Handmer, 2011).
Land Tenure System: “The terms and conditions on which land is held, used and
transacted, within a particular system of rights and institutions that govern access to and
use of land” (Ellickson, 1993; Reale and Handmer, 2011).
Land Administration System: The set of government agencies responsible for state
management in the land sector.
Land Acquisition: Plans and actions of the government to acquire a specific piece of
land assigned to landholders. The term can be used interchangeably with some other
terms such as land-taking, land appropriation, land recovery, and land conversion.
xiii

Land Acquisition Policy: A policy adopted by the Vietnamese government to acquire
land use rights assigned to landholders for defence or security purposes, economic
development, and infrastructure. In order to obtain land use rights over a piece of land,
the government has to compensate land users.
Land Acquisition Project: A plan (e.g. goals, rules, procedures, and schedule) issued by
the government to acquire a specific area of land.
Land Conflict: Any controversies between land actors when they pursue incompatible
land related goals, whether by peaceful means or by the use of force.
Land Price System: A price system issued by provincial governments in Vietnam to be
used in valuing a specific piece of land for compensation.
Land-Taking Compensation: Various forms of benefits (cash, business properties, or an
alternative piece of land) offered by local governments to land users in exchange of
giving up their land to the government.
Matching Capital: Resources such as land and business privileges offered by the
government for investors in exchange of public constructions such as road, bridges….
Official Policy Actor: “A participant in the policy process whose involvement is
motivated or mandated by his or her official position in a government agency or office”
(Birkland, 2016: 108).
Public Policy: “A statement by government – at whatever level, in whatever form – of
what it intends to do about a public problem” (Birkland, 2016: 9).
Policy Noncompliance: Non-collaborative responses from policy target groups over the
implementation of public policy. In this dissertation, the term “policy noncompliance” is
used interchangeably with “policy resistance”, “policy disobedience”.
xiv

Policy Process: A system that translates policy ideas into actual policies that are
implemented and have positive effects. A classic model of policy process includes six
stages:

Issue

Emergence,

Agenda

Setting,

Alternative

Selection,

Enactment,

Implementation, and Evaluation (Birkland, 2016: 27-28).
Policy Design: “The process by which policies are designed, both through technical
analysis and the political process, to achieve a particular goal” (Birkland, 2016: 300).
Policy Formulation: The process of generating options on what to do about a public
problem.
Policy Implementation: The process by which policies enacted by government are put
into effect by the relevant agencies (Birkland, 2016: 332).
Policy Tools: A tool/instrument is an identifiable method (technique) through which
collective action is structured to address a public problem (Salomon, 2002: 19).
Policy Mechanism: The term refers to how or ways to put a policy into effect in practice.
A policy mechanism will determine how policy tools work. Direct government, Indirect
Government, Authority, Financial Incentives, and Information are common policy
mechanisms used by governments across countries.
Policy Effectiveness: The achievement of the valued outcomes of a policy. Policy
effectiveness is often measured in terms of units of products/service or monetary values.
Policy Efficiency: The relationship between costs and benefits throughout the policy
process. A policy choice that generates more total benefits per total cost is the most
efficient policy option.
State: The State is a political association that establish sovereign jurisdiction within
defined territorial borders, and exercises authority through a set of permanent institutions
xv

(Heywood, 2007: 91). The State in Vietnam comprises the CPV, Administrative System
with its Political Executives, Formal Representative Institutions, Armed Forces, Police,
Security Agencies, and Social Mass Organizations controlled by the State.
Top–Down Approach: A way of studying policy design and implementation that
considers the goals of the highest-level policy designers and traces the design and
implementation of the policy through the lowest level implementers (Birkland, 2016:
334).
Target Group/Policy Target: “The entities – people or organizations – whose behavior
the policy seeks to alter” (Birkland, 2016: 325).
Unofficial Policy Actor: “A participant in the process who does not have constitutionally
or legally created incentives or mandates to be a part of the process, such as experts,
researchers, and reporters, all of whom are important to the policy process” (Birkland,
2016: 109).
Wicked Problem: Challenges that have no clearly identifiable solution and that are
embedded in a highly fluid and interconnected set of causal influences (Morgan, Ingle,
and Shinn, 2019: 215).
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

“Public policy is fundamentally conceived as pragmatic-that is, as
a political and technical approach to solving problems via
instruments; that it views such instruments as natural; they are
viewed as being “at our disposal”, and the only questions they
raise relate to whether they are the best possible ones for meeting
the objective set; and that the central set of issues is around the
effectiveness of instruments (Lascoimes and Le Gales, 2007)

1.1. Introduction
Although Vietnam is currently recognized as a “major development success
story”, the country’s rapid industrialization and urbanization process comes with costs.
Among emerging challenges, long-lasting tensions and severe conflicts between land
users and government resulting from large-scale conversion of rural farmland to urban
and industrial uses are “highly visible hot spots” (Brown, 2012&2013; CECODES, VFFCRT, RTA & UNDP, 2018). As manifestations of policy noncompliance, disputes and
conflicts between land users and government over land-takings have become one of the
most critical threats to the Vietnam’s sustainable development (The Economist, 2017).
This introductory chapter aims to provide a general background of the dissertation
research on land-taking policy noncompliance. The chapter first starts with an overview
of Vietnam’s context and the land policy, describes land-taking policy challenges, and
1

clarifies the research problem. It then justifies the need to examine government’s actions
in policy implementation stage as the research opportunity, set out research purposes and
questions, followed by a statement of the research significance. Chapter 1concludes with
the dissertation structure and individual chapters’ brief summaries.
1.2. Research Background
Located in Southeast Asia, Vietnam is a developing nation with a population of
around 95 million (World Bank and MPI, 2016). The country’s governance system is
characterized by a “State centered model” in which the governing power is centralized in
the “State” – a political association with sovereign power that includes but is not limited
to the government institutions; and democratic centralism is claimed as the fundamental
principle of public governance (Heywood, 2007: 36-43; Huang, 2009: 43).As the sole
ruling political party, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) serves as the core
institution of the State’s power system. The unity of State powers is emphasized, and
there also is no clear separation between the public sphere and civil society. The central
government not only controls local governments but also administrates all domestic and
international affairs. In such a unitary system, social organizations are incorporated into
the State system; State institutions are encouraged to support each other and collaborate
for shared purposes. To ensure the guidance role of the State, the Vietnamese government
can intervene in the market for development purposes. Allowing the State’s intervention
in the market sphere, Vietnam does not aim to develop a pure capitalist market, but a
guided market economy consistent with socialist values. As a State centered model of
governance, the State in which the CPV is a core institution plays a dominant role in
organizing and managing Vietnam’s economy and society (Huang, 2009; London, 2014).
2

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Vietnam was one of the poorest countries in the
world (Phong, 2009; WB and MPI, 2016). Agriculture dominated the economy with
around 90 percent of the population living in rural areas and a relatively small proportion
of the labor force working in the industrial sector owned by the State. The economy of
Vietnam in the 1980s was heavily dependent on foreign aid; annual inflation rate was
more than 400 percent, food was in short supply, and a majority of Vietnamese
population were living in poverty. In 1986, the Vietnamese government launched
economic reform (referred to as Doi Moi Policy in Vietnamese) - a transitioning process
from a centrally planned to a more market-oriented economy.Shifting to a market
economy has become a driving force for Vietnam’s development in the last decades: the
nation’s GDP growth has been among the fastest in the world, accompanied by major
gains in human development. Rapid industrialization and urban expansion also offered
rural laborers with new job opportunities and higher incomes. The number of people
living below poverty line declined dramatically: poverty rate was reduced from 58% in
1993 to 14.5% in 2008. Urban population doubly increased from 14 million in 1991 to 30
million in 2014 and more than half of the nation’s GDP came from urban areas (WellDang, 2013; WB and MPI, 2016).
In modern time of Vietnam, land access is not only a driving force for political
movements but also a central concern of the government. According to Toan and Quang
(2014: 280-285), until mid-nineteenth century, before colonial occupation of French,
Vietnam was an underdeveloped nation with an agriculture-based economy. Land was
owned by the emperor who granted land to villages for State purposes. Village authorities
then allocated land to households living within the village. From late nineteenth century,
3

colonial French introduced a Torrens title registration system that recognized
individualized, private property rights (Wiegersma, 1988). However, only a small number
of elites (large landlords) connected to the French bureaucratic structure benefited from
the Western right-based land tenure system. Most Vietnamese people remained outside
the modern statutory rights-based land regime. Socio-political conflicts over land issues
were not only because of unequal access to land but also were related to differences
between modern land administration and traditional perceptions regarding land
ownership (Toan and Quang, 2014: 281). From its early days of establishment in the
1930s, therefore, “land to the tillers” was a key political slogan used by CPV to attract
political support from the Vietnamese people. After 1945, the revolutionary government
in the North of Vietnam removed the colonial land titles and village household ownership
and adopted a social class-based system of access to land. The agrarian reform in early
1950s coercively took land from landlords and directly transferred the land to tenants.
Between 1954 and 1975, the Democratic Republic Government in the North nationalized
most types of land and put land under the State’s absolute control through agricultural
cooperatives. In the South, the Republic Government of Vietnam still employed the
French rights-based system that respected and protected private property rights. After the
nation’s re-unification in 1975, the 1980 Constitution formally abolished private land
ownership in Vietnam. Since then, under the ruling of the CPV, Vietnam’s Constitution
and Land Laws in 1987, 1992, 2003, and 2013 consistently asserted the public ownership
based land regime: land is a public property owned by the Vietnamese people and the
“State” is the representative of the people’s ownership over land (alternatively referred as
the public ownership or State ownership in daily language). Individual citizens,
4

households, and organizations are land users only with land use rights assigned by the
State (Hare, 2008; Pincus, 2012).
Reforms of the land tenure system that was characterized by “de-collectivization”
and “privatization of land rights” began with the CPV’s Resolutions 100 in 1981 and
Resolution 10 in 1988. The two resolutions respectively returned land to individuals and
organizations with limited land use rights. In 1987, the security of land use rights was
ensured with the issuance of the first Land Law. The revised Laws on Land in 1993,
2003, and 2013 further improved the land use right security by addressing a wide range
of issues such as threats from administrative reallocation, lack of transferability, and short
duration of use rights (Lodhi, 2004; Deininger and Jin, 2005; Ho and McPheson, 2010;
Wells-Dang, 2013;Toan and Quang, 2014). According toArticles 5, 6, and 7 of the 2013
Law on land, land use rights in Vietnam currently are divided into three categories:
ownership rights that belong to the entire Vietnamese people; control rights remains with
the “State”; and land use rights are allocated to individuals, households, and
organizations for a certain period of time depending on types of land. Vietnamese people,
households, and organizations have five fundamental land use rights, including:
inheritance, exchange, transfer, lease, and mortgage of land use rights. In such a land
regime, “land-takings” (alternatively, land appropriation, land conversion, land recovery
or acquisition) refer to a policy adopted by the Vietnamese government to acquire land
from landholders for economic and infrastructure development purposes. In order to take
back land use rights over a piece of land, the government has to compensate land users
for their land use rights.
5

Table 1: Evolution of Land Policy in Vietnam
Policy Documents

Year

Key Contents

● 1st Constitution

1946

● Agrarian Reform
Law
● 2nd Constitution

1953

● 3rd Constitution

1980

● Land Law

1987

● Constitution

1992

● Land Law

1993

●
Land
Law
Amendments
and
Supplementations

19982001

Private ownership right on properties of Vietnamese
people is secured.
Land Ownership was removed from landlords and
passed directly to tenants.
Article 11 recognized State Ownership, Collective
Ownership, Individual Ownership, and National
Capitalist Ownership on main materials for production,
including land. Cooperatives were encouraged.
State ownership was established as the only form of the
land ownership. Land was managed by the State; the
State had right to allocate and recover land.
Households and Individuals were issued land use rights.
The State controlled all land transactions; land had no
values; land market was not recognized.
State ownership over land. The State manage land and
allocates land to individuals, organizations, and
households.
State ownership overland; land price was defined by the
State. Households had rights to transfer, exchange,
inherit, lease, and mortgage land. The only land-taking
form was compulsory land acquisition. Economic
organizations could lease land from the State.
Domestic economic organizations could access land for
housing and infrastructure developments. Households,
individuals could transfer, lease, or contribute land as
capital to economic projects.
State ownership over land; further clarifications of
authorities and responsibilities of land management
agencies as well as rights and responsibilities of land
users. Market land price was recognized; domestic
economic organizations could lease land or be allocated
land from the State. Limits to compulsory land
conversion were set; voluntary land conversion allowed.
Foreign investors could access land for commercial
housing developments. Improvements of transparency
and dissemination of compulsory land conversion
procedures.
State ownership overland; two forms of land acquisition:
compulsory and voluntary. Land could be acquired for
economic development purposes.

● Land Law

1959

2003

● Decree 84

2007

● Constitution
● Land Law

2013
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Though land acquisitions had been occasionally conducted before the launch of
DoiMoi policy in 1986, the Vietnamese government widely enacted the land-taking
policy to meet demands of rapid industrialization and urban expansion process across the
country from the early 1990s (Buttle, 2009; Pincus, 2012). With the Law on Land of
1993, the Vietnamese government can collect land use right if the land is not being used
for intended purposes. The land appropriation (land-takings) can also take place when the
“State” needs land for public purposes such as national defense & security, national
interests, public interests, or economic development. More specifically, the 1993 Land
Law allowed compulsory land use right acquisition as the only form of land-takings.
However, the implementation of a land-taking project was very complicated because only
the State had right to conduct land acquisition; investors had to negotiate compensation
with land users, and with governments at every level, including commune, district, and
provincial governments. The implementation of land-taking policy became more flexible
after a revised Law on Land was passed in 2003. The new Land Law for the first time
allowed land developers directly negotiate with land users in order to obtain a land area.
In addition to compulsory land acquisition, the revised Land Law of 2003 also recognized
voluntary land conversion in which investors and land users can discuss and develop
mutual agreements regarding land transfer, land lease, or land contribution as capital.
These two forms of compulsory and voluntary land use right-takings remained in the
latest Land Law of 2013. Accordingly, compulsory land appropriation is carried out for
public purposes in which land users have to accept the State’s administrative decisions
while voluntary land use right acquisition in which investors and land developers can
negotiate compensations with land users in exchange of land. Though all Land Laws
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require local governments to carry out compulsory land-takings for public purposes only,
there has been a trend that involuntary land acquisitions are also widely applied with
economic development projects(Mc Pheson, 2011; World Bank, 2011a & 2012; World
Bank and MPI, 2016). In the last three decades, therefore, the implementation of such a
land-taking policy played an important role in Vietnam’s rapid economic development.
On the one hand, open and easy access to land and cheap land rent attracted investment
projects from non-State and foreign investors. The policy, on the other hand, also
generated negative consequences such as the increase of disputes and conflicts between
land users and government.
1.3. Research Problem
Land globally is not only a means of production but also a form of valuable
property (Wehrmann, 2008). In addition to economic importance, the critical role of land
also derives from its spiritual attachments and emotional connections to the people (Ho
and McPheson, 2010; Hall, 2013). In Vietnam, as a fundamental production material of
around 70% of the Vietnamese population, land currently still is a strategic natural
resource strictly controlled by the Vietnamese State (World Bank and MPI, 2016). As a
sole political party leading the nation, the CPV adopts the Marxist economic perspective,
arguing that the State’s control in fundamental economic sectors such as the land sector is
necessary to protect the people’s interests and maintain the socialist characteristic of the
nation’s socio-economic system. Being influenced by Marxist political economy, the
ruling CPV has followed a governance perspective that views people’s interests in terms
of social classes rather than individuals. In such a governance system, to harmonize
interests of different social classes (ex. Workers, Farmers, Soldiers, Businessmen, Public
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Officials), the State controls key economic sectors through public ownership and the
State’s active intervention in the economy (Huang, 2009; London, 2014).

Figure 1: Land disputes are one of Vietnam’s problems at present
(Source: economist.com)
The implementation of land-taking policy in practice, however, has resulted in
numerous disputes and conflicts between land users and local governments. According to
Lodhi (2004), from 1988 to mid-1990s, some 200,000 land related villagers sent
complaints to the government at district, provincial, and central levels. In the early 2000s,
land related confrontations became the most severe problem across the country. Around
50% of all complaints sent to the government in 2005 were about land conversion and
compensation (World Bank, 2011a: 17). The Office to Receive Citizens’ Complaints of
the Central Party Committee and the State received more than 30,000 land petitions in
2006 in which only 20% concerned boundary disputes or claims while about 70%
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involved compensation for site clearance (Gillespie, 2011). A study conducted by the
Institute for Research on Policy, Law, and Development in 2009 reported that the number
of land-taking incidents in recent years increased by 80%. In the first ten months of 2012,
over the 97% of 3,193 petitions and complaints to the government werere lated to land
issues (LocNga, 2012; cited in Wells-Dang, 2013).
Noticeably, violent clashes over land-takings between government officials and
land users have significantly increased in recent years. On April 15th, 2017, a first of its
kind of land-taking conflicts occurred in Dong Tam commune (Hanoi City) where local
villagers held 38 local government official hostage to request a dialogue with the city
Chairman. The confrontation between the land users and local government officials
reached its peak when villagers stated that they were ready to die for their land if the
government used force to free the hostages (Ives, 2017).The Dong Tam event was
preceded by a similar incident in January 2012 in Tien Lang district (Hai Phong city –
Northern Vietnam) when a fish farmer family used a homemade land mine and
improvised shotguns to resist local government’s land-taking actions (Brown, 2012). The
Vietnamese public was also aware of serious land tensions in Van Giang (Hung Yen
Province, near Hanoi) from 2006 to 2012. Long lasting disputes in Van Giang district led
to a severe violent clash between about 2000 police officers and approximately 3000 land
users in April 2012 (Labbe, 2015). Those high-profile events in Dong Tam, Van Giang,
and Tien Lang, as well as the statistics described above show that land-taking disputes
and conflicts are not only an economic problem but also a socio-political threat to
Vietnam’s social cohesion, economic development, and political stability (Brown, 2012;
The Economist, 2017).
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From a public policy perspective, the widespread incidence of long-lasting
disputes and violent conflicts is an indicator of policy noncompliance and raises the
question of policy effectiveness (e.g. policy acceptance and the achievement of valued
policy outcomes). Land-taking policy noncompliance is defined as land users’ unwilling
to accept local governments’ decisions over issues such as land price, compensation, or
acquired land area. The policy noncompliance is manifested in specific forms of disputes
and conflicts between affected land users and local governments. In theory, a policy
always aims to alter the behavior of target populations (Gofen, 2015; Birkland,2016).
Disputes and conflicts over land-takings show land users’ disagreements with the
government’s policy decisions. Evidently, the land-taking policy is not welcomed by the
target group in some particular situations, and there is no indication that this phenomenon
will end in the coming years. The fact that the land-taking policy is unable to change land
users’ behaviors (e.g. they do not act as expected by policy makers and implementers)
shows a policy failure (Birkland, 2016: 345). In this case, the land-taking policy does not
fail in achieving its goals of land collection; it fails because of unintended consequences
such as long-lasting land users-government confrontations and tensions.
According to policy researchers, noncompliance among target groups is often
described as a problem of policy implementation and enforcement (Mazmanian and
Sabatier, 1989; Gofen, 2015). Policy implementation is what develops between the
government’s intention and the ultimate impact in the world of action - the process by
which policies enacted by government are put into effect by relevant agencies (O’Toole,
2000; Birkland, 2016: 332). When a policy gets implemented, a variety of interests and
desires are clearly manifested. Interest conflicts that have not been solved during the
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stages of policy formulation, design, and adoption might emerge again. As a complex
political process, policy implementation involves various actors and stakeholders. A
world of multi-institutional actors – more than one government, agency, or sector requires cooperation and coordination for implementation success” (O’Toole, 2000; Hill
and Hupe, 2002). Even a “good policy design’, therefore, does not ensure a policy
target’s compliance. The ways local governments execute and enforce public polices in
practice also play a critical role. In other words, the success of a policy not only requires
“good policy design” but also “good policy implementation”. Conversely, implementers
might still obtain expected outcomes with a poorly formulated policy if they carefully
and rightfully manage policy implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Brinkerhoff
and Crosby, 2002; Salomon, 2002; Anderson, 2015; Sandfort and Moulton, 2015).
Land-taking policy practices and literature suggest a research problem: why don’t
land users comply with land-taking policy? And how do local governments respond to
policy noncompliance to minimize public risks? In order to explore the research problem,
this dissertation is interested in potential linkage between policy tools and noncompliance
over land-takings. The researcher starts with a theoretical assumption: public policy
failures might relate to types, uses, advantages, problems, and trade-offs among the range
of policy tools. Policy effectiveness not only depends on the way policy tools are
combined in a policy mix but also is affected by how those tools are applied in particular
situation. Even if right tools are chosen, they can be as problematic as using them in
wrong ways (Cooper, 2018: vii). Therefore, this study proposes that actions of local
governments, including tools choice and use, in the “land-taking policy implementation
stage” might contribute to land users’ noncompliant attitudes and behaviors. This major
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research proposition directs the researcher’s attentions to policy tools used by local
government officials to interact with affected land users as policy target group.
1.4. Research Purposes
The general purpose of this study is to explore potential linkage between landtaking policy implementation tools and land users’ noncompliance. Specifically, to
achieve the main purpose above, this study will conduct three main tasks:
■ Examining land-taking policy implementation: In order to deal with policy
failure, argued by policy experts, it is necessary to consider issues related to the entire
policy process: policy formulation, design, and policy implementation (Hill and Hupe,
2002 & 2009). This means that manifestations of policy failure such as policy
noncompliance can

relate to

various

elements

of policy-making or

policy

implementation, or both stages. Policy professionals, therefore, also share a consensus
that learning from policy failure occurring in the implementation stage is one of the
strategies to secure policy success (May, 1992; Birkland, 2016). As pointed out by May
(1992), policy learning can take place in three forms: instrumental learning, social
learning, and political learning. The viability of policy interventions and implementation
design can be improved through instrumental learning – a learning form that focuses on
implementation tools and techniques. This dissertation research, thus, is motivated by
concerns about government’s actions, relationships, and dynamic interactions between
government agencies and target groups during the policy implementation process. It is
particularly interested in how local governments interact with non-state actors to
implement land-taking projects. The focus on the stage of policy implementation allows
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the researcher to examine coordinating mechanisms, methods, devices, or tools used by
government to achieve policy goals.
■ Exploring the role of policy tools: This dissertation secondly will explore if
implementation tools used by local government officials relate to land users’
noncompliance. Empirical studies show that policy noncompliance often arises as a result
of long-lasting and unsolved disagreements between parties. To ensure effective
implementation, policy implementers are required to accommodate views and preferences
of different participants and harmonize conflicting interests (Mint, 2012: 287). This
requirement not only places policy implementers in front of economic-political concerns
but also challenge them in terms of technical issues of tool choice and use. This is
because, theoretically, government tools are defined as devices for interactions between
policy implementers and policy targets. Policy tools can “cause agents or target groups to
do something they would not do otherwise or with the intention of modifying behavior to
solve public problems or attain policy goals” (Schneider and Ingram, 1997: 93). Tool
selection and use, thus, not only significantly affect relationships between the two parties
but also the effectiveness of policy implementation. Policy success (e.g. high level of
policy compliance), demands collaborative actions by multiple actors and stakeholders,
both within and outside the government sectors. An investigation of tool use in the landtaking policy implementation stage, thus, might provide additional insights regarding a
wicked-problem of noncompliance with land-taking policy.
■ Exploring alternative tool mixes: This study will also consider alternative tools
to secure land users’ compliance. Policy noncompliance not only challenges the viability
of policy goals but also reveals problems in interactions between government and target
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groups. This is because different actors evolving in policy implementation often have
their own values, beliefs, incentives, and perspectives that influence outcomes of policy
implementation. Since policy tools define a set of actors, their roles, and relationships
among them, the tool approach offers a novel approach to explain land-taking policy
noncompliance. It is important to know if land-taking problems relate to tools and if
local governments in Vietnam can reduce land-taking policy noncompliance by shifting
their tool choice and use. These concerns require an in-depth exploration of tool mix
used by government officials in their local contexts.
1.5. Research Questions
Research question: When and how do the policy tools used in the implementation
of land-taking policy in Vietnam help to explain noncompliance?
Research tasks: In order to address the research question above, the researcher
will carry out following research tasks:
(i)

Describe background history and progress of three land-taking incidents.

(ii)

Examine tool mixes used by implementers to execute land-taking projects

(iii)

Explore implementers’ tool preferences and patterns of tool use

(iv)

Describe contextual factors affecting implementers’ tool choice and use

(v)

Identify linkage between implementation tools and landholders’
noncompliance over land acquisition.

(vi)

Explore if implementers change tools in order to deal with noncompliance,
and if tool changes can increase policy effectiveness (ex. reduce land
users’ resistance and reach a settlement).
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(vii)

Make

tool-based

recommendations

to

minimize

landholders’

noncompliance in land-taking policy implementation.
1.6. Significance of the Research
Since land still plays a role in livelihoods of around 70% of the Vietnamese
population, socio-political tensions resulting from land-taking policy noncompliance are
critical challenges for CPV as the sole ruling party (Brown, 2013; Yves, 2017; The
Economist, 2017). The study of land users’ noncompliance regarding land-taking policy
implementation, thus, is especially significant to both the CPV and the Vietnamese
government. The tool approach adopted in this study will offer an additional explanation
of land users’ policy resistance manifested in land-taking disputes and conflicts. Research
findings will, therefore, increase CPV leaders’ understanding about land-taking problems,
suggest new initiatives, and enable them to make more informed policy decisions within
the current context of Vietnam. The tool approach will also bring policy makers and
implementers at the central level new insights about land-taking policy noncompliance,
suggest alternatives in re-designing rules and procedures for more effective policy
implementation. Increased compliance among land-taking policy target groups will not
only improve the effectiveness of government administration but also strengthen the
legitimacy of CPV as the nation’s leading party.
This study is also critical to local policy implementers who are directly
responsible for land-taking policy implementation at the provincial, district, and
commune levels. A tool-based study of policy noncompliance will provide an additional
in-depth description of government’s failure in changing land users’ behaviors.
Recommendations generated from this study will be helpful to local governments in
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managing the policy implementation process and improving policy effectiveness.
Specifically, research results might be helpful in enhancing implementers’ awareness of
stakeholder network and their roles, and how to discover new ways of tool use for more
effective collaboration between the government’s agencies and non-state actors. Local
policy implementers will also be guided how to properly use policy tools to legitimate
their actions and convince land users in land-taking policy enforcement. Local
government agencies in the land sector will also gain information about what needs to be
improved regarding tool choice and applications; land officials will learn how to better
mix implementation tools in order to minimize policy noncompliance. Overall, the toolbased research approach might be helpful to local policy implementers by providing an
in-depth description of strengths and weaknesses of available implementation tools, the
relationships between tool choice, tool use, and policy compliance/noncompliance; and
how to effectively mix and apply tools in order to reduce policy noncompliance within
the local context.
This dissertation research is helpful for Vietnamese policy professionals and
academic researchers who are interested in wicked problems such as land-taking policy
noncompliance. Instead of looking at land-taking problems from traditional lens (ex.
institutional, economic, or democratic governance), policy researchers can learn a new
research pathway – the new public governance perspective as a new research philosophy,
and the tool-based theoretical framework within it that is still new to Vietnamese
academic community. As a valued centered perspective, the NPG can motivate
researchers to develop new theories on the role of policy tools and seek new ways of tool
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use relevant with Vietnam’s local contexts in order to enhance policy legitimacy and
facilitate collaborative responses from policy target groups and other non-state actors.
1.7. Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is structured into six chapters as follows:
Chapter I. Introduction: Dealing with land-taking policy problems, in addition
to advocacy for a reduction in the State’s control over the land sector, there has been a
support for a bigger role of market forces and improvements of land legislation (Pincus,
2012; World Bank, 2009 &2012; Bell, 2014). Academic literature, however, suggests that
government’s capacity in governance and policy implementation do matter. Policy
compliance cannot be achieved if action aspects of policy implementation are ignored
(Mc Pheson, 2011; Pincus, 2012; World Bank, 2011a & 2012; World Bank and MPI,
2016). Chapter I, therefore, provides a background of this dissertation study: the chapter
first overviews Vietnam’s current context, reviews the evolution of land policy in general
and land-taking policy in particular, and clarifies the research problem of land-taking
policy noncompliance. These sections are followed by the presentation of research
questions, research purposes, and research tasks that will be targeted within this study.
Chapter I also justifies the need of this study by discussing how CPV, government
leaders and officials at every level, professionals and academic researchers in Vietnam
can benefit from research results. This introductory chapter, finally, is completed with a
brief overview of the dissertation structure.
Chapter II. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework: The main purpose
of chapter 2 is to critically review land-taking policy literature, analyze research gaps,
and develop a theoretical framework used to explore potential relationship between
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policy tools and land users’ policy noncompliance. In the first section, the author
conceptualizes the key term of “policy noncompliance” and develops a typology of landtaking noncompliant manifestations relevant to Vietnam’s context. This is followed by a
critical review of three influential theoretical approaches in explaining noncompliance
over land-takings: institutional, economic, and good governance explanations. Policy
noncompliance (ex. low level of policy acceptance) might relate to a variety of factors
and, thus, can be explored using different theoretical lens. With a focus on government in
actions, the third section clarifies the research gap that this dissertation fills in: whether
tool choice and application in the policy implementation stage affects land users’ noncompliance. Next, the author develops a tool based theoretical framework used in this
dissertation study. This section provides a definition of policy tools and categories of
tools as means or methods to realize policy goals. It argues that noncompliance in landtaking policy implementation in Vietnam is conventionally studied using a top-down
approach that pays too much attention to institutions, rules, procedures and the capacity
of local governments. Similarly, the good governance perspective that requires
participatory institutions is not really realistic if we consider current context of Vietnam.
As an alternative approach to noncompliance with land acquisition - the tools approach
focuses on the role of local governments intaking actions and interactions with nongovernment actors rather than the quality of policy design or the capacity of local
government.
Chapter III. Research Design and Methods: The fact that qualitative research
design is rarely used in part explains a limited understanding of land-taking policy
noncompliance. Chapter III, thus, first aims to justify the use of “qualitative case study”
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as this dissertation’s research strategy and design. The chapter then is organized into
three main parts: (i) Research Design; (ii) Data Collection; and (iii) Data Analysis and
Representation. Unit of analysis and case selection are the most fundamental elements of
a qualitative research design. In this study, land-taking instances were chosen as the “unit
of analysis”. The research population, therefore, consisted of all on-going land-taking
projects. However, since this study focused on policy noncompliance, the researcher
excluded land-taking instance without resistance. This means that only land-taking
incidents in which land users did not comply with local governments’ policy decisions
were considered for case selection. Research participants included local leaders, land
officials, and land users who were directly involved in land-taking policy
implementation. Regarding data collection, the author mainly relied on online sources
such

as

government

and

non-government

organizations’

websites,

online

newspapers…for gathering secondary data. Primary data collection was carried out in
rapidly urbanizing provinces in the North of Vietnam (VinhPhuc and BacNinh) where
large areas of farmland were converted for industrial development and urban expansion.
This dissertation’s data are in forms of documentation, video clip, field notes, and
transcripts. The main methods of data collection included focus group, in-depth
interview, field observation, web-search, and document analysis. Qualitative data were
analyzed using techniques such as coding, content and thematic analysis. Research results
were organized and presented in themes associated with the research questions.
Chapter IV: Description of the Cases. Chapter iv presents a description of the
selected land-taking projects that local government had to deal with noncompliance.
Three land-taking incidents took place in Thu Thiem in the HCMC area; in Tu Son
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district (Bac Ninh province); and in Dong Tam commune (Hanoi capital city).
Governments in HCMC and Bac Ninh acquired land for economic development and
public infrastructure. Land acquisition in Dong Tam, whereas, was for defense purpose.
The key details related to each of the incident include the location and local context,
starting time and time length, acquired land area, land-taking purposes, number of
affected people, number of noncompliant landholders, the evolution and intensity of
noncompliance, the government’s responses to noncompliance and the consequences.
Facts provided in this background chapter not only help to draw a picture about the
specific noncompliance but also further clarify why economic, institutional, and good
governance factors are insufficient to explain the selected incidents. A detailed
description of incidents also helps to reveal the research opportunity for the policy tool
approach that is expected to generate new insights about landholders’ noncompliance.
Chapter V: Noncompliance with Land Acquisition: A Tool focused Analysis.
Chapter v presents a cross case analysis of three land acquisition incidents. Data used for
analysis includes two types: (i) primary data collected by the researcher in Bac Ninh (and
Vinh Phuc) provinces and (ii) secondary data published by other authors and agencies.
Instead of analyzing single land-taking project, the researcher conducted a theme-based
analysis that covered similarities and variations emerged from three cases. Qualitative
research results revealed similar tool mixes used by local implementers in Hanoi, HCMC,
and Bac Ninh to acquire land. The tool mix included a direct government organization
(BCGC), authoritative tools (most importantly, executive order and land price
regulations), information-based tools (e.g. proclamation, public poster, moral suasion,
public dialogue, information portal) and three financial or financial equivalent tools of
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cash, land, and resettlement apartment. A shared feature across three incidents was that
authoritative tools and information-based tools played a decisive role in land acquisition.
The role of three financial or financial-equivalent tools in land-takings was limited.
Authority-intensive tool mixes enabled implementation effectiveness and efficiency but
limited responsiveness and legitimacy. Dealing with policy noncompliance, “executive
order”, “propaganda”, and “moral suasion” were the three tools commonly used by
implementers. Another shared pattern of three incidents is that after information-based
tools failed in persuading landholders, the government was willing to coercively take
land using executive orders and government agencies.
Chapter VI: Conclusions and Implications. In this chapter, the researcher
clarifies linkages between implementation tools and noncompliance with land
acquisition. Research findings are discussed in relation with available literature. The
researcher argues that tools do contribute to landholders’ noncompliance. This is because
available tools used in acquiring land allow coercive land acquisition once implementers
face resistance. Tool preferences over direct government organizations, authoritative
tools, and information-based tools define a one-way relationship between policy
implementers and affected landholders who have no choice except receiving
compensation and giving up their land. Coercion, instrumentality, and routinization are
three prominent features of Vietnamese implementers’ tool choice and use.

These

characteristics ensure implementation effectiveness and efficiency but are not necessarily
associated with responsiveness and legitimacy of government’s actions. This, from a tool
perspective, explains why and how government’s actions contribute to noncompliance
with land acquisition in Vietnam. Based on research results, the researcher suggests
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implications and recommendations for policy makers, policy implementers, professionals
and academic researchers who are interested in tools approach to public policy problems.
1.8. Summary of the Chapter
As a developing country, land is not only a valued commodity but also is a special
asset and an important means of production. Historical evolutions of Vietnam in the 20th
century shows that any change in the land policy sector might have profound effects on
the nation’s economy and society. After the Vietnam War, land policy reforms starting in
early 1980s resulted in the privatization of land use rights. Vietnamese people currently
have five land use rights while the land ownership is controlled by the State. Over the last
two decades, land-taking policy have been widely implemented across the country to
meet demands of economic development and urban expansion. Easy access to land use,
on the one hand, attract numerous investors who play vital role for economic growth. On
the other hand, Vietnam’s economic development and socio-political stability are also
challenged by unexpected outcomes of the land-taking policy implementation: policy
target’s noncompliance manifested in the increase of disputes and conflicts between land
users and the government. This reality raises the research problem: why land users do not
comply with land-takings?
Although land-taking problems have attracted attentions from public officials,
professionals, and academic researchers, most up to date studies on the topic were
conducted from social science perspectives such as sociology, economics, and legal
studies. Studies based on a public policy approach are still very limited. This reality
motivates an exploratory dissertation research adopting policy tool lens. The main
research question is if policy tools relate to land users’ noncompliant behaviors?
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Accordingly, land-taking disputes and conflicts are viewed as manifestations of policy
noncompliance that often takes place between land users and local governments in policy
implementation stage. The policy tool approach places an emphasis on interactions and
relationships between policy implementers and policy target groups. Based on a
qualitative case study, the researcher will explore tool choice and use in local contexts,
and how policy tools might relate to land users’ noncompliant behaviors. While research
results will first serve as a start for future studies, policy makers at the central level of
government might benefit from policy implications, and local policy implementers might
be guided to effectively reform policy implementation.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK

“A key attraction of the tools approach is that it can simplify
this complex concept (public policy), making more tangible the
abstract idea of policy….It encapsulates the idea that there are
choices to be made, and that the selection of instruments can
make policy-making better, or more efficient, or socially optimal
in some way” (Margetts and Hood, 2016: 133)

2.1. Introduction
The rise of long-lasting disputes and violent conflicts between land users and
local governments over land-takings in Vietnam reveals unexpected policy outcomes. As
manifestations of policy noncompliance, land-taking disputes and conflicts vary in terms
of scope and intensity and might be closely associated with local particular conditions.
What causes noncompliance with land-taking policy and how to increase policy
acceptance among land users have become the two main general questions attracting
public concern and the interest of policy makers, implementers, professionals, and
academic researchers in Vietnam. The purpose of this literature review chapter is to
provide an overview of what has been studied, what is still unclear, and what is studied in
this dissertation.
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This chapter consists of three main parts: (i) reviewing land-taking policy
literature, (ii) analyzing the research gap, and (iii) elaborating a theoretical framework to
guide the research. Specifically, the main task of the first section is to define the concept
of policy noncompliance and develop a typology of land-taking noncompliant
manifestations relevant with Vietnam’s context. It will then conduct a critical review of
institutional, economic, and democratic governance explanations as the most three
influential theoretical approaches to explaining land-taking policy problems in Vietnam.
The next section of chapter II will argue that recommended reforms of land legislation
and economic interests are insufficient to deal with land-taking policy problems while
reform initiatives towards a democratic governance are impractical in Vietnam’s current
institutional context. Seeking an additional theory of land-taking policy problems, the
final section describes a theoretical framework of policy tools that will be used to explore
how implementation tools might affect land users’ noncompliant attitudes and behaviors.
2.2. Noncompliance with Land Acquisition in Vietnam
2.2.1. Policy noncompliance
When a government responds in a preferred way to a public problem, we refer to
that response as a public policy. A public policy, theoretically, is defined as “a purposive
course of action or inaction followed by an actor or a set of actors in dealing with a
problem or matter of concern” (Anderson, 2011: 7). The government issues what it
intends to do (public policy) in forms of laws, regulations, statutes or a constitution to
alter target groups’ behaviors and promote a consistency of actions in response to specific
conditions (Mintz, 2012; Birkland, 2016). Policy target groups are populations whose
behavior is expected or intended to be changed by government action (Howlett, Ramesh,
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and Perl, 2009: 163). Target groups of policy might be domestic or international (Doods,
2013); individuals such as public officials, bureaucrats, and citizens; or organizations
such as private firms and public agencies, and even countries or states (Fen, 20014). The
success of a public policy, therefore, requires compliance with the policy intent among
target groups. A high level of compliance indicates the target’s acceptance of the goals
and objectives of the policy and they respond as intended by policy makers. In other
words, policy compliance shows that the government’s policy has effectively changed the
target group’s behavior.
In contrast, noncompliance by the target population raises the question of public
policy effectiveness (e.g. the government’s failure to alter a particular the target groups’
behavior). According to Fen (2014), policy noncompliance refers to target behavior that
is inconsistent with a given policy’s goals and objectives. Noncompliance might be direct
(e.g. breaking the law), indirect (e.g. not to follow recommendations), active (e.g. doing
something different than what is expected by a policy), or passive (e.g. refusing universal
services). Noncompliant responses indicate that policy targets are willing to act in
opposition to policy expectations. Noncompliance, thus, not only reflects target groups’
disagreements with the government but also reveals an inconsistency between policy
objectives and target group behavior (Cialdini and Goldstain, 2004).
Based on the conceptualization above, land-taking policy noncompliance in
Vietnam broadly refers to non-collaborative responses from land users who are the policy
targets affected by the implementation of land-taking projects. Noncompliance with landtaking policy, more specifically, is defined as situational tensions and confrontations
between local governments and land users in which land users act in opposition to policy
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implementers’ intent and expectations. Disputes and conflicts between the two parties can
take place prior and during, or even after a land-taking project. Controversies might be
related to various issues such as acquired land areas, land prices, land valuation methods,
compensation offers, or all of those matters in combination. Because of unsolved
disagreements, land users do not accept land-taking policy decisions; government thus
cannot acquire a piece of land as scheduled. This results in tensions and delays in the
implementation of land-taking projects. Manifestations of land users’ noncompliance
vary, depending on the intensity of confrontations, and can range from resistant attitudes
to peaceful demonstrations and violent acts. An intensity based-typology of land-taking
policy noncompliance in the following section will present common types of
noncompliant manifestations with land-taking policy in Vietnam’s context.
2.2.2. Noncompliant manifestations with land acquisition
Since land related problems are a complex phenomenon in the developing world,
no single typology can capture common manifestations or forms/patterns of controversies
(Warner, 1999; Boone, 2013). In actuality, problems over land policy can be classified on
the basis of various dimensions such as causal factors or parties involved, at either macro
or micro levels (Wehrman, 2008); land regime, social level and dimensions, or land
control forms (Boone, 2013; Hall, 2013).Available typologies of land problems, however,
do not cover the unique characteristics, scope, and intensity of controversies that mainly
occur between a public institution (government) and land users (policy target group)
regarding land-takings in Vietnam. This dissertation, therefore, develops an intensitybased typology of policy noncompliance to identify and classify different manifestations
relevant to Vietnam’s context. Accordingly, in addition to various forms of everyday
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resistance, manifestations of land-taking policy noncompliance are classified into three
main groups: at the lowest level are administrative land claims and petitions, followed by
peaceful land protests, demonstrations, and occupations. Violent conflicts over landtakings are the most severe form of policy noncompliance.

Violent
Conflict
Protest/Occupation/
Demonstration

Claims and Petitions

Daily Forms of Resistance

Figure 2: Intensity Based Typology of Noncompliant Manifestations
(i) Everyday forms of resistance: this form of noncompliance refers to any
(intended or situational) actions enacted by individual land users aiming to individual
government officials who get involved in land-taking projects (ex. Window breaking,
individual threatening, and individual grievance).
(ii) Land-taking claims and petitions: land claims and petitions occur when land
holders disagree with local governments’ intents and decisions regarding particular landtaking projects. They, thus, send requests to State agencies such as courts or local
governments for reconsideration of goals, rules, or procedures. If tensions last long and
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affect the progress of land-taking project implementation, a trial is required in which the
dispute is resolved by courts.
(iii) Land-taking protests/occupations/demonstrations: when land holders still
disagree with decisions made by local governments or courts over land-takings, they can
collectively organize peaceful demonstrations/protests or land occupations. These
manifestations of policy noncompliance often attract many people in a collective action,
last long, but still manifest a peaceful attitude.
(iv) Violent conflicts over land-takings: this is the most serious/negative form of
land-taking policy noncompliance. Involved parties rely on physical force and violent
acts to show the intensity of their disagreement with a policy in attempt. A violent landtaking clash occurs when land users violently resist the government’s coercive actions to
protect their land related interests.
2.3. Theoretical Explanations of Noncompliance with Land Acquisition
Acritical review of available land-taking policy literature reveals the dominance
of institutional and economic explanations while governance and public policy
implementation approaches plays a less influential role. This not only explains
researchers’ preferences of analysis of land legislation and large-n quantitative surveys
but also shows that process aspects of policy implementation and their potential linkages
to noncompliance over land-takings have largely been neglected.
2.3.1. Institutional approach
Institutional theory always is one of the most influential theoretical approaches in
studying policy problems (Ostrom, 2007; Anderson, 2014). According to Ostrom (2007:
37), institutions are shared concepts and they are manifested in both written and
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unwritten forms. Those shared concepts are “used by humans in repetitive situations
organized by rules, norms, and strategies”. Some scholars such as Ho (2005: 2) use the
term “institution” with a narrower meaning, referring to “institutional arrangements
embodied in promulgated policies, formal laws, and customary rules, and the state
administration”. Scott (2014: 58-59) points out three vital elements of institutions,
including regulative systems, normative systems, and cultural-cognitive systems. The role
of institutions is not only to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behaviours
but also to support and empower activities and actors.
Institutional settings of the land sector refer to a wide array of issues such as the
role of the State, the market, and the private sector, but “the way in which property rights
and land use arrangements are structured and managed are widely accepted as being of
the utmost importance” (Markussen, Tarp, and Van De Broeck, 2011). To explain land
policy problems, institutional analysts are primarily concerned with the role of a nation’s
land regime and land tenure system (Ho, 2005; Lipton, 2009; Ingram and Hong, 2009).
While “land regime” is used to describe two types of land ownership (e.g. public and
private), the concept of “land tenure system” is more complicated, referring to “the terms
and conditions on which land is held, used and transacted, within a particular system of
rights and institutions that govern access to and use of land” (Ellickson, 1993; Reale and
Handmer, 2011). A land tenure system defines legal or customary relationships among
people, either individuals or groups, with respect to land: “who can use what resources
for how long and under what condition” (FAO-UN, 2012: 7). Overall, the primary
concerns of the institutional approach to land-taking challenges in Vietnam are
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problematic aspects of written norms such as law, rules, legislations, and the
organizational structure responsible for land administration.
As in other developing nations, institutional ambiguities and inconsistencies of
land legislation (e.g. laws, rules, and regulations) are among the most prominent
contributors toland-taking problems in Vietnam (Vo, 2011, Ho and Mc Pherson, 2010,
Mc Pheson, 2011; World Bank, 2009, 2011a&2012, Wells-Dang, 2013). The collective
ownership over land was stated consistently in the Vietnam’s Constitutions of 1980,
1992, and 2013: all land belongs to the State. Based on a review of legal documents, the
World Bank (2011a) pointed out that the State’s absolute power over land is reasserted in
key legislation such as the Constitution and the Laws on Land. Article 53 of the
Constitution 1992 that is clarified by Article 4 of the Law on Land 2003, stated that the
State is the representative of the people’s ownership over land and the State manages land
on behalf of the people who have land use rights only. As the sole representative of land
ownership, the Vietnamese State has rights to determine land use purposes, land use limit
and period, land allocation to land users (individuals, households, or organizations), and
land conversion for development purposes. The term “people’s ownership”, however,
does not define specifically who is a “real owner” over a particular area of land. No
guidance in the Constitution and land legislations specifies how land is managed. No
specific State agency is assigned to manage land ownership. One is also unable to find
instructions on who (and under what conditions) can have access to land. In addition,
land legislation also does not clarify the State as a representative of the people’s
ownership and the State as an institution having control rights over land. As commented
by Mac Pheson (2011), there is no “explicit guidance over who has to do what, when,
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where, with whom, for whom, how, and over what period to allocate and use land
efficiently, equitably, and sustainably”.
Consequently, as pointed out by Lodhi (2004), Ho and McPherson (2010), and
Wells-Dang (2013), while the State is the most powerful actor determining every land
issue, flaws in land legislation provide various opportunities for government officials to
interpret legal requirements and determine land planning in the ways they want. Land
officials can determine what legal requirements mean and how they are applied. Land
management is largely subject to interpretations and regular amendments under particular
conditions. The unclear definition of the land regime (people’s ownership) makes land
access in Vietnam a highly politicized process that government officials can take
advantages for economic gain and political influence. Although land acquisition is
supposed to follow land use planning, what happens in practice is that both central and
local authorities are able to take land whenever they need it. No clear legislation can
monitor or prosecute State agencies when disputes and conflicts occur. This reality made
argument for a clarification of the role of the State in land administration a main topic in
policy debates before mid-2013 in Vietnam (when the revisions of Land Law were
approved by the National Assembly). Public debates at that time focused on two key
topics: (i) the scope of a land users’ right to exploit a piece of land, and (ii) how and
when the State might take the land for other purposes (Brown, 2013).
Another institutional dimension of the trend in the rise of noncompliance relates
to land pricing mechanisms and land valuation methods (Suu, 2009; World Bank,
2009&2011a). Under the CPV’s rule, for most of the second half of the 20th century,
pursuing a centralized and planned economy, the Vietnamese government did not
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recognize land as a valuable good; landholders were not allowed to trade land. They
instead were just able to trade assets on land. After nearly three decades of the transition
towards a market economy, private ownership over land is still not recognized. Vietnam’s
Land Laws currently still use the terms: land users (not land owners), price for land use
rights (not price for land). Though the Law on Land of 1993 recognized land price, the
price system annually issued by the State does not reflect land value on the land use
rights market. Although the Law on Land of 1993 also recognized land use right
certificates, Vietnamese people cannot freely trade those rights in an official market. This
is because there is no private ownership over land, and an official free land market also
does not exist (Butler, 2009; World Bank, 2011a). In such a land regime system, methods
and principles of land pricing and valuation are solely determined by the State: local
governments are allowed to develop their own land price and valuation system based on a
general land price framework issued every five years by the central government.
Provincial People’s Councils then issue specific land price systems used for
compensation in each province. Land prices are calculated on the basis of profitability in
cases of agricultural land or by comparing the practical land transfer price for nonagricultural land (Land Law 2013). All these characteristics lead to a perception of
unfairness in land value and pricing calculations. This is because the existing land pricing
and valuation methods result in a big gap between land prices offered by local
governments and the real value of land on the land use right market. Studies conducted
by Ho and McPherson (2010); World Bank (2009; 2011a; 2012); De Wit et al(2012)
show that, even though the 1992 Constitution and the Laws on Land of 1998 and 2003
required local governments to develop land prices in line with market prices, land prices
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offered by local governments were always around 20 – 40% of market prices. According
to the World Bank (2009 & 2011a), the main cause of long-lasting disputes and conflicts
over land-takings is that Vietnam’s current land legislation, lacks proper measures to
value and determine land price. As a consequence, both local governments and affected
people cannot find any concrete guidance or objective standards for land valuation and
pricing. Furthermore, despite its legality, there are no specific regulations on mandatory
land valuation services. Land pricing and valuation, therefore, are totally determined by
government agencies in charge of the implementation of land-takings, compensation,
support, and resettlement.
In terms of organizational structure, Vietnam’s land administration system has
been criticized for its lack of capacity that results in poor policy implementation. The
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment currently is the sole government agency
responsible for land administration in Vietnam. The land administration system consists
of four levels associated with four levels of government: central, provincial, district, and
commune. According to Land Law of 1993 that started the decentralization process in the
land sector, the central government manages land for large investment projects using
more than 1 ha. Most decisions on land management belong to provincial and district
levels. The Land Law of 2003 further decentralized the land administration system:
government at the provincial level can issue land use right certificates for organizations,
religious bodies, and foreign investors while the district level of government has
authority to issue these for individuals, households, and communities. Ho and Mc Pheson
(2010) and World Bank (2012), however, argue that such a single department of land
administration does not have enough capacity (ex. staff, budget, and authority) and
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influence to work effectively with varieties of actors in the land sector. In reality, land
use planning is largely an internal government exercise characterized by unclear
relationships between sectoral agencies. There is limited integration and coordination
across governmental bodies. Structural problems of the land administration system not
only make the efficient, equitable, and sustainable management of land resources
impossible but also result in conflicts among different land use plans. The limited
capacity of the land administration system is more evident inthe fragmentation of the land
information management, inconsistency in records, and the insufficient capacity of
district governments in policy implementation. Such a fragmented institutional system of
land administration is not efficient in the current context as the development of
information and communication technologies offers more useful tools for land
management. While having much power in land management, the insufficient capacity of
the district level leads to poor policy implementation that is closely linked to land user
grievances and noncompliant attitudes.
In addition to problems associated with the land administration system, the
organizational model of land-taking board also matters (World Bank, 2009; De Witt,
2012&2013). Under provisions of the Land Law 2003, there are two types of Units for
Land Compensation and Clearance. If the Land Development Organization (LDO) is a
permanent organization established by the Provincial People’s Committee, the Board of
Compensation, Support, and Resettlement (BCSR) is temporarily established by the
District People’s Committee. As a public agency, activities of LDO do not confront landtaking noncompliance because LDO does not convert land for any approved investment
project. Instead, it only transfers contents of land use planning to the market based on
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principles of benefit sharing between land users, investors, and the State. In contrast,
land-takings conducted by BCSR confront a high possibility of policy noncompliance
because BCSR’s activities follow administrative regulations that do not fully respect the
market mechanism. BCSR is always headed by a district government leader and consists
of officials from several district departments, representatives of investors, residential
community, and affected land users. Converting land for approved investment projects,
BCSRs are responsible for the entire land acquisition process, from land valuation and
compensation to support and resettlement. In actuality, as assessed by the World Bank
(2009), such an organizational model cannot ensure the objectivity and the fairness of
land valuation and compensation. This was evident in the World Bank’s 2011a report
that, although land valuation services provided by independent organizations are
recognized by the Decree No. 17/2006/ND-CP, local governments are not required to use
land price frameworks developed independently by those organizations.
As commented by Buttler (2009), Vietnam’s institutional conditions in the land
sector permits the State agencies to exercise absolute power over land issues while
undermining the role of the market and non-State actors. Such an institutional context
creates openings for the abuse of compulsory land conversion. As representatives of the
State, local governments can rely on administrative decisions to appropriate land for
socio-economic development projects. In other words, the general purpose of local
economic development can be used as a reason to justify for non-voluntary land recovery
plans. This results in an increasing trend in which compulsory land-takings are applied
for commercial projects often with unclear public benefits while investors and businessgovernment alliances are groups that are most benefited from coercive land acquisitions.
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This reality explains why nearly all cases of land-taking dispute and conflict between
government and land users are related to investment projects generating commercial
benefits while non-commercial cases are negligible (World Bank, 2011a: 46-48).
2.3.2. Economic approach
The economic perspective in general views individuals as interest-maximizers
whose behavior is motivated by “material self-interests”; their decisions are determined
by economic rationality (Arrow, 1958; Sabatier, 2014). According to the economic
approach, all policy actors and stakeholders are economically rational because they are
people who are “egoistic, rational, utility maximizers” (Mueller, 1976: 395). In particular
situations, both official and unofficial policy actors often weigh the costs and benefits
among different options as well as their likely outcomes. In order to make a decision,
economic rational actors will establish an order of preferences and select the option
(s)that maximize interests (Ostrom, 2007: 30). Therefore, seen from an economic lens,
profit maximization is the key motivation for land users’ noncompliance with land-taking
policy decisions. Adversaries involved in land-taking disputes and conflicts pursue and
protect their economic interests. Accordingly, manifestations of policy noncompliance
such as disputes and conflicts over land-takings are land users’ rational responses. As an
economic rational actor, land users resist government’s land-taking decisions because
they are not satisfied with economic benefits offered by the government. Wehrmann
(2008: 21) added that the economic motivation for land actors is further facilitated by
shortcomings of the land market and the deficit of land institutions. This is because, even
in a perfect land market, market forces alone cannot lead to socially and ecologically
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optimal land use patterns. This is evident in the case of Vietnam’s land price institutions
and market.
One unique characteristic of Vietnam’s land governance is the co-existence of the
“official” land price system issued by the State’s and the “unofficial” land price system
used by landholders on the free market. According to Lodhi (2004); Butler (2009); Mac
Pheson(2011), Toan and Quang (2014), historically, the dual characteristic of the land
market began in Vietnam in the colonial period. During the colonial time, despite the
statutory rights-based property rights and title regime adopted by the French, Vietnamese
self-regulating communities still heavily relied on customary land rights mode that
recognized the land ownership based on occupation and community knowledge. Land
holders, thus, often relied on written documents for land transactions. These mutual
relationship and community pressure-based documents were then approved by local
authorities. To validate claims over land, Vietnamese people were traditionally familiar
with the use of personal connections within communities rather than legal entitlements.
This tradition was strengthened under the Communist regime in the North from 1954 and
in the South from 1975. From the early 1960s, the State became the sole actor having
authority to allocate and transfer land and housing. Although private sales and
transactions were not recognized, a self-regulatory land and housing market still existed.
In recent years, the percentage of land transactions taking place outside the State’s land
tenure system is still high: around 75% (VNCI, 2007; cited in Gillespie, 2011).
Community norms and precepts are still preferred by urban residents to deal with land
transactions; land laws play a marginal role in the lives of those people. This unique
characteristic of land price systems makes competition for land more complex: a large
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number of land-taking noncompliance is caused by the large difference between the
received compensation based on the State’s land price and the real value of land that can
be sold on the market.
From an economic perspective, acquiring land in a compulsory manner for
economic development often cause unfairness in benefit sharing between beneficiaries
(e.g. investors and local governments) and the affected people (land users). Who loses
and who wins in terms of economic gains is a key cause of land-taking policy problems
(Suu, 2009, World Bank, 2012, Bell, 2014). In developing countries like Vietnam, a large
population relies on agriculture and land related economic activities for their livelihoods.
The rapid increase in population and high demand of economic and infrastructure
development make land more valuable. Vietnam’s current land legislation allows both
compulsory and voluntary land acquisition. As stated in the Land Laws of 2003 and
2013, compulsory land acquisition is not only applied for public purposes of national
defence and security, or public interests, but is also used for economic development.
Land users have to give up all or part of their land to the government once the
government decides to carry out a land-taking project. Affected land users are primarily
concerned with how to restore and improve their livelihoods after their land is acquired.
Benefit sharing, of which economic compensation is just one form, is critical for land
users’ livelihood rehabilitation. A majority of scholars, therefore, view competition for
landed economic interests as the most critical cause of land-taking policy noncompliance
(Ho and Mc Pheson, 2010;World Bank, 2011&2012; Kim, 2011; De Wit et al, 2012).
Political aspect of land-taking problems in Vietnam is the power inequality between the
two key actors: local governments and land users. Landholders are at a disadvantages
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side in struggles over land with a powerful actor – the State represented by local
governments. Politically, the aim of the State in taking control of land is to advance
public interests but land policy practices show that landholders always are losers in the
‘competition for land” (Butler, 2009: 166). In such an unequal power structure, landtaking problems arise due to disagreements about benefit sharing.
A large literature specifically criticizes unrealistic land valuation method and low
compensation as the main cause of land users’ grievances and resistances. Suu (2009) and
World Bank (2009), for example, provided intensive reports showing that, over the last
two decades, thousands of hectares have been appropriated for purposes of urban
expansion and industrial development in Vietnam. Decisions about land valuation and
compensation, however, ignore market principles. Land users often received very low
compensation calculated by land officials based on an unrealistic land price system issued
by local governments. In addition, considering different types of land, while favouring
non-agricultural land users and public and private investors (enterprises and individuals),
Vietnam’s existing land acquisition legislation is economically unfair to farmers. Though
the value of land converted to commercial, industrial, or residential uses often increases
hundreds of times, farmers often get paid at an unbelievably low compensation (World
Bank, 2009&2011a). Butler (2009) commented that the current land pricing system
discriminates against poor land users and transfers wealth to wealthier investors and more
powerful actors. The reason is that by keeping land price low, local governments can
attract investment and prevent windfalls to land users. However, windfalls in practice can
occur in many places and current policy actually transfers windfalls that can be used as
additional compensation for land users, to investors. Such an unequal distribution of
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economic benefits induces more protests and refusals to land adjustments, relocations,
and acquisitions. In fact, unfair land prices and unrealistic compensations are often the
first reason mentioned by land users when they explain why they do not comply with
local governments’ land-taking decisions (Ho and Mc Pheson, 2010; Kim, 2011).
Landholders are typically offered two kinds of compensations: in-kind provision
of housing and cash. Both forms of compensation, however, do not meet land users’
demands: the new resettlement areas are located far from employment which make land
users unwilling to move. Further, the public sector is unable to provide enough housing
before the transition. As resettlement programs fail, compensation in cash increases. This
kind of compensation creates more disagreements between land users and government
because private investors supported by local governments often offer very low
compensation. Between 1993 and 1998, the State’s price of land was equal to 10-30% of
the land price on free market (World Bank, 2009). It recently was estimated that land
prices in urban areas still were 40 to 70% lower than the market value (TN News, 2012).
Land prices offered by the government of Hanoi Capital City are much higher than land
prices adopted in other provinces. But even in Hanoi, it is equivalent to only 50-70% of
the land value on the market (World Bank, 2009: 36). Only 10% of land users responded
that their compensation is close to market value (CECODES et al, 2012; cited in WellsDang, 2013). A survey of 600 land users conducted by the World Bank in Vietnam found
that more than 80% of affected people are dissatisfied with land-taking compensation.
Among surveyed participants, up to 38% said they cannot use the compensation to buy
other parcels of land, 28.5% reported their reduction or loss of income, and 16.3% lost
jobs (World Bank, 2011a).
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As pointed out by TriaKerkvliet (2006) and Kim (2011), while land users’ rights
are limited, the agrarian reform and de-collectivisation process from the late 1980s
allowed local governments in Vietnam the authority to approve land transfers through
which they collected fees and contributions for local services. In the view of peasants,
however, the fee collection and expenditures were not transparent because they did not
know how the fees were collected and how local governments spent them for public
services. Also, due to the lack of public finance to deal with the high rate of rural-urban
migration or infrastructure development, local governments were allowed to establish
new forms of economic relationships with private entrepreneurial firms. Accordingly,
local governments in exchange for public financing of public infrastructure approved
private land development projects. By this arrangement, both local governments and
private real estate investors benefited from current land-taking policy while the economic
losers were landholders (Kim, 2011). Though compensation offered by investors was
significantly higher than annual farming incomes, receivedpayments did not offset land
users ‘lifetime economic loses. In addition, the one-time delivery of compensation and
support in cash did not fully consider non-monetary and long-time benefits (World Bank,
2009&2011a). Another reason as described by the World Bank (2009) and Toan and
Quang (2014) is that the alliances between local governments and investors was often
biased to protect investors’ interests. The enforcement of land-taking projects was often
conducted in separate stages: land allocation for investors was not associated with
compensation, support, and resettlement. Both investors and local governments believed
that their responsibilities ended after they completed compensation, support, and
resettlement. Affected people had no option but accepted what was determined by
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government agencies (returning land at cheap price) while investors easily obtained land
with low compensation and cheap rent but then many of them left the land for unused for
several years.
Loss of income, redundancy among rural labour force, and unemployment put
economic pressures on land users (Van, 2006; Suu, 2009; De Wit, 2013). In the last three
decades, peri-urban areas in Vietnam experienced a high rate of agricultural land change
for other purposes. Some researchers such as De Wit (2013) felt that the inter-provincial
competition seemingly resulted in too many industrial parks in Vietnam. While many of
those parks were still empty or were not fully used, land dispossessions in large areas put
a high demand on non-agricultural jobs. Therefore, according to the Vietnamese
government’s Decree 17/2006/ND-CP, investors and entrepreneurs who use converted
land were required to employ some former land users. The situation in reality, however,
is far from the government’s regulations. For example, a company in Hai Duong province
employed only 48 workers while they promised to recruit 11, 000 labourers. In 2004
alone, land appropriations for the government’s programs made 63,760 farmers in
Northern Vietnam jobless (Xuan Quang, 2004; cited in Suu, 2009). Many land users
became landless people because of the government’s uncontrolled land-taking projects
(Tran Duc Vien, 2005; cited in Suu, 2009). For land plots left between industrial parks or
infrastructure developments, land users are often unable to continue farming due to the
lack of irrigation systems, pollution, or small areas. Farmers lose stable jobs, lose
incomes, and face insecure livelihoods. Overall, as pointed by the World Bank (2006&
2009), the land-taking process largely creates opportunities that benefit middle- and
upper-income groups while poor land users become economic losers due to their low
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competitiveness in new living communities. Only a few groups of people have a better
standard of living or become richer.
2.3.3. Good governance approach
From late 1990s and early 2000s, Vietnam based international organizations such
as the World Bank, the Asia Development Bank (ADB), and the United Nation
Development Program (UNDP) have advocated for “a good governance system” as a
fundamental perquisite for dealing with socio-economic problems in developing
countries. Overall, good governance is not only about the quality of government
institutions but also governments’ interactions with business and social organizations
(Enemark et al, 2009; Deininger, Selod, and Burns, 2012). Though a good governance
system is not necessarily associated with a democracy, good governance literature
suggest that a developing nation cannot meet standards of good governance without some
kinds of participatory institutions (Kjaer, 2004; FAO-UN, 2007; Chotray and Stoker,
2009; Enemark, McLaren, and Molen, 2009; World Bank, 2011b; Deininger, Selod, and
Burns, 2012; De Wit. et al, 2012; De Wit, 2013). According to the World Bank, for
example, four fundamental elements of good governance, including: civil service reform
and privatization initiatives, rule of law, accountability, and transparency, are considered
as fundamental indicators and policy conditions for development. For the Pacific Asia
region, the ADB (1995) recommended four key values of good governance:
accountability, transparency, participation, and predictability. In order to highly score
with these indicators, a nation is required to develop participatory conditions. The good
governance approach, thus, especially supports the transformation towards a democratic
land management system in developing nations. In the land sector, several ‘Land

45

Governance Frameworks” developed by World Bank, FAO, and UNDP have been used as
policy guidelines. Studies regarding land-taking policy problems in Vietnam, therefore,
often focus on key principles of good land governance such as accountability,
transparency, control of corruption, and public participation…etc. Based on quality
indicators of good governance, Vietnam’s current land governance system is described by
researchers and international observers as a “bad system” – a system that is corrupt and
willing to abuse public authority to seize land from landholders (FAO, 2007; World
Bank, 2011b; Brown, 2013).
In order to improve the quality of land governance, transparency in land
managementis among the first issues of concern for both domestic and international
researchers. A transparent governance system characterized by the availability of
information to the public and clarity about government rules, regulations, and decisions.
Transparency in government decision-making and policy implementation and
information disclosure can inhibit corruption among public officials and increase the
effectiveness of land management (ADB, 1995). According to a research conducted by
the World Bank (2012), however, provision of land related information in Vietnam still
falls short of legal requirements. There have been lots of barriers preventing land users
from full access to information over land issues. In another intensive study on
transparency in the land sector, the World Bank (2014) examined four sources of land
related information: on provincial websites, and at land offices of three levels of
government (provincial, district, and commune). Research results showed that though the
Vietnamese government made impressive progress in information disclosure, access to
land information was largely dependent on the availability and the willingness of local
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governments’ officials and leaders. The implementation of transparency rules was limited
in practice. Citizens and firms reported difficulties in finding information they need. This
study confirms land users’ common belief that local officials’ hesitation and
unwillingness to provide land related information not only causes poor transparency but
also reduces citizens’ trust in government’s land management actions (World Bank,
2009; World Bank and MIP, 2017).
Holding public institutions in the land sector accountable for their actions is
another big challenge. Vietnam’s governing system is featured by hierarchies and power
centralization (London, 2014). Such a system is based on a scientific rationality that the
central authority acts as the supreme source of power and delegates functions and tasks to
subordinates. Each level in this structure performs differentiated functional tasks, people
and sub-organizations in the lower tiers are accountable to those above them (Huang,
2009). In reality, however, State institutions in Vietnam are characterized by
fragmentation – “the lack of clear hierarchy and assignment of roles and responsibilities
both within the central government and between the central government and
provinces…Horizontal and vertical fragmentation of power has resulted in overlapping
mandates with conflicting rules and decisions (World Bank and MPI, 2017: 31). Because
of the overlapping of responsibilities among Vietnam’s land authorities, land users
sometimes do not know exactly which government agencies are responsible for their land
concerns. As a result, land users’ claims and petitions may go around local governments’
administrative agencies. Even if land petitions are transferred to local courts, private
parties such as land users cannot expect very much from courts because in such a
situation, decisions often are pushed back to government officials. Local government
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directives will be used by courts to make final decisions that can be justified as a
protection of the State benefits (Gillespie, 2014; World Bank, 2011a). In other words,
because of hierarchical accountability and unclear functions among land management
agencies, it is very often that land users are unable to find evidence and explanations for
land authorities’ decisions. There are no checks and pressures to compel the transparency,
fairness, and accountability of decisions over land. This reality accounts for a fact that
most of complaints concerned land-takings sent to government agencies remain unsolved
(Toan and Quang, 2014).
Numerous studies conducted by both Vietnamese and international researchers
and organizations such as Denmark Embassy et al; World Bank; NEU and UNDP also
reported land related corruption as a pervasive problem. From late 1980s, according to
Wells-Dang (2013), a noticeable characteristic of land conflicts between land users and
local governments was that those conflicts were viewed as peasants’ response to
corruption in the land sector. In the eyes of research participants, corruption in land
management was “the biggest and most frustrating issue in our society”. An analysis of
articles between 1999 and 2006 on the “Youth Newspaper”, conducted by Kim (2011),
found that the majority of articles about land issues portraying local government officials
as “greedy and corrupt individuals who took advantage of their position and did not
follow the official regulations”. While most local people were still living in economic
hardship, land corruption was believed as the only mean by which government officials
can have a much higher living standard. According to Embassy of Denmark et al (2011),
World Bank (2011a, b, & 2012), corruption mainly happened with the issuance of land
use right certificates and in land acquisition/allocation. This is because current land
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administration rules and procedures allow local land officials to intentionally create
difficulties or delay administrative procedures. Land users, therefore, often have to pay
bribes in order to get their land claims solved quickly. Lodhi (2004) went further as
arguing that the main cause of local unrests and uprisings is the abuse of authority and
land related corruption among local officials. Since compensation was based on the value
of economic production, local authorities were encouraged to assist land developers to
get a low price. The formation of local government-investors alliances was confirmed by
Mr. Dang Hung Vo (2011) – a high-ranking land official, that the existing land
conversion policy created endless chance for corruption, benefits local governments and
private investors while underestimated land users’ interests. Since land officials have a
decisive role over land issues, corruption can take place in all land management activities
and land transactions (Denmark Embassy et al, 2011). This reality is confirmed by the
World Bank and GIV (2012) that police officers and land officials were the most corrupt
groups in the Vietnam’s government system.
Despite some progress in creating conditions for citizen participation in
governance, previous studies suggest that limited public participation in land
administration plays a significant role in exacerbating land-taking policy noncompliance
(World Bank, 2009&2011a, b &2012; Kim, 2011; Wells-Dang, 2013). According to good
governance perspective, public participation is critical to land administration because it
allows land users and stakeholders to exercise their rights and contribute to effective land
management. However, as pointed out by De Wit et al (2012), despite the adoption of the
Grassroots Democracy Resolution in 1998, the Vietnamese people have limited formal
means for voicing dissent or participating in the policy process. There is a lack of power
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for non-government actors to participate in decision-making, even at local level of
governance. This is in part because non-government grassroots groups and social protests
are not allowed in nations ruled by a One Political Party System (Huang, 2009).
Specifically, though the Law on Land of 2003 required that land use planning must be
disclosed to the public, no specific guidance can be used to determine who should be
consulted or how land disputes should be resolved (Adams, 2012; cited in Wells-Dang,
2013). Current legislations allow community members to participate in land use planning
at the commune level only. At higher local levels, land use planning requires the
participation only of the People’s Council. Policy noncompliance, thus, is an inevitable
consequence of a reality that: “if the project fitted the master plan and had been approved,
the ward, district, and city government bodies generally help the developers to attain the
land use right at low price from the current users” (World Bank, 2009: 44; Kim, 2011).
Despite having representatives in Board of Compensation, Support, and
Resettlement (BCSRs), voices of local communities, social associations, and affected
people play only a marginal role in land-taking policy implementation (World Bank,
2009: 44). In actuality, local people can discuss land issues at commune-level meetings
but very few decisions can be made at those meetings. A survey of public participation
found that only 22% of respondents have an opportunity to make comments about local
land plans, and only two out of five reported that their responses had been taken into
consideration (Oxfarm, 2012d; cited in Wells-Dang, 2013). Based on a case study in
VungAng Economic Zone (Ha Tinh Province), De Wit et al (2012) commented that
despite the ruling Party’s Grassroots Democracy Resolutions that allow the people to
inspect and supervise the operation of socio-economic development projects, citizen
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participation in the policy process is very poor. Community members were not directly
represented in Committees such as Committee of Land Valuation, Compensation, and
Resettlement; Harmony Committee; Propaganda Committee; and Citizen Monitoring
Committee. Kim (2011) and Wit et al (2012), asserted that Mass Organizations in
Vietnam such as Peasant Union, Youth Union, Women Union, and the People’s Council
“ultimately side with the State, rather than the people”. Mass organizations are not truly
institutions of “civil society” which can critically interact with the State. They are instead
dependent on the Vietnamese State and operate as advocacy agencies to encourage the
people’s acceptance of the State’s policy decisions.
2.4. Research Gap Analysis
2.4.1. Critiques of existing theoretical explanations
Despite having widespread influence, the institutional approach is unable to
explain why within the same commune and adopting the same procedures, local
governments achieve different levels of implementation effectiveness. In other words,
variations

in

target

group’s

noncompliance

indicate

that

land-taking

policy

noncompliance is not only related to institutional conditions. Policy literature suggests
that, on the one hand, while institutional conditions always play a prominent role, reforms
of land institutions alone are not enough for government to effectively deal with land
policy problems, including policy noncompliance. Based on a wide survey of land
problems in the developing world, for example, Wehrmann (2008) argued that conflicts
over land can take place anywhere regardless of a nation’s institutional setting. This
argument is supported by Gillespie, Hualing, and Nghia (2014): their examination of land
acquisition policy literature from Vietnam’s neighboring countries such as China and
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Cambodia showed that legal and administrative reforms are insufficient to solve landtaking problems. This is because, globally, land institutions are not the only factors
affecting policy compliance or noncompliance. On the other hand, considering Vietnam’s
current politics and policy context that is featured by “a single party system” (the
Vietnamese Communist Party as the sole ruling political party), reforms of the policy’s
institutional design will be limited by the Communist party’s ideological values and
beliefs. That is, the public ownership and the State’s control over the land sector is a core
economic – political principle. Such a political and policy context not only limits
institutional changes of the land-taking policy but also makes improvements of policy
implementation and governance a more realistic strategy in short term period in order to
increase land users’ policy acceptance.
The economic approach of land-taking policy noncompliance is correct when
pointing out that rational actor will select the best option (s) among their alternatives to
maximize economic interests. Conflicts between land users and government over landtakings are first and foremost because of unfair land prices that result in too low
compensation. However, while the key assumption above is applicable to market
situations, it could be challenged in non-market contexts. As argued by Simon (1955),
Williamson (1979), Mintz (2005), and Denhardt (2011), the economic rational
explanations do not take into account the influence of non-economic constraints such as
psychological factors to policy target groups when they have to make decisions in nonmarket situations. The concepts of cost and benefit are not only limited to economic
interest. It also includes time and resource devoted to establishing and maintaining
relationships or an individual reputation for being reliable and trustworthy. As a result,
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non-economic factors might motivate actions that do not generate maximized interests. In
short, an important shortcoming of the economic explanation to land-taking problems is
that it almost ignores non-economic contributors. Therefore, dealing with target groups’
noncompliance in land-taking policy implementation is not simply a matter of offering
them the best economic benefits. Also, as argued by Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002: 6)
and Stone (1997), policy-making and implementation are conducted in political
communities (e.g. country or state/province). Each community has its own standards to
set goals, define problems, and justify policy solutions. As each policy is being
implemented, it is affected by the unique contextual characteristics of the political
community. This argument is well documented in policy literature that target groups’
motivations to comply or not comply with a policy might be influenced by various factors
(Meier & Morgan, 1982; Winter and May, 2001; Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002; May,
2004 & 2005; Tyler, 2006; Levi and Sacks, 2009; Jones, 2010; Im et al, 2012).
The governance approach to land-taking problems that advocates for market
factors and modern democratic elements such as rule of law, public participation,
accountability, and decentralization of the decision-making process, faces contextual
barriers. Vietnam now is a developing nation led by CPV as the only ruling party; the
governing-structure is still unitary and hierarchical in nature; and the Leninist modelbased Party-State system continues to control fundamental sectors of Vietnam’s economy
and society (Huang, 2009). More specifically, over the last three decades, reform process
(Doi Moi policy) has mainly resulted in the deconcentrating of the Vietnam’s
administrative system while decision-making power remains centralized (De Wit et al,
2012). This maintains CPV and State agencies as the most powerful actors in public
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governance while non-government actors and other underdeveloped civil society forces
still play a limited role. State’s control over the society and government intervention in
the economy, the immature of civil society, and the lack of representative and
participatory institution, therefore, make recommended improvements towards a
democratic governance system largely influenced by Western concepts unrealistic in
Vietnam’s current context(Beresford, 2008; De Wit et al, 2012; London, 2014, World
Bank and MPI, 2016; TriaKerkvliet, 2018). This argument is supported by international
scholars who assert that the development of democratic elements in developing countries
face distinct challenges such as the lack of democratic culture and civil society, poverty
and pressure for immediate results, and the lack of institutional infrastructure (Denhardt,
Terry, Delacruz, and Andonoska, 2009). In other words, level of the nation’s
development, governing tradition, and current policy context encourage efforts to search
for a new alternative approach that is appropriate to Vietnam’s socio-cultural traditions
and current political-institutional conditions.
2.4.2. Research opportunity
As reviewed above, in searching for explanations of land-taking problems,
previous studies pay too much attention on economic and institutional aspects of the
policy, capacity of local governments while action aspects of policy implementation and
governance is still understudied. As an unexpected policy outcome, theoretically and
practically, land-taking policy noncompliance might relate to different elements of the
policy process - a system that includes mechanisms and procedures to translate ‘policy
ideas” into actual policies (Anderson, 2011; Birkland, 2011). The creation of public
policies involves two main activities: policy formulation and design (responsibility of
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political leaders), and policy implementation carried out by public bureaucrats (Mint,
2012: 285). Different roles of political decision makers and bureaucrats in the policy
process might create a wide gap between policy makers’ intents and preferences and
policy implementers’ attitudes and behaviors. In other words, policy implementers might
ignore policy goals and act to maximize their own interests that affect policy outputs and
policy outcomes. As a result, policy effectiveness is not only related to the quality of
policy formulation and design, organizational resources, but also government officials’
actions in policy implementation. Process aspects of policy implementation, therefore,
need to be concerned in securing target groups’ compliance (Salomon and Elliot, 2002,
Howlett, 2011; De Wit et al, 2012; De Wit, 2013; World Bank, 2011, 2012, &2014; Fu
and Gillespie, 2014).
A policy cannot succeed in changing target groups’ behaviors without policy
legitimacy – an important element that is able to convince all actors and stakeholders that
the policy is necessary, vital, and worth pursuing (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002).
Theoretically and practically, policy legitimacy is not only dependent on how a policy is
made and for what purposes but also on ways of executing it (Birkland, 2016). This
requires attention on interactions and relationships defined by policy tools between
government and non-government actors in the policy process. Lascoumes and Gales
(2007) convincingly argue that the effectiveness of policy implementation is largely
dependent on the choice of tools; policy tools might determine policy effectiveness:
“Public policy is fundamentally conceived as pragmatic – that is, as a political and
technical approach to solving problems via instruments; that it views such instruments as
‘natural’; they are viewed as being ‘at our disposal’, and the only questions they raise
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relate to whether they are the best possible ones for meeting the objectives set; and that
the central set of issues is around the effectiveness of instruments” (Lascoumes & Gales,
2007).
Over the last two decades, the rise of new policy instruments has resulted in
policy researchers’ belief that our society is transitioning to a new era of public
governance. As a key component of new governance perspective, the tool approach to
implementation problems advocates for a shift in the “unit of analysis” from public
programs/policies and public agencies to governing instruments. This dissertation,
therefore, is motivated by a research opportunity: looking at tools used in land acquisition
in order to generate new insights and develop an additional explanation of land users’
noncompliance over land acquisitions. In the following section, the researcher presents
the theoretical framework of tool approach in detail.
2.5. Tool Approach to Policy Noncompliance: A Theoretical Framework
Though qualitative researchers are not required to start with a theoretical
framework, it is more helpful if a study is guided by a theoretical lens (Maxwell, 2013:
49). With a theory in mind, the researcher can develop right research questions and
collect relevant data to address those questions. In this qualitative study, specifically,
theory is not used to develop hypotheses as in quantitative designs. It instead serves as an
“anchor” that makes the researcher focused on the research interest. The researcher’s
attention is drawn to phenomena or events, and relationships that might otherwise be
neglected or unnoticed. The theoretical framework will also help the researcher put
together the data that seem irrelevant or unconnected and make sense of what will be
observed.
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The focus of this study is potential linkages between implementation tools and
policy noncompliance. Data collection and analysis, thus, will be driven by the theory of
policy tools. In following parts, the researcher will first provide an overview of three
policy implementation regimes and the tool approach, then define the policy
tool/instrument, and clarify what types of policy tools/instruments are available for
government officials. However, defining the concept of “policy tool” and developing a
typology of government’s tools are not easy tasks. This is because there are many types
of policies with complex features that need to be considered if we want to have a
complete understanding of “government tools/instruments”. The critical review below is
an effort to incorporate different viewpoints into a simple picture of policy tools.
2.5.1. Three regimes of public policy implementation
Osborne (2010) used the term “implementation regime” to refer to overall field of
design and delivery of public policy and public services. Accordingly, the public sector
has passed through three implementation regimes associated with unique implementation
mechanism and tools. Three implementation regimes include: (i) Public Administration,
emerged in late 19th century and lasted until late 1970s; (i) New Public Management that
appeared from the yearly 1980s to late 1990s; and (iii)New Public Governance, arose
from the start of the 21st century onwards.
Under the traditional public administration regime, public officials and agencies
play decisive roles in the success of policy implementation (Pressman, Wildavsky, and
Aaron, 1973; Sabatier, 1986; Shafritz, Russell, and Borick, 2012). Aiming at efficiency
as a key criterion, the administrative tradition places administrative procedures and the
bureaucratic system at the center of public governance. As a result, “top-down” and
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“bottom-up” approaches to policy implementation are the two most influential
approaches within the public administration regime (Hill and Hupe, 2009; Sandfort and
Moulton, 2015). Top downers argue that policy success largely depends on the quality of
policy design. Based on a causal theory of change that links “initial conditions” with
“predicted consequences”, top-downers assert that if a policy outcome is not realized, it is
because of an infeasible link or wrong theory of change that results in a mismatch
between means and ends. Policy implementation fails because the policy lacks clarity or
guidance for implementers. Policy success is largely determined by policy formulation
and design. In contrast, bottom-uppers emphasize the role of various implementation
actors such as street-level bureaucrats who interact at the local level on problems. Policy
outcomes are mainly dependent on the capacity of “street-level bureaucrats” who carry
out the policy. In order to create conditions that facilitate expected policy outcomes, the
experiences and insights of local implementers need to be included in the policy design
process.
Despite its domination in public sector in a long time, the public administration
perspective has increasingly been challenged by modern governance practices. A key
weakness of both “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches, for example, is the
unrealistic assumption that policy implementers are provided by decision-makers with
clear goals and directions (Howlett et al, 2009: 165). In reality, policy implementation is
not a simple stage. Implementers might have to deal with variety of unexpected factors
that can determine policy success or failure (Hill & Hupe, 2002&2009).

Another

prominent shortcoming of the public administration regime over policy implementation is
the over-confidence in administrative procedures to ensure equality of public treatment
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(Osborne, 2010). In actuality, public resources are never sufficient to meet public
demands. Government intentions are influenced by many factors that might define policy
implementation success or failure. In other words, public policy success is hardly
achieved without the involvement of actors and the accumulation of resources outside the
government system. Limitations of public administration regime motivated the
emergence of new public management and new public governance perspectives.
From late 1970s andearly1980s, the governments were not the only actor
providing public goods. Instead, varieties of non-governmental organizations (private
actors) involved in policymaking and policy implementation. Inter-organizational and
inter-sectoral activities, networks, coalitions, contractual relationships, collaboration
between formal and informal actors... became main features of public management.
Emerged from that time, the term “governance” in the public administration and policy
disciplines referred to “the rules of collective decision-making in settings where there are
a plurality of actors or organizations and where no formal control system can dictate the
terms of the relationship between these actors and organizations (Chotray and Stoker,
2009; Bivir, 2011). This perspective led to the rise of the new public management (NPM)
that took the market model as the standard for measuring government success (Hood,
1995; Osborne, 2006 & 2010). New public management regime, therefore, supports an
expanded role of private and nonprofit sectors in public policy implementation and
service provisions. Proponents of NPM regime believe that citizens’ needs are better met
by the dynamic involvement of non-government actors in public policy process. Privatesector-management techniques should be applied to public service delivery and policy
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implementation. Efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness, therefore, are among the
most prominent emphases of the new public management.
However, the new public management perspective has been criticized for its
interorganizational focus in an increasingly plural world and for its emphasis on the role
of management techniques learnt from the private sector. Since management tasks in the
public sector are not simple as in the private sector, those techniques have been becoming
out of date (Osborne, 2006). NPM has also been challenged for its limitations in building
political trust and legitimacy among citizens (Morgan and Shinn, 2014). Economic
factors such as profit, market share, or return on investment cannot be used as common
denominators to enhance citizens’ trust in political institutions. Also, efficiency,
effectiveness, and responsiveness are not enough to determine the legitimacy of political
institutions and processes. The sustainable development of a political community requires
the incorporation of elusive values such as equity, protection of right, and transparency
into public governance. These political elements that are undermined in NPM show
weaknesses of NPM and leads to the movement of new public governance.
From 1990s, a movement of new public governance (NPG) placed political values
at the center of governance debate (Osborne, 2010; Morgan and Shinn, 2014). Proponents
of new public governance perspective argue that building legitimacy and trust among
citizens in their political institutions should be the ultimate purpose of public governance.
Political values such as political trust play a fundamental role in determining the
legitimacy of political institutions, processes, and outcomes. The goal of government,
thus, is not just improved efficiency, responsiveness, or effectiveness in policy
implementation and provisions of public services. Government, in addition, should aim to
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promote the larger common good that can strengthen citizens’ trust in government and
the legitimacy of government’s actions. The new public governance perspective, thus,
emphasizes the creation of government processes in order to produce implementable
agreements among various stakeholders whose legitimate values might be very different
but need to be preserved and integrated into the larger public good. Instead of focusing on
official actors, formal rules and procedures, and political factors, the value based new
public governance regime views public policies as “dynamic combinations of purposes,
rules, actions, resources, incentives, and behaviors leading to outcomes that can only
imperfectly be predicted or controlled” (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002: 5). Policy
implementation, therefore, is a multi-level and multi-actor system in which nongovernment players and varieties of other factors interact in a decentralized structure that
influence policy outcomes. This complex process of policy implementation requires
collaboration among public, private, and nonprofit actors in order to deal with complex
public problems.
New public governance, thus, advocates a collaborative approach to the provision
of public services, working with partners within and across public, private, and nonprofit
sectors. This perspective results in a shift in focus from agencies and programs to policy
tools to sustain network agreements (Salomon, 1981&2002; Osborn, 2006&2010;
Morgan and Shinn, 2014). Accordingly, the main function of policy tools is to coordinate
various actors in a multi-level system of policy implementation and governance. As
argued by Salamon (2002) and Gales (2011), the important role of policy
instruments/tools is that they can define the relationship between the government and the
governed, and greatly affect policy outcomes. Policy makers and implementers, therefore,
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need to develop policy mixes that can incorporate socio-political-institutional factors into
technical policy options. Rather than selecting policy priori among different alternatives,
policy makers should consider the guiding role of tools in policy development and
implementation.
2.5.2. The evolution of tool approach in policy implementation
Policy tools as a theoretical approach was initiated by researchers such as
Anderson (1971) and Salamon (1981). The theoretical framework originally first and
foremost was concerned with “what government uses rather than what happens inside
government system or what government does” (Hood, 1983). Linder and Peter (1989) put
concerns with policy instruments into a broader context of policy design. One of the main
research interests on policy instruments at that time was: how governments attempt to
perform their tasks? By what means do they rely on to reach policy goals? In the 1990s
and early 2000s, the tool argument became more powerful due to the proliferation of
public actions used to address public problems (Salamon, 2002: 1-3). In contemporary
world, as described by Salamon, public services or goods are not only directly provided
by government bureaucrats. A wide range of third parties such as commercial banks,
private universities, private corporations and firms also gets involved in public actions. A
variety of new government tools emerge and increasingly play an important role in public
good delivery. In his classic book on government tools, Salamon (2002: 4-6) wrote:
“What is distinctive about many of the newer tools of public actions is that they involve
the sharing with third parties actors of a far more basic governmental function: the
exercise of discretion over the use of public authority and the spending of public
funds….The proliferation of these new tools of public action has created new
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opportunities to tailor public action to the nature of public problems”. This new trend
makes “indirectness” becomes a common feature of governing tools in modern era. Since
government agencies increasingly operate in complex and interdependent relationships
with third party partners, public officials are required to develop collaborative
relationships and share public authority with non-government actors in order to
implement public policies and programs. As an alternative approach to deal with public
problems, the policy tool approach emphasizes the “how” question (Brinkerhoff and
Crosby, 2002; Salamon, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Gales, 2011; Sandfort and
Moulton, 2015; Cooper, 2018).
From the 1990s, therefore, the tool approach was labeled as “the third generation
of policy implementation research” that moved beyond both the top-down and bottom-up
approaches (Howlett et al, 2009: 164). Tool supporters argue that policy studies in the
21st century should start by defining a policy in terms of tools rather than in terms of
areas or fields. Instead of focusing on an individual program or even a collection of
programs and government agencies, policy researchers should concentrate on the tools of
governments, on techniques of social intervention. Instead of looking at what happens
inside government and what government does that may lead us to an endless list of
problems, as ever argued by Hood in 1983, the tool-based approach helps researchers,
policy makers and implementers reduce the complexity of modern government’s
operations and focus on some basic elements that link government’s wishes and
fulfillment. Under the tool lens, the public policy process becomes simpler and easier to
understand. Like a dentist who can fix a dental problem or a carpenter who can address
problems around the house with a tool box, complex policy problems can also be
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effectively fixed if we consider the role of tool choice and use (Lascoumes and Gales,
2007; Gales, 2011; Margetts and Hood, 2016).
The evolution

of theories

of public governance,

regimes

of

policy

implementation, and recent developments of the tool approach suggest a shift to focus on
policy tools that might offer new insights regarding land-taking problems in Vietnam.
2.5.3. Defining policy tools
A variety of policy tool definitions can be found in the public policy literature
(Dodds, 2013: 23; Margetts and Hood, 2016). In one of very first publications on
government tools, Salamon and Lund (1989) defined tools as “a method through which
government seeks a policy objective”. Bemelmans-Videc,Ray&Vedung (1998: 3)
conceptualized policy instruments as “the set of techniques by which governmental
authorities wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect or prevent social
change”. Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009) and Mint (2012) viewed actual means or
devices used by governments to address problems and implement solutions as policy
tools. From a sociological perspective, Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007) provided an indepth analysis of policy instruments and the instrumentation. In addition to distinguishing
between “instrument”, “tool”, and “device”, the authors placed a strong emphasis on the
relationship between State and society in their definition. Accordingly, the “instrument’
is a type of social institution while the “technique” is a concrete device that
operationalizes the instrument, and the “tool’ is viewed as a micro device within a
technique: “Policy instrument constitutes a device that is both technical and social, that
organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to,
according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of
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institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of
the politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation” (Lascoumes
and Le Gales, 2007).
Beside short and simple definitions, some policy scholars such as Salomon,
Howlett, and Cooper help readers to be aware of important differences between policy
mechanisms and policy tools. In his influential book on government’s tools, for example,
Salamon (2002: 19) presents a definition that is more about policy mechanism: “policy
instrument is an identifiable method (technique or means) through which collective
action is structured to address a public problem”. Salamon’s general definition is further
clarified by Cooper (2018) when he argues that policy mechanism answers the question
of “how to put a policy into practice” while policy instruments address the question: by
what methods/techniques or means? In other words, policy mechanisms such as coercive
regulations, direct and indirect government will determine how or ways policy tools work
and policy instruments such as executive orders, rules, or contracts refer to what legal
devices will be used to put those mechanisms into operation (Cooper, 2018: 4).
In this study, in addition to a differentiation between policy mechanisms and
policy tools, the two terms of policy instruments and tools are used interchangeably. Both
refer to specific devices of interventions such as government organizations, law, tax,
regulations…that governments can use to change a given set of social interactions. This
study also adopts a sociological perspective to policy tools. Accordingly, “public policy
instruments are a form of power. Instruments are not neutral: they structure public
policies and their outcomes; they have impacts on their own, independent from the policy
goals; and they structure the mode of governance” (Le Gales, 2011).
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2.5.4. Types of policy tools
Constructing typologies of policy tools was an early interest of numerous scholars
such as Cushman (1941), Dahl and Lindblom (1953), Lasswell (1958), Lowi (1966), and
Anderson (1971). However, classifying tools and instruments or developing a typology of
policy tools is no simple task. This is because, as argued by Linder and Peter (1989),
academic scholars and public policy makers might greatly vary in their understandings
and conceptualizations of government tools. Additionally, Salamon (2002: 21) comments
that “tools have multiple features and can be defined at any of a number of levels of
abstraction”. The multidimensionality of policy tools, thus, makes the task of describing
and sorting them complicated. Unlike tools in physical world, “tools of public actions
rarely appear in pure form…Rather, they come bundled in particular programs, many of
which combine more than one tool” (Salamon, 2002: 21). This results in difficulties in
identifying “which features are truly the defining features, and which are the design
features that can vary with particular manifestations” (Salamon, 2002: 21).The complex
nature of public actions and complicated tool dimensions suggest that any single facetbasedtypology of tools would be very disputable.
The challenge of policy tool classification is evident in policy literature where
various features, aspects, or dimensions are used by researchers to identify and categorize
tools. Those defining feature might be the degree to which they affect actors inside or
outside government; the extent to which they involve government expenditure; intended
outputs, or coerciveness and directness of instruments (Dodds, 2013: 23-32).In one of
very first book on “policy tools”, for example, Hood (1983) split government’s tool-kit
into two simple groups: (i) Detectors – instruments that government uses to collect
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information; and (ii) Effectors – tools that government relies on to make an impact on its
citizens. Hood then introduced eight basic tools based on four types of resources,
including: (i) Nodality – the use of information; (ii) Treasure – the use of money; (iii)
Authority – the use of legal powers; and (iv) Organization – the use of formal
organizations. Considering strategies of intervention, McDonell and Elmore (1987)
divided government tools into four types: (i) Mandates – rules constraining behaviors, (ii)
Inducements – funds to incentivize certain behaviors, (iii) Capacity Building – funds
enabling agencies to act; and (iv) System Changing – organizational changes to agencies
in order to implement policies. In 1990, Schneider and Ingram presented an output-based
tool categorization aiming at behaviors that government programs seek to modify. This
categorization consists of five tool types: (i) Authority Tools, (ii) Incentive Tools, (iii)
Capacity Tools, (iv) Symbolic Tools, and (v) Learning Tools. More simply, introduced
by Bemelmans-Videc,Ray&Vedung (1998), policy instruments can be classified into
three categories: (i) Economic Means, (ii) Regulations, and (iii) Information (they called:
carrots, sticks, and sermons, respectively). Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl (2009) went
further when they offered two models for identifying government devices used to address
public problems:(i) “Economic Models” and (ii) “Political Models”. Both models view
the coerciveness as a fundamental criterion for differentiating tools. Though the two
models favor non-coercive tools, they differ in how to avoid using the most coercive
policy instruments.
A disputable characteristic of tool typologies as described above is that
researchers often rely on a single criterion to define and differentiate policy tools. In his
intensive book on tools of government, therefore, Lester Salamon (2002: 24) presents an
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alternative approach for tool classification. He argues that, due to the complexity of tool
features, instead of focusing on a single dimension that can work for all purposes, we
need to consider a range of aspects that can be used to compare different tools. Based on
common criteria of policy assessment such as efficiency, effectiveness, and equity,
Salamon suggests four tool dimensions to “clarify the full matrix of choices that policy
makers face and the significant tradeoffs that exist among them”. Those four key
dimensions include: (i) Degree of Coerciveness; (ii) Degree of Directness; (iii) Degree of
Automaticity; and (iv) Degree of Visibility. Each dimension can be used to group policy
tools and assess them in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, equity, manageability, and
legitimacy.
In this study, the researcher uses a tool typology as summarized in table 2below to
conduct the case analysis. The tool matrix is adapted from key books and book chapters
on “Policy Tools and Policy Design” written by Hood (1983), Salamon (2002), Howlett
(2011), Dodds (2013), and Cooper (2018). Each policy mechanism consists of various
tools or devices used by the government to transfer policy ideas into actions in practice.
● “Direct/Indirect Government” refers to the involvement of the government in
the provision and delivery of public goods/services. If direct government is defined by
the provision and delivery of public goods/services based on public agencies, employees,
and budget, the indirect government mechanism allows non-state actors, in exchange for
money, to deliver certain public goods/services on the government’s behalf (Salamon,
2002: 282; Howlett, 2011: 64). Direct government-based tools include organizations such
as line departments or State-owned enterprises that rely upon the use of government
institutions, personnel, and budget to achieve policy goals.
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● “Authority” as a policy mechanism refers to the use of the real or perceived
threat of sanctions enforced by the government in order to guide policy targets undertake
activities in directions preferred by the government. A unique characteristic of the
authority-based mechanism is that it allows the government to rely on coercive power of
the State to achieve policy goals (Howlett, 2011: 83). Coerciveness, therefore, is the most
important feature of authority-based instruments such as laws, regulations, executive
orders, or administrative rules.
● Financial and financial-equivalent incentives as a policy mechanism refers to
the use of finance-based resources in order to affect targets’ behaviors. The government
might offer financial/treasure incentives for desired activities while the imposition of
financial costs aims to control discouraged activities (Howlett, 2011: 101). Grants,
vouchers, cash transfer, subsidies, land are examples of finance-based tools.
● Information as a policy mechanism refers to ways policy makers and
implementers “inform an audience of target actors about a policy issue or pattern of
behavior to influence what people think, know, or believe when they engage in target
behavior” (Salamon, 2002: 218). In other words, by information mechanism, the
government intendedly communicate knowledge and information to target groups in
order to change their behaviors. Common information tools include proclamation, public
hearings, information campaigns, public posters, propaganda…etc (Howlett, 2011: 115).
2.6. Summary of the Chapter
Over the last three decades, land-taking disputes and conflicts have become a
wicked challenge in Vietnam. The increase of land-taking incidents indicates a policy
noncompliance in which landholders resist government’s land acquisition plans.
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Implementers increasingly confront with disobedience among affected landholders. To
some extent, the policy fails in changing target groups’ behaviors.
As manifestations of policy noncompliance, land-taking disputes and conflicts
have attracted numerous researchers that can be grouped into three influential
approaches: (i) institutional approach; (ii) economic approach; and (iii) good governance
approach. To explain noncompliance with land acquisition, institutional approach focuses
on the institutional design of land-taking policy. Land legislation, in the eyes of
institutional theorists, play the most important role. In order to reduce noncompliance
with land acquisition, institutional approach supports reforms of land legislation and the
administration system in the land sector. From an economic approach, researchers point
out problems of benefits sharing resulted from the implementation of land-taking policy.
Accordingly, because of unfair land prices and unrealistic compensation, affected
landholders become losers. They resist land acquisition because they do not benefit from
the policy. To minimize policy noncompliance, economic approach argues that the State
should reform methods of land valuation, so that landholders can have fairer
compensation. Economic perspective also advocates for a market mechanism-based
policy implementation in which landholders can protect their land related interests by
trading land with investors. As the third influential explanation, good governance
approach centers on the quality of Vietnam’s land governance system. Poor scores on key
indicators of the good governance framework such as transparency, accountability,
corruption prevention, and public participation are considered as significant contributors
to noncompliance with land acquisition. Reform of governing system in the land sector,
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thus, is required to improve the quality of land governance, and minimize land-taking
policy noncompliance.
Three influential approaches above, however, tend to largely ignore
process/action aspects of policy implementation that importantly contributes to policy
acceptance or noncompliance. The research argue that institutional and economic factors
are

insufficient

to

understand

land-taking

noncompliance.

Many

reform

recommendations suggested by the good governance approach are not appropriate,
considering current context of Vietnam. This study, thus, proposes to contribute to landtaking policy literature by focusing on policy tools used by implementers to change target
groups’ behaviors. The researcher controls the role of economic, institutional, and
governance factors, and argue that implementation tools that define interactions and
relationships between implementers and target groups might play a role in
noncompliance with land acquisition. The government can reduce policy noncompliance
by changing tool choice and use.
Policy tools are devices used by implementers to transfer policy ideas into actions
in practice. Policy success or failure not only depends on policy formulation and design
but also subject to the quality of policy implementation – actions of implementers in real
context. An action focused study of noncompliance with land acquisition, therefore,
requires a discovery of policy tools. Adopting a tool approach, this study aims to explore
implementers’ tool mixes, discover strengths and weaknesses of each tool, examine how
tools are combined in tools mixes, its consequences, and potential linkages between
implementation

tools

and

landholders’
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noncompliance

over

land

acquisition.

Table 2: Matrix of Policy Mechanisms and Tools
Sources: Salamon (2002); Howlett (2011); Dodds (2013); and Cooper (2018)

Categories
of Policy
Mechanisms
Direct
Government

Indirect
Government

Authority

Policy Mechanisms
How to put the policy into practice?
The delivery or withholding of a good or
service by government employees.
Government plays a direct role in
providing goods or services for the
necessities of life and the pursuit of
happiness.
A business arrangement between a
government agency and a private entity in
which the private entity promises, in
exchange for money, to deliver certain
products or services to the government
agency or to others on the government’s
behalf.

Policy Tools
By what
methods/means?
e.g. Government
Agencies; Government
Loan; Government
Corporation;
Government Insurance
e.g. Government
Insurance; Contract;
Grant; Loan Guarantee;
Public-Private
Partnership (PPP).

Rules that identify permissible and
impermissible activity on the part of
individuals, firms, or government
agencies, along with accompanying
sanctions or rewards, or both

e.g. Statutes;
Legislations; Voluntary
Regulations; Treaty,
Executive Orders,
Decrees, Circulars…

Policy makers use prices or other market
mechanisms to create treasure/financial
incentives for individuals to change their
behavior in ways that reduce social harms
or secure benefits for society at large.
Policy makers inform an audience of
target groups about a policy issue or
pattern of behavior to influence what
people think, know, or believe when they
engage in target behavior. People change
what they do because public policy has
changed what they think or has changed
what they think about, without necessarily
changing anything else about the situation

e.g. Vouchers; Grants;
Subsidies; User Fees;
Tax Expenditures.

Treasure/
Financial
Incentive

Public
Information
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e.g. Public Meetings;
Hearings; Information
Campaign; Public
Posters, Press
Conferences…

Figure 3: NONCOMPLIANCE WITH LAND ACQUISITION IN VIETNAM

Structural Context:
● Political Context: Single Party System
● Economic Context: Industrialization
● Social Context: Rapid Urbanization
● Culture: Values and Beliefs embed in land

Policy
Outputs
Policy
Formulation
● Land Regime
● Land Tenures
● Land Pricing
● Land Valuation
● Land Rights

Policy
Implementation:
● Organization
● Resources
● Tools
● Decision-Making
● Monitoring
● Supervision

● Acquired
Land Area

Policy Outcomes
●Noncompliance

Quality of Land Governance
● Legitimacy
● Transparency &Accountability
● Responsiveness
● Public Participation
● Fairness/Corruption….
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CHAPTER III: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

3.1. Introduction
If “research strategy” refers to “qualitative” or “quantitative” approach, the
research design is an overall plan or a protocol regarding a particular scientific study
(Singleton and Straits, 2010; Bryman, 2012; Yin, 2013; Maxwell, 2014). Researchers
starting with “how” and “why” questions that primarily stress exploratory and
explanatory purposes are more likely to favor small-n qualitative studies while “what”,
“who”, and “where” questions aiming to description and prediction are more preferred
large-n quantitative investigation. Overall, a good research strategy and design needs to
provide clear information about entities to be studied (e.g. individuals, groups,
organizations, events, or people); aspects of entities that are of researchers’ interest;
relationships or issues being investigated or explored within a research project, and types
of data that will be collected (Singleton and Straits, 2010: 79).Considering this
dissertation’s research problem an research questions, the qualitative case study is
employed to explore potential linkages between policy tools and land users’ policy
noncompliance.
This chapter contents methodological issues. The researcher will describe
fundamental elements of a qualitative research such as the research design and strategy,
methods of data collection and analysis, and the presentation of research results. The
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chapter is organized as follow: the first section will justify the choice of an “instrumental
case study” as the dissertation’s research design. Attention will then be turned to key
elements and steps in conducting a multiple-case study, including: the unit of analysis
and case selection process, research site access and participant recruitment, description of
the researcher’s role, and data collection and analysis techniques. The final section will
discuss how data and research findings are presented in following chapters.
3.2. Justifications for the Selected Research Design
While quantitative researchers are interested in the “quantity of things”,
qualitative approaches are more focusing on their “qualities or non-quantifiable things”
(Bazelley, 2013: 3). Qualitative research can be defined as a process beginning with
“assumptions, a worldview, the possible use of a theoretical lens, and the study of
research problems inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or
human problem” (Creswell, 2007: 37). In order to study social or human problem,
qualitative researchers often focus on some entities, collect data in natural settings, and
qualitatively analyzes data to establish patterns or themes. The emphasis on quality of
things indicates that if a large number of samples is required by quantitative research
designs, qualitative researchers only work with a limited number of research entities or
cases. The main interest of qualitative researchers is to observe, describe, interpret, and
analyze the ways that people think about themselves, act on, or experience the world
around them. Because of this fundamental nature, researchers inspired by qualitative
approaches are often centered on a separate and single entity or multiple instances of the
phenomenon under study (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014). While a qualitative study can
adopt varieties of methodological approaches such as ethnography, grounded theory,
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phenomenology, narrative analysis, or discourse analysis, this dissertation employs “Case
Study” as the research design.
According to Yin (2014: 16-17), a case study is defined with two components: (i)
the scope of a case study inquiry, and (ii) its features. For the first component, case study
is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life
context, especially when boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be
clearly evident” (Yin, 2014: 16). While the first component emphasizes the important
role of contextual conditions in understanding the topic or the case under study, the
second component of case study definition refers to some other methodological features.
Accordingly, a case study inquiry will cope with the technically distinctive situation and
rely on various sources of evidence. The data collection and analysis in case studies are
guided by prior developments of theoretical propositions. Specifically, the case study
design is selected as the research design for this dissertation because of its following
advantages (Singleton and Straits, 2010: 356; Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014):
First, “case study” is a powerful tool when researchers want to explore a new
phenomenon (Stake, 2005; Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014). In situations of little available
knowledge about the research topic, researchers will find qualitative case study helpful
because the openness and flexibility of qualitative strategy allow researchers explore all
possibilities. Focusing on single unit or a limited number of units, case study is more
relevant in investigating dynamic situations in natural settings of things and phenomenon.
Based on real experiences in research sites, researchers can hear silenced voices from
research participants or deal with dimensions/factors that are not easily measured. They
also can develop detailed descriptions and understandings of the research topic. Since
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noncompliance with land-taking policy is a wicked problem, case study is a right design
to develop an in-depth understanding of the complex phenomenon under study.
Second, “case study” also can be used when available theories need to be further
developed. According to Yin (2014: 6-7), the use of case study design is not limited to
exploration of a single unit or phenomenon. In reality, numerous explanatory and
descriptive case studies can be found in scientific disciplines such as political science and
sociology. This reality indicates that the design of case study never simply serves as a
preliminary method used for exploratory purposes only. The case study design instead
can also be used to describe, explain, or even test theoretical propositions. Research
literature of land-taking policy in Vietnam suggests that influential theories such as
institutional, economic, and participatory governance face contextual limitations of a
centralized Party-State governing system. This motivates a scientific exploration driven
by policy tool theory that can offer new insights about land-taking problems. If tool
choice and use can affect implementation effectiveness and policy success, how do tools
relate to noncompliance over land-takings? A “tool centered case study”, thus, is an
appropriate design to investigate if there are linkages between policy tools and land
users’ noncompliance in land-taking policy implementation.
Third, this dissertation’s research questions are in form of “how” that favor the
design of qualitative case study. This is because “such questions deal with operational
links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidences” (Yin,
2014: 10). Giving no previous study has been done on the role of tools in land-taking
policy noncompliance in Vietnam, this dissertation research first and foremost aims to
exploratory and explanatory purposes. Based on an in-depth examination and analysis of
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local governments’ tool choice and use, this dissertation explores action/process aspects
of the land-taking policy and how those aspects contribute to land users’ noncompliant
behaviors. This action centered research interest draws all attentions to devices
(mechanisms and tools) used by local government officials to interact with land users
during the policy implementation process. Understanding of the potential linkage
between policy tools and noncompliant behavior might not only explain why the target
groups (land users) resist land-taking policy decisions but also suggest further research
opportunities in future.
Fourth, qualitative strategy and case study design also ensures that the qualitative
explorer can get an insiders’ view of reality by directly interacting with research subjects,
including land users and government officials, in a small sample study. The researcher is
able to play a role of active learner who can tell the story from participants’ views as well
as making judgments as an expert. With qualitative approach, the researcher is not only
interested in events and participants’ behavior but also concerned with “how the
participants in study make sense of these and how their understanding influences their
behaviors” (Maxwell, 2013: 22). This helps the qualitative researcher to understand the
research topic from local people’s views of points. Unlike quantitative studies that
examine and compare differences and relationships found in a large number of samples,
exploring a limited number of cases (e.g. 03 land-taking incidents) allows an in-depth
investigation of how local context influences government’s actions and how individual
circumstances of land users shape their individual behaviors.
Finally, the sensitiveness of the research topic in Vietnam’s context encourages
the choice of an instrumental case study design. As a wicked problem, it is not easy for
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the researcher to access land-taking projects and collect data on a large number of
affected land users and government officials. This reality suggests “the instrumentality”
as a unique characteristic of this dissertation’s research. The “instrumentality” means that
case study is instrumental to accomplishing something else rather than understanding
particular situations (Stake, 1995: 3). The instrumental case study is especially an
appropriate research approach when researchers are interested in a research puzzle, a
need for general understanding, and a feeling that studying some cases in their own
choice might bring them new insights into research questions. These features differentiate
“instrumental case study” from “intrinsic case study” in which researchers are assigned,
even being obligated to conduct study on particular cases without other choices. In other
words, the “instrumentality” of the research design allows the researcher with some
flexibilities and a purposeful selection of land-taking incidents as cases for analysis.
3.3. Research Design
3.3.1. The unit of analysis and case selection
●Unit of analysis:
At the starting point of study, it is important for researchers to clarify the unit of
analysis - who or what will be described or analyzed. According to Singleton and Straits
(2010: 81-83), the right choice of unit of analysis will not only help researchers exactly
identify research population and sample (case), collect adequate data, but also avoid false
assertions about research findings. This means that research conclusions are made only
about the particular unit of the researcher’s interest. Researchers, in other words, can
eliminate logical fallacy if they choose the appropriate unit of analysis and only draw
conclusions on the basis of information collected from the analysis unit.
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The “unit of analysis” refers to entities (objects or events) under study (Singleton
and Straits, 2010: 81). Research entities might be organizations, individuals, events,
artifacts, or even nations. The choice of analysis unit depends on researcher purposes and
researchers’ interests. The implementation of land-taking policy in Vietnam involves
varieties of entities such as local government agencies, local leaders and officials, land
users, and investors…etc. Therefore, a land-taking policy study can use either “local
government”, “individuals”, or “land-taking events” as the unit of analysis. Based on
research purposes, land-taking instance (or project) in which government executes
required legal and administrative procedures in order to acquire land use right over an
area of land from land users is chosen as the unit of analysis for this dissertation study.
● Samples and Cases:
While research population is a whole class of similar objects or events, a
“sample” is a case or a single unit the researcher observes (Singleton and Straits, 2010:
151). In this case study, since the unit of analysis is the land-taking instance, the research
population consists of all land-taking projects implemented in Vietnam by the
government in order to collect the land use right over a piece of land assigned to land
users. However, considering the main research interest of policy noncompliance as
suggested by pilot studiesin Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc provinces, non-resistant landtakings offer limited opportunity to explore the linkage between policy tools and policy
noncompliance. The researcher, therefore, exclude compliant projects in which most
affected land users accept the government’s compensation offers. Only “noncompliant
instances” (alternatively, incidents) in which there is a group of at least 20% of affected
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land users who resist local governments’ land-takings were selected as the cases for
observation and exploration.
Unlike traditional approaches to policy implementation that largely examines
government’s organizational capacity such as human and financial resource or
organizational structure, this study is interested in “government in actions” – ways that
the government interacts with policy target groups in the policy implementation process.
This research inquiry, therefore, does not require collecting data on organizational sizes
and structure, financial and human resources, or individuals’ characteristics (e.g. age,
gender, education level…). Instead, a government’s action centered study will explore the
choice and application of implementation tools that transfer policy ideas into
government’s land-taking actions in practice. Based on research assumptions that actions
of local governments might also affect target groups’ policy acceptance or nonacceptance, the selection of land-taking incidents as the cases for analysis is expected to
ensure the focus on instruments used in specific land-taking situations.
● Case selection technique
Though sampling in qualitative study is not as important as in quantitative
research, the researcher’s theoretical understanding and practical experiences encourage a
careful consideration of “case selection” based on sampling principles. This not only
ensures the right choice of cases but also helps the researcher determines case featured
dimensions showing the typicality that can illustrate matters of concerns. Most simply,
the sampling process in quantitative study is to determine how many units will be chosen
from the research population and by what method? (Singleton and Straits, 2010: 151).
Since this study applies qualitative strategy to explore policy noncompliance, the
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researcher excludes land-taking projects without disputes and only focuses on a limited
number of land-taking incidents. The case selection question, therefore, is: what type of
land-taking incidents in which land users resist government’s land-taking decisions will
be chosen? How many cases will be selected? And by what techniques or methods?
The main technique for case selection employed in this research is purposeful
sampling: land-taking incidents (cases), research sites, and research participants were
conveniently and purposefully chosen based on subjective judgment and experiences of
the researcher (Bryman, 2012: 418). Therefore, only land-taking incidents relevant to
research questions and instrumental purposes were chosen. This general strategy enables
the typicality (ex. level of tension and conflict) of selected land-taking cases. In addition
to purposeful case selection, theoretical sampling is another technique used in
combination with criteria above (typicality and instrumentality) to determine whether a
case is selected or not. “Theoretical sampling” is “the process of data collection for
generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and
decides what data to collect next and where to find them” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 45).
This technique indicates that the case selection is an ongoing process rather than a
distinct and single stage. The researcher can work on several interested cases, but he/she
might also look for other cases while being in research sites and finally focus on the most
typical cases that meet their research expectations and requirements.
The case selection process was managed as follow: first, a sampling frame was
developed to identify and determine what type of incidents (case) would be selected. In
order to have a good sampling frame, various land-taking projects (instances) with typical
characteristics of the research population were reviewed by the researcher and local
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officials. The selection of noncompliant land-takings (incidents)then was conducted on
the basis of a set of criteria such as the number of affected land users, acquired land area,
level of tension, land use purpose, and locations of land-taking projects. The use of these
criteria ensures typical features of land-taking incidents. In order to enhance the diversity
of collected information, the cases were selected in different settings. Variations
regarding local conditions enable contextual differences in policy implementation and
potential effects of those differences on levels of policy noncompliance over landtakings.
The purposeful case selection technique excludes land-taking instances or projects
without disputes and conflicts. This is because those effective projects often affect a very
limited number of households that facilitates agreements on compensation between land
users and the government/investors. More importantly, land-taking projects without
affected residents’ resistance often aim to serve public purposes such as constructing a
school/university, roads, or bridges that greatly benefit local people, including affected
land users. The purposes of serving public interest legitimate land-taking policy actions
and, thus, easily convince land users returning their land to government. The land
acquisition process is often executed with limited noncompliance or even without
affected people’s resistance. This does not push local governments into complex
situations as in implementing non-complainant land-takings. Land officials are not
required efforts regarding tools choice and use in order to acquire land use rights.
Therefore, though adopting the same rules and procedures, land-taking instances without
conflicts are not typical cases for this tool focused policy noncompliance study.
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Based on principles above, the researcher selected three land-taking incidents
taking place in Hanoi city and Bac Ninh province (in the North of Vietnam) and Ho Chi
Minh city in the South for a cross-case analysis.
3.3.2. Procedures of selecting three land-taking incidents
Research requests first were sent by the researcher to four provinces and cities in
the North of Vietnam including: Ha Noi, Bac Ninh, Hung Yen, and Vinh Phuc. Informal
conversations with land officials in Hanoi and Hung Yen provinces revealed that they
were not ready to support the dissertation research plan. Though government officials in
Hanoi and Hung Yen were able to provide some government reports, official statistics,
and willing to participate in interviews, they were very hesitated to organize meetings
with government agencies and land users involved in on-going land acquisition incidents
of interests. The researcher, thus, canceled fieldwork plans in the two province/city.
The two provinces of Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc where governments responded to
research requests served as research sites to get real experiences about land acquisition.
With supports from local officials, several profiles of on-going land-taking projects in the
two provinces were reviewed during the pilot study stage. Some “qualified land-taking
projects’, then, were selected to apply for government’s approval of the research plan.
However, due to contextual complexities, access to potential cases suggested by the
researcher was refused. According to local officials, tensions and complicated situations
at local communities are not conducive of doing research. Intended interviews and focus
groups with land users at local communities might be risky for both local governments
and the researcher. Though government officials in two provinces were willing to arrange
visits to effective land-taking projects (instances without land users’ resistance) and
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participate in this study, they were able to set up only one land-taking incident for an indepth investigation in Dong Ky ward (Tu Son district – Bac Ninh province). The case of
Dong Ky, thus, is the only one incident that the researcher gains real experiences in a
local setting.
Difficulties in accessing land-taking incidents in local settings made study of
high-profile land-taking events in Hanoi City and Ho Chi Minh City an alternative
option. After reviewing the availability of data, the researcher chosen the two “typical
incidents” that serve as “instrumental cases”. For the two cases of Dong Tam and Thu
Thiem, the researcher relied on online sources of secondary data such as government
websites, online newspapers, Youtube.com…etc. Numerous media publications
regarding the two cases such as video clips, newspaper articles, and interviews with
leaders, official documents, and stories telling by affected land users who involved in the
two land-taking projects, were collected by the researcher. While the two cases might
reduce the researcher’s real experiences at local settings, they offer a great chance to look
at complex situations and explore action aspects during the execution of land acquisition.
Specifically, three land-taking incidents selected for analysis present an opportunity to
discover action aspects of policy implementation process.
Unlike similar land-taking disputes, most noncompliant land users affected by the
three projects did not, first and foremost, criticize local governments for financial and
economic consequences. The less important role of economic factors first is evident in
the large number of land users accepting compensation and moving out of their land.
Second, more importantly, the key question raised by 115 disobedient landholders in Thu
Thiem was: are we really affected by the Thu Thiem project? Is our land really covered
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by land-taking plans? Similarly, land holders in Dong Tam also did not dispute
compensation or the application of land-taking law and rules. They instead questioned the
Hanoi city government if the defense land area covers their land? Though only 14
households had to give up the land to the government as the result of the land-acquisition,
unclear land boundaries determined by the city government was the root cause of
villagers’ collective disobedience. The case of Tu Son, whereas, shows a typical
noncompliance over land-takings serving private and public partnership (BT) projects.
The involvement of private investors in BT projects makes land-takings more
complicated and disputes are more likely to occur. In views of land users, private
investors greatly benefit from constructing properties such as apartments and houses on
cheap land and selling at very high price on the market. These practices motivate land
users’ requests to directly negotiate with investors for market-based land price and higher
compensation. Such a request, however, is not supported by the government. This often
results in long lasting disputes and tensions between the government and affected land
users. In many situations, the government has to rely on compulsory acquisition as the
final action.
Three selected incidents show that, instead of common economic and institutional
factors such as low compensation, unfair land price, or the ambiguity of land legislation,
actions of local governments in policy implementation do matter. The three incidents,
thus, provide an opportunity to explore action or process aspects that have been still
underestimated in explaining land-taking problems in Vietnam. In the section below,
three land-taking incidents will be analyzed from a policy tool lens that centers on
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devices/tools driving interactions and relationships between the government and policy
target groups.
3.3.3. Site access and participant recruitment
● Research site access:
In order to gain real experience at research sites in Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc
provinces, the researcher relied on local government’s websites as the first official
sources for seeking background information. In order to find the most suitable research
sites at district level of government, the researcher contacted with local governments
through Office of Provincial People’s Committee, Provincial Department of Natural
Resources and Environment; and District People’s Committee, asking for permission to
conduct study with local residents and government agencies such as Provincial Center for
Land Development, District Boards of Compensation, Support, and Resettlement. With
support from local governments in the two provinces, a pilot study was conducted in
March 2017 to initially examine land-taking incidents and local settings prior
determining the selection of research fields and looking for cases.
● Recruitment of research participants:
To collect insights regarding tools choice and use in land-taking policy
implementation, the researcher needs to access policy implementers and policy target
groups in local settings. There are two groups of informants in this study: (i) government
leaders and officials who are responsible and directly involved inland-taking policy
implementation, and (ii) land users who are affected by particular land-taking projects.
Due to the sensitiveness of the research topic, the researcher was not able to collect
information from investors. In reality, as shared by local officials, investors often play a
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very minimal role in land-taking projects. Because most land-taking incidents are in
compulsory form, government officials are the only people with legitimate authority to
work with affected land users. This reality explains why investors were unwilling to
participate in this research. Some told the researcher that they even were not allowed to
respond interview requests without approval from local government.
The selection of research informants, therefore, was as follows: first, in
consultation with local government leaders, only land officials who directly got involved
in land-taking policy implementation were invited for in-depth interviews. The researcher
also accessed local leaders (ex. district/commune mayors and party secretaries) for
information at the decision-making level. Local land officials and leaders then supported
the researcher in recruiting affected land users who were invited to participate in focus
groups. Totally, …interviews were conducted with…. policy implementers (government
officials and leaders) and …affected land users (this section will be properly completed
after finishing case analysis).
3.3.4. The role of the researcher
As pointed out by Singleton and Straits (2010: 356-358) and Creswell (2013),
conducting qualitative research is a challenging journey because design elements of a
qualitative research are not specified and fixed before data collection. Qualitative
researchers often start their research process with a broad research topic, a
methodological approach, and some research propositions. The research design can be
revised during field visits in order to adapt to local settings. Instead of using data
collection tools developed by other researchers, qualitative explorers rely on themselves
as an instrument for data collection. Researchers in qualitative studies have to visit
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research sites for multiple times and directly collect data over a long time through the use
of multiple methods such as: observing behaviors, examining documents, and
interviewing participants. They thus have to set research agenda, decide what questions to
ask, take notes, and record. Qualitative researchers also have to review, and code
collected data, organize themes across the data sources, and conduct data analysis by
themselves. Only the researchers who are directly involved in data collection analyze
data. During data collection process, the researcher observed policy implementation
activities, talked to policy implementers, interviewed land users, and joined in
community meetings to develop an in-depth description of the topic under study. In this
qualitative study, therefore, the researcher plays multiple roles: an observer, a participant,
a data collection instrument, and a data analyst.
3.3.5. Limitations of the research design
As pointed out by Creswell (2013) and Yin (2014), since the main purpose of
qualitative research design is to describe in detail the topic under study, researchers often
formulate their exploratory research questions with “how” and “what”. Case studies,
therefore, often require a large amount of time to do field observations and interviews. It
also highly depends on observational and interpretive skills of researchers because
individual researchers only interact with a limited number of people in limited settings.
Due to the focus on some cases, researchers might face difficulties if they want to make
replications and comparisons. Most importantly, small – n qualitative research design
lacks the generalizability and researchers are unable to make predictions. All these are
common limitations of the selected case study design. Case study results, therefore, are
often served as a reference for further studies in future.
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Another shortcoming of the design of case study adopted in this dissertation
relates to the difficulties in seeking and accessing “typical cases” (ex. a high level of
tension and a significant number of noncompliant land users). Noncompliance regarding
land-taking policy is a sensitive problem in contemporary Vietnam. Accessing “hot”
land-taking incidents, therefore, is not an easy task. This unexpected situation resulted in
the selection of two cases of Dong Tam and Thu Thiem as an alternative option. For
these two high-profile cases, since the researcher was not able to directly interact with
research participants in local settings, most collected data are secondary. Though lots of
data were gathered from public sources such as articles and interviews conducted by
reporters, government documents, or video clips, the dependence on secondary data
reduced the researcher’s ability to explore the research topic in local settings.
In addition, the researcher’s inability to directly access the two incidents in Thu
Thiem and Dong Tam and the dependence on secondary data might also affect the
validity and reliability of research findings and interpretations. The exclusion of nonresistant land-taking projects is also a limitation of this research. Without an examination
of effective land-taking instances, the researcher is not sure if there are any variations in
tool choice and use; and if variations in the application of policy tools really contribute to
effective policy implementation. However, due to the focus on policy noncompliance,
this study does not aim to compare differences in terms of tools between effective and
non-effective execution of land-taking projects. Such a comparative study can be saved
for future.
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3.4. Data Collection
3.4.1. Key questions guiding data collection
Instruments used for data collection consists of interviews and focus groups in
Vinh Phuc and Bac Ninh provinces and searching online sources. The researcher spent
time in Vinh Phuc and Bac Ninh provinces to talk to local land officials, managers, and
leaders and affected land users in order to gain real experience with land-taking policy
implementation. In Tu Son district (Bac Ninh province), the researcher also had chance to
attending community meetings, observed the enforcement of land-taking procedures and
stakeholders’ responses in practices. The collection of primary data at research sites and
secondary data from public sources was directed by specific questions below:
● What are mechanisms and tools available for land-taking policy implementers?
● Do land-taking policy implementers rely more on economic incentives,
coercive authority, or persuasion and capacity building? Direct or indirect mechanisms?
Why?
● What are mechanisms and tools preferred by government officials? How do
policy implementers justify their tool preferences?
● What are strengths and weaknesses of preferred mechanisms and tools?
●What political, economic, institutional, and socio-cultural factors affect policy
implementers’ tool choice and use?
● Do non-state actors such as investors and land users play any role when
government officials select implementation tools? If not, why?
● How effective are tool choice and use from affected land users’ perspective?
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● In response to land users’ noncompliance, do local government officials change
their choice and use of tools? How do they make changes and how effective are those
tool related changes? If they do not change tool choice and use, why?
● Is it possible to increase policy compliance among land users by making
changes in tool choice and use? Considering context of Vietnam, what are feasible tool
alternatives?
3.4.2. Stages of data collection
The data collection of this study is a continuing process that consists ofthreestages
with multiple field visits. Fieldwork activities target purposes and specific tasks
associated with each stage: (i) Stage 1 - Pilot fieldwork in both provinces to select and
confirm research sites and verify the research problem; (ii) Stage 2 - Field visits with a
focus on policy implementation; and (iii) Stage 3 - Field visits with a focus on linkages
between implementation tools and policy noncompliance. As a qualitative study, the
dissertation’s research design is modified during the data collection process.
●Stage 1: Pilot Fieldwork in March and April 2017
Starting with a broad research interest in manifestations of policy noncompliance
(land-taking disputes and conflicts), the pilot study at potential research sites served as an
opportunity to verify, clarify, and confirm the research problem. General data collection
strategy and tools such as interview guides were also developed during the pilot
fieldwork. Based on background information on government websites, the researcher
made contacts with local governments in four potential research sites for support (four
provinces in the North of Vietnam: Bac Ninh, Vinh Phuc, Hanoi, and Hung Yen). Some
initial field visits with field observations and free talks with local officials served to not
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only determine if locations are suitable and convenient for study but also revise and
refine the research problem and the research design. Finally, two Northern provinces of
Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc were chosen for field experience and data collection. The
researcher also confirmed the research problem of policy noncompliance from a tool
approach and determined case study as the dissertation’s research design.
● Stage 2: Field visits with policy implementation focus in August 2017
In addition to policy literature, the pilot study suggested that land-taking policy
noncompliance in Vietnam might be related to a variety of factors associated with
different stages of the public policy process. Therefore, the second field visit was to
ensure if a focus on the implementation stage of the land-taking policy is a right choice.
After 14 days in the two provinces of Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc, the researcher got
updated with latest rules and procedures of the land-taking policy. Some focus groups
and in-depth interviews were conducted with local officials and affected land users for a
deeper understanding of the land-taking policy. Finally, the researcher decided to explore
policy implementation stage. Some profiles of land-taking incidents were collected for
initial review and analysis. In addition to choosing potential informants and inviting them
to participate in the research, data collection tools such as interview and focus group
guides were further developed and revised based on field experience.
● Stage 3: Field visits with a focus on policy tools and land users’ noncompliance
in March& August 2018, and February 2019.
The researcher came back research sites with a focus on linkages between
implementation tools and land users’ noncompliance over land-takings. Requests to
explore some selected typical cases (on-going land-taking incidents) were sent to local
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governments. However, due to the sensitiveness of the research topic, the access to a
“hot” land-taking incident in Vinh Yen city (Vinh Phuc province) was refused by the city
government. The city government suggested some other less serious incidents. However,
since there were only some noncompliant landholders, the researcher ignored the two
incidents suggested by local governments in Vinh Phuc province. In Bac Ninh province,
with efforts to access on-going incidents, the researcher was able to access a land-taking
incident in Dong Ky and Trang Ha wards (Tu Son district).
Due to difficulties in accessing typical on-going land-taking incidents in both
selected research sites, the high-profile incidents of Thu Thiem (Ho Chi Minh city) and
Dong Tam (Ha Noi city) were chosen. Both cases showed typical features and richness of
available data. For example, both land-taking incidents affected the livelihoods of a large
number of land users, lasted long, and attracted public concerns and debates on mass
media. This forced governments in the two cities to provide official data to the public.
Thousands of articles, government reports, interviews, and video clips… are available
online. More importantly, the purposive sampling of cases with significant conflict is
intended to provide relevant cases where mechanisms of non-compliance and responses
to non-compliance can be studied. This allows the researcher to reach conclusions about
the mechanisms at work in these cases. After reviewing criteria and requirements of case
selection, consulting with supervisor, the researcher decided to choose the two incidents
in Thu Thiem and Dong Tam, and the collection of secondary data started in April 2018.
3.4.3. Data sources and data forms
Field notes and observations, research participants, government’s websites,
international organizations’ websites, online newspapers, Youtube.com, official

94

documents and reports, and scholarly Journals are the main data sources of this study.
Data are in the forms of official documentations and statistics, photos and video clips,
technical reports, interview articles, notes, and transcripts. More specifically, there are
two types of data used in this dissertation research:
(i)

Primary data gathered from research participants, including government
officials and land users. This type of data was collected by the researcher
for this dissertation’s research purposes.

(ii)

Secondary data is the data gathered by other institutions and
researchers/reporters for other purposes (Bryman, 2012). For this study,
the researcher collected secondary data from the government agencies,
Vietnam based international organizations, other research teams, and
publications of mass media agencies.

3.4.4. Data collection methods
In-depth interview, focus group, document review, and web-search are four
techniques used for data collection. These techniques aim to gather qualitative (verbal
and written) evidences in order to: “exploring, describing, and explaining a complex
situation” (Rubin and Rubin, 2012: 49). The researcher relies on in-depth interviews to
collect information from local governments’ leaders and land officials. As key policy
implementers at local levels, they are among the most helpful informants about landtaking policy problems. Individual interviews with local policy implementers are not only
more convenient than focus groups but also ensure more time for in-depth discussions of
the topic under study. With separate interviews, the researcher can compare policy
implementers’ different viewpoints on key themes of interest.
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Practically, pilot studies suggested that focus group is not really a suitable method
for gathering information from government officials. In Bac Ninh province, when
officials sit in groups, they often responded with general comments; all questions were
transferred to land officials whom participants believed the best source of information on
land acquisition issues. Therefore, the researcher conducted only three focus groups with
government managers and officials. Remaining focus groups were with noncompliant
land users who get involved in disputes and conflicts over land-takings. The focus groups
provided land users a forum to share their own experiences with land-taking policy
implementation and respond to others’ views regarding to the concerns. Whereas, websearch and document review are especially helpful in gathering information on rules,
regulations, and statistics about policy implementation. The use of data collection
techniques is specifically conducted as follows:
● In-depth Interview:
As a key data collection tool in this qualitative research, the interviews are semistructured and responsive in nature because they are conversations between the
researcher and informants based on some specific topics with prepared questions. Each
responsive interview that lasts from 60 to 90 minutes is developed around three elements:
main questions, follow-up questions, and probes (Rubin and Rubin, 2012: 116). The main
questions cover the overall research questions and structure the interview, while further
details and in-depth justifications on themes, concepts, or events are gathered by followup questions. The role of probes is to keep conversations on track and clarifying
ambiguities. Alternatively, these are topical interviews in which the researcher “looks for
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specific facts, descriptions of events, or examples that will help answer a particular,
focused research question” (Rubin and Rubin, 2012: 31).
Fieldwork study revealed that leaders and officials in the land sector were the
most active respondents while officials working in other government agencies that
involve in land-taking policy implementation were unable to provide detailed information
on interested topics. These participants shared that their role is only to collaborate with
land officials whose responsibility is the land-taking policy implementation. This reasons
why in-depth interviews were only conducted with research participants working in the
land sector. In practice, due to the sensitiveness of the research topic, the researcher was
unable to schedule interviews with government leaders. They were unwilling to
participate in a recorded interview. They, however, could meet with the researcher and
had free conversations without recording. The researcher took this chance to ask some
key questions and took notes that then were used for data analysis.
Totally, the researcher conducted 13 in-depth interviews. Interviewees included
heads of DONRE of Tu Son, Yen Phong, Que Vo in Bac Ninh province; Vinh Yen and
Binh Xuyen (Vinh Phuc province); deputy director of Bac Ninh’s CLD; head of Bac
Ninh’s land management agency, head of Tu Son’s CLD; land officials in Dong Ky and
Trang Ha wards, and Tu Son DONRE, and two affected landholders in Dong Ky and
Trang Ha wards. In addition, the researcher also conducted numerous short conversations
(in around 10 to 15 minutes) with landholders and government managers/leaders. These
conversations were taking notes for later analysis.
● Focus Group:

97

A limited number of participants were invited to sit together in an isolated setting.
The researcher acted as a facilitator who posed some questions, moved the conversation
along, and intervened if necessary, to manage the focus groups on track. Participants in
focus groups were able to freely share their opinions and experiences, responded to each
other’s viewpoints on topics under discussion. Each focus group included about 6 – 8
individuals representing affected land users and lasted from 60 to 90 minutes. In practice,
as reported above, focus group was not really an appropriate data collection instrument.
The researcher used focus group as a means for discovering general issues and then
included in in-depth interviews.
The total number of focus groups, thus, is 06. Focus groups were organized with
government officials in Tu Son district; managers in the land sector Bac Ninh provincial
government; managers in the land sector in Vinh Phuc provincial government; two focus
groups with landholders in Dong Ky and Trang Ha wards (Tu Son, Bac Ninh); and one
with landholders in Tich Son ward (Vinh Yen district, Vinh Phuc province). .
● Web-search and Document Review:
Web-search and document review involve examining anything in written forms
(Rubin and Rubin, 2012: 27). Collected documents include government’s socio-economic
plans, land use planning reports, annual land acquisition reports, executive orders,
decrees and directives, CPV’s resolutions, meeting transcripts, video transcripts,
newspapers, speeches, interviews, or internet posts…etc. Web-search was also a
technique to collect data available in form of video clips. Information obtained from
public sources was used to support data collected from research participants. Web-search
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and document review were the only technique used to collect data on Thu Thiem and
Dong Tam incidents.
3.4.5. Recording and data management
At the beginning of the data collection process, the researcher intended to record
all interviews and focus groups. However, while recording was accepted with land users,
only some government officials allowed their interviews to be recorded. This is because
all issues regarding an ongoing land-taking project are very sensitive in local contexts.
Land officials were often anxious that recordings can be used against them who get
involved in land-taking policy implementation. Taking notes, therefore, was an
alternative technique for data collection at research fields.
Selected sections of recorded interviews and group discussions were transcribed;
field notes were typed; and data in forms of media outputs such as video clips and articles
accompanied by links were saved in separate folder. All collected data are stored in
personal device such as USB and laptop. Each interview/focus group is numbered so that
the researcher is the only person who can identify and use the research data. Only
selected extracts are translated into English for data representation and analysis purposes.
3.5. Data Analysis and Representation
3.5.1. Data analysis strategy
The purpose of data analysis is to make clear and convincing answers to the
research questions based on raw data (Rubin and Rubin, 2012: 190). One of the most
important features of qualitative studies is that researchers seek an understanding of a
particular issue or problem or phenomenon from the perspective of whom experiences it
(Vaismoradi, Turunen, and Bondas, 2013). The task of qualitative data analysts,
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therefore, is to search for commonalities, contrasts, and the meanings in the collected data
(Grbich, 2007). According to Creswell (2013, 181-220), the analysis of qualitative data
aims to answer two questions: (i) “what does the data say?”, and (ii) what do the findings
mean? A typical qualitative data analysis often follows three common steps: (i) line by
line coding; (ii) categorizing; and (iii) analyzing and interpreting key contents and themes
(Bryman, 2012). In this study, the researcher relies on the theoretical prepositions-based
approach as the general data analysis strategy. That is, the tool focused research
prepositions developed prior data collection are used to organize common themes and
guide the data analysis. Basically, the analysis of qualitative data follows steps below:
● Organizing data: the collected data were saved and stored into different
categories such as in-depth interviews, focus groups, government’s documents, and
media publications. The researcher carefully reviewed all organized data files to find if
the data can be used or any mistakes/errors occurred.
● Finding and organizing key concepts and main ideas: the researcher carefully
read documented data, listened and re-listened to recordings, and watched video clips to
find key concepts and construct main ideas. Concepts and ideas were then grouped into
categorical issues associated with research propositions; initial codes were formed. By
this approach, the researcher was able to note down important concepts and ideas as they
appeared and organized the data in responding to the research questions.
● Developing themes in the data: based on research prepositions, some common
tool-focused themes were tentatively developed by the researcher. The researcher then
relied on codes to find evidence supporting key themes developed prior the data
collection or construct new themes found in the coded data. Typed transcripts and field
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notes, government documents, and media outputs were marked with codes that helped the
researcher easily found and linked the data in writing up research results. Sub-themes
such as “policy mechanism”, “tool mix”, “tool preference”, “contextual factors”, “tool
response” …etc. were used to conduct a cross-case analysis.
● Ensuring validity: validity raises the question of integrity of research findings,
interpretations, and conclusions (Bryman, 2012: 47). In this qualitative study, the
researcher is concerned with two types of validity, including: internal validity and
ecological validity. While internal validity is helpful to verify if there is a potential
relationship between implementation tools and noncompliance over land-takings,
ecological validity encourages an awareness of questioning whether research findings
really happen in local natural settings. Specifically, the researcher is the first person to
check the accuracy of qualitative accounts. Evidence from different sources (ex. land
users vs. land officials) is corroborated to shed light on themes. In addition to field
observations, corroborating evidence allows the researcher to triangulate information and
provide validity to research findings. The second technique for ensuring validity of the
research is seeking feedback from research participants. By this technique, research
participants were invited to provide feedback on findings and interpretations. Participant
feedback then was used to judge the accuracy and credibility of qualitative accounts
(Maxwell, 2013: 261).
● Interpreting research findings and developing naturalistic generalizations:
research findings first were summarized, interpreted, and discussed in the context of
literature covered in this study. By this step, the researcher discussed the significance of
the study findings in relation to both empirical and theoretical literature. In the next step,

101

the researcher developed generalized lessons and initial conclusions. Finally, policy
implications of research findings were assessed for the topic under study: e.g. how to
make better choice of implementation tools to reduce the incidents of noncompliance.
3.5.2. Data analysis techniques
This study’s data analysis is an on-going process that started from the beginning
of data collection: the researcher regularly reviewed field notes, documents, media
publications, and transcripts to develop a general overview of textual contents, video
clips, and informants’ responses, identified notable words (key concepts),key sentences
(main ideas),and compared them to find differences and similarities that then were used
to organize into themes. In addition to “coding” as a key technique, content analysis and
thematic analysis were the two methods used for analyzing the collected data.
● Coding: the main purpose of coding is to mark key ideas found in the data
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). The deductive coding technique employed in this study starts
with pre-set themes developed by the researcher to group similar types of information
into themes or categories. This process, however, is very open and flexible because the
researcher can either select informants’ words or his own words for coding. In either way,
the key words used as codes must reflect meanings of the sentences or participants’
experiences. The table 3 below presents some key codes and code categories used in this
study.
Several categories of codes showing shared experiences by research participants
were developed. By comparing codes, the researcher can develop some code categories
covering similar responses among participants. Each category captures a theme or issue
that is convenient for finding coded paragraphs, further exploring them and conducting
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analysis. Linked categories consist of participants’ common experiences that help to
quickly identify significant issues or topics. Instead of reviewing single codes, code
categories can be used for later analysis purposes.
Table 3: Coding in data analysis
Categories

Codes

● Policy Mechanism

Direct/Indirect Government, Authority,
Finance, Information

● Organizational Tools

Government, Non-Government

● Authoritative Tools

Regulation, Rule, Executive Order

● Financial or financial equivalent Tools
● Information based Tools

Cash, Land, Apartment
Dialogue, Press Conference, Propaganda,
Moral Suassions, Poster, Proclamation

● Contextual Factors

Legislation, culture, society, economics

● Content Analysis: to gather information and evidence for qualitative reports,
researchers can examine documented and video-typed contents to find out who says
what, to whom, and with what effect – this refer to content analysis method(Bloor and
Wood, 2006). The method of content analysis is defined as “an approach to the analysis
of documents and texts that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined
categories and in a systematic and replicable manner” (Bryman, 2012: 290). Researchers
subjectively interpret the documented data “through the systematic classification process
of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). By examining
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textual data, researchers can identify and describe patterns of language and words used in
documents and by informants in interviews and focus groups. They might also find
frequency and relationships of trends and patterns as well as structures and discourses of
communication. Based on reviewing documents and transcripts, researchers can break the
texts into sub-units of contents for further exploration. Information/messages collected
from content analysis can be used for hypothesis tests or theory development
(Vaismoradi et al, 2013). The content analysis method can also provide a useful tool to
describe what patterns are, quantify the data, and offer a more effective means to
compare views of different research participants (Morgan, 1993). Most importantly, the
content analysis method is more useful in a study that researchers aim to test hypotheses,
modify, or extend existing theories (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005).
In this study, content analysis was used to work with government’s documents
and online publications such as news articles, media interviews, and journal articles. The
researcher followed three steps of content analysis as outlined by Elo and Kyngas (2008):
(i) Preparation: the researcher immerses in the collected data in order to obtains
the sense of the whole.
(ii) Organizing: the researcher codes, creates categories, groups codes into
headings, develops a general description of the research topic.
(iii) Reporting: the researcher develops conceptual systems, conceptual maps, or
categories, and a story line to present research results.
● Thematic Analysis: as this study’s main qualitative data analysis method,
thematic analysis is used by researchers to identify, analyze, and report patterns (themes)
within data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Data set in forms of interviews, texts, or focus
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groups will be searched by the researcher to find repeated patterns of meaning. Various
aspects of the research topic, then, will be interpreted based on a constructionist
epistemology. A theme is something important found in data in relation to research
questions and represents patterned responses or meaning within the data set.
In order to determine what counts as a theme and how to work with the collected
data, this study adopt “theoretical thematic approach” in which the researcher’s
theoretical interests direct the entire data analysis process. Instead of providing a rich
description of the data overall, a study with theoretical thematic approach focuses on
analyzing in detail some aspects of the data. This means that the researcher’s analytic
preconceptions will guide data coding, and the analysis is not data driven. Instead,
thematic data analysis started when the researcher began to collect online data or
conducted interviews/focus groups at research fields. Drafting ideas and developing a
structure of the research report also were initiated during the data collection and analysis
process.
Specifically, thematic data analysis in this study followed6 steps as suggested by
Braun and Clarke (2006):
(i) Becoming familiar with data: the researcher reviewed all documented data,
listened to recordings and transcribed the collected data, repeatedly read the data and
searched for initial ideas/issues of interest.
(ii) Generating initial codes: important features found in the data such as
significant actors, images, and words were coded.
(iii) Looking for patterns/searching for themes: codes were grouped into themes
and gathered relevant data to each theme.
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(iv) Reviewing themes/patterns: the researcher checked if themes were workable
with the coded extracts and developed a map of themes/patterns for analysis.
(v) Defining and naming themes: the researcher refined themes, clearly defined
key themes, and organized the overall story told by themes.
(vi) Producing the research report: extracts, photos, video clips, or charts were
used to produce the final research report.
3.5.3. Data representation
Without a good data representation approach, researchers are unable to make
sense of the data for others (Grbich, 2007). In this qualitative study, data analysis and
representation start with an overview description of land-taking cases. This section
provides facts - a detailed view of aspects about three land-taking noncompliant
incidents. It highlights key events, major characteristics of each incident and its local
setting, roles and activities of actors and stakeholders involved in the incidents. The data
are then organized into common themes emerging across three cases such as policy
mechanism, tool mix, tool preferences…etc. Finally, research findings that are
generalizations learned from cases in terms of themes will be discussed in the context of
published literature, compared and contrasted with other studies on land-taking
noncompliance.
Regarding data illustration techniques, in addition to “quotes”, the researcher also
relies on “graphic summaries” and “visual displays” for presenting study results.
“Graphic summaries” that includes tables, charts, matrices, graphs…can provide a quick
summary of some kinds of collected statistics or key patterns/themes found in the
research data. This technique of data representation is useful for presenting an overall
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snapshot of themes or an overview of factors under analysis. Whereas, “quotes” in both
English and Vietnamese are selected segments of transcripts used in final reports for
either illustration purposes or as a starter for more detailed discussions and explanations.
Finally, visual displays such as photos and video clips bring readers real feelings and
impressions about things that the researcher wants to emphasize or illustrate.
3.6. Summary of the Chapter
Chapter 3 on research methodology presents the research design and methods for
data collection and analysis adopted in this dissertation study. The relationship between
policy tools and policy noncompliance is a brand-new research direction in Vietnam. The
researcher, thus, aims to address the research question if tools contribute to
noncompliance with land acquisition? How? Because the research question is in form of
how that targets exploratory purposes, a qualitative case study is selected as the research
design. Case study is a right choice of research design because it allows the researcher
focusing on a limited number of cases and developing an in-depth understanding of the
topic under study. The researcher will have chance to interact with research participants
in local settings, discover unique story of each case, and tell stories from insiders’ lens.
By qualitative strategy, the researcher is not able to discover if implementation tools
relate to policy noncompliance but also understand when and how tools can contribute to
landholders’ noncompliance.
This study selected land-taking instances as the unit of analysis. Since the
research interest was land-taking noncompliance, the researcher was interested in landtaking incidents in which local governments had to deal with landholders’ resistance over
land acquisition. After several filed visits, three land-taking incidents taking place in
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different locations (Hanoi, Bac Ninh, and HCMC) were selected for analysis. While the
case of Tu Son allowed the researcher to get real experience of policy implementation in
local context, two high profile cases of Thu Thiem and Dong Tam brought the researcher
an opportunity to explore similarities and variations of land acquisition across
province/city in Vietnam.
The researcher used two types of data for analysis: primary data collected by the
researcher at research sites and secondary data gathered from media publications.
Research participants in this study included affected land users, policy implementers,
local government managers and leaders. In-depth interviews, focus groups, and websearch were three major instruments used to collect data. The researcher spent a large
amount of time over the last two years in Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc provinces. While the
selected incident of Tu Son is a district in Bac Ninh, the researcher also conducted
fieldwork in Vinh Phuc province to gain additional experience with land acquisition in a
different setting.
Three techniques of data analysis used in this study included: coding, thematic
analysis, and content analysis. The researcher listened to recordings, watched video clips,
and reviewed field notes and documented texts to find out common themes across three
incidents. Instead of analyzing single case, the researcher conducted a cross case analysis
based on common themes emerged from three incidents.
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CHAPTER IV: DESCRIPTION OF THE CASES

4.1. Introduction
Three land-taking incidents selected for this study took place in Thu Thiem in the
HCM city area; in Tu Son district (Bac Ninh province, North of Hanoi); and in Dong
Tam commune (Hanoi capital city).Governments in Ho Chi Minh City and Bac Ninh
province acquired land for urban/economic development and public infrastructure. Land
acquisition in Dong Tam, whereas, was for defense purpose.

Figure 4. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam
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Chapter iv presents a description of the selected land-taking projects that local
government had to deal with noncompliance. The key details related to each of the
incident include the location and local context, starting time and time length, acquired
land area, land-taking purposes, number of affected people, number of noncompliant
landholders, the evolution and intensity of noncompliance, the government’s responses to
noncompliance and the consequences. Facts provided in this background chapter will not
only help to draw a situational picture about the specific noncompliance but also further
clarify why economic, institutional, and participatory governance factors are insufficient
to explain the selected incidents. A detailed description of incidents will also help to
reveal the research opportunity for the policy tool approach that is expected to generate
new insights about landholders’ noncompliance in land-taking policy implementation in
Vietnam.
4.2. The case of Tu Son –Land Acquisition for Infrastructure in BT design
The land-taking instance in Tu Son (Bac Ninh province) is in a building and
transfer design (BT project) in which the government partners with private investors to
construct public infrastructure or provide public services. The public–private partnership
(PPP) was recognized in the Vietnam’s 2014 Law of Investment and further specified by
the central government’s Decree 15/2015/NĐ-CP (CGV, 2015). Over the last years, this
policy has resulted in the proliferation of BT and BOT project across Vietnam. PPP has
been preferably used by local government across Vietnam for public infrastructure
development. The involvement of private investors in BT and Bot projects, however, also
make land acquisition more complicated and disputes are more likely to occur (Anh
Phuong, 2018). Within Tu Son district, several public constructions (e.g. roads and a
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water supply system) were funded by private sources. The provincial government often
used land as a “matching capital” to attract private investors for public constructions. The
Tu Son incident was in form of claim and petition over land-taking because it lasted long
but landholders did not rely on violent acts to protect thier land.
Local context

Figure 5. Provincial Road TL 277 in Tu Son district
(Source: tuson.bacninh.gov.vn)
Locating in the North of Hanoi capital city, Tu Son is the second largest district of
Bac Ninh province. The district has a natural area of 61, 33 km2, and a population of
163.000 people(TSG, 2017). After nearly two decades of urbanization process, Tu Son
district has become a new urban center that increasingly required a modern infrastructure
system. In 2012, the district government was approved by Bac Ninh’s PPC to take land
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serving the construction of a road in BT design. However, like other BT and BOT
projects across Vietnam, the local government confronted disobedience among affected
land users who argued that investors should only receive land in locations that they
invested in.
The disputes

Figure 6. Compulsory land acquisition in Dong Ky ward
(Source: tuson.bacninh.gov.vn)
The Tu Son case was a typical BT land-taking incident that the researcher had
chance to get real experiences with policy implementation in the research field. Disputes
arose in late 2012 when the provincial government recovered land in two wards of Dong
Ky and Trang Ha to construct a provincial road of 9 km in length. The project was a
Build – Transfer Design (BT project) in which a private company, Long Phuong Co., was
selected by the provincial government to build the road. A unique characteristic of Tu
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Son incident was that the government had to deal with individual households to recover
numerous small plots of land. Since the road went through both residential areas and
agricultural field, types of affected land varied between households. Some households
had to give up part of their housing land right of way while others were acquired a piece
of farming land. More importantly, because landholders knew that the road was in the BT
design and investors was assigned another land patch in the same two wards, land
acquisition became more complicated. As the researcher leant at the dialogue between Tu
Son district BCGC and affected landholders on September 5, 2018, some landholders did
not believe in the public purpose of land-taking. They instead often had doubts about land
transactions for profits once the government recovered land for BT projects.

Figure 7. Dialogue with noncompliant land users in Dong Ky ward on September 5, 2018
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There were 323 landholders who had to give up part of their land to the provincial
government. The total acquired land area was 86.9 ha of which 39.4 ha was taken by the
provincial government while the district government appropriated the remaining 47.5 ha
for the road. There were 49 disobedient land holders who did not accept government’s
compensation offers. Specifically, land-taking that started in 2012, was carried out in two
phases: in phase 1, there were 199 affected households of which the government had to
forcefully acquire land from 35. In the 2nd phase, the district government took 1.97 ha
affecting 124 households. However, 14 out of 124 households resisted the land-taking
plan. Disputes did not last long but affect the road construction. Though the road was
supposed to be completed in the first half of 2018, disobedience over land-taking delayed
progress until January 2019 (TSG, 2017).
Dealing with noncompliance, public officials were sent to individually convince
resistant landholders at their home. The government also organized several dialogues
with affected landholders to reach a settlement. Despite government’s persuasion efforts,
noncompliance over land-taking resulted in disputes and tensions, and critically slowed
progress of the road construction. According to land officials, with the involvement of
private investors, land users mainly disputed unfair land price and low compensation.
They did not really care about the public interest of land appropriation. They instead
wanted to directly negotiate with investors for better benefits and higher compensation.
This was because affected landholders knew that private investors who built the road will
receive another land area for business purposes.
Coercive land acquisition: Long lasting noncompliance resulted in a provincial
government’s executive order that allowed compulsory land acquisition. The Tu Son
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district government then continued to dialogue with noncompliant land users until
September 2017. However, the remaining 14 affected landholders still disagreed with
compensation offers. Finally, in late September 2017, the local government acquired the
land by force.
4.3. The case of Thu Thiem – Land Acquisition for Economic Development
Local context: Thu Thiem is located in Ho Chi Minh City (HCM) – the heart of
Vietnam’s economy. According to ICB (2018), the general plan of Thu Thiem was
approved by the Premier in 1996. The total area covered 930 ha and had a population of
180.000. In June 2002, the HCM city’s Council approved a plan to transform Thu Thiem
into an international finance and services center. Thu Thiem was expected to be a key
part of the urbanization and development of the city’s Eastern areas. The new urban
complex consists of seven functional sub-sections such as office buildings, a recreation
and tourism zone, an administrative zone, a financial and trade zone, and a resettlement
zone. According to the Investment and Construction Board of Thu Thiem, the HCMC
government by 2015 had acquired 930 ha of land in preparation to develop the new urban
center. Land acquisition was conducted in five areas: An Khanh, Binh An, Binh Khanh,
An Loi Đong, and Thu Thiem. Land-taking affected 14,351 households and over 60,000
residents. By the end of 2015, the city government had compensated 14.251 households,
accounting for 99. 28% with total acquired land area of 715. 143 ha (98. 97%).
The disputes: Disputes started in mid-2000s, but the most serious disputes mainly
took place over the area of 4.3 ha that was outside of the boundary line of the Thu Thiem
complex (Central government’s Inspectorate, 2018). The land acquisition of 4.3 ha
affected 321 households: 166 accepted compensation and moved to new places while 155
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noncompliant households were compulsorily removed by the city government (Huy
Thinh, 2019). These 115 noncompliant landholders owning 7. 4065 ha remained in
possession of the land. They disputed the city government’s claim that their land was
within the borders of the Thu Thiem project (ICB, 2018). Some of the 115 noncompliant
land users asked the HCM city government for a separate land-taking plan. Giving the
city government did not accept land users’ request, disputes lasted over nearly two
decades. This made Thu Thiem incident become one of the most serious land-taking
conflict that was ranked on top of the intensity-base typology of land-taking
noncompliant manifestations.

Figure 8. New Urban Area of Thu Thiem (Source: baogiaothong.vn)
. A key reason for disagreement between land users and the city government were
the different scales between the map issued in 1996 by the Premier (latter approved by
the city government in 2005) and a modified map issued by the Ho Chi Minh City
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government in 2012. According to the original map approved by the central government,
these 115 noncompliant households were not affected by the Thu Thiem project while the
Ho Chi Minh City’s new land planning map did include them. Tensions rose from 2005
and more serious disputes began in September 2014 when land users sent a collective
petition to the City government. Since the city government’s response did not meet the
land users’ demands, they sent the petition to the central government (Minh Quang,
2018). Affected land users’ grievances reached a peak between 2016 and 2018 when the
district government forcibly remove them in order to take the land.

Figure 9. Apartments and Office Buildings under construction in Thu Thiem

(Source: News.zing.vn)
Still seeking a solution: In late 2018, responding to the land users’ request
regarding the original land planning map, the City government stated that the map was
lost. However, the land users had a map copy and made it public. This turned the Thu
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Thiem incident into a “hot land scandal” in Vietnam (Vietnamnet, 2018). After the
central government’s inspectorate released the inspection report in September 2018, some
city’s high-ranking leaders were disciplined. The government also issued a commitment
that they would make their best efforts to solve disputes in the last two months of 2018.
However, until May 2019, the Thu Thiem incident has not been solved yet. At the
meeting between representatives of the National Congress and voters on May 7, 2019,
affected landholders still aggressively criticized the city government for slow progress of
solving the Thu Thiem incident. Many landholders asked representatives to bring this
incident to the National Congress.

Figure 10. A dialogue between land holders and the HCM city government

(Source: cafebiz.vn)
4.4. The case of Dong Tam – Land Acquisition for Defense Purpose
Local context: Dong Tam is a rural community locating 40 km in distance from
the Hanoi’s city center. Most villagers work on agricultural field surrounding their
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commune. The Dong Tam event is distinct from other land-taking disputes because the
incident was a collective resistance led by a former commune’s leader. Thousands of
villagers resisted land acquisition for Viettel. Co. owned by the Ministry of Defense.
Viettel Co. was founded in 1989 and now is one of the two largest telecommunication
corporations in Vietnam. Considering the number of service users, Viettel is among top
15 global telecommunication providers. In addition to the telecommunication service,
Viettel Co. is also a defense technology producer - one of the most successful enterprise
owned by the State of Vietnam (Viettel, 2019).

Figure 11. Noncompliant land holders at the disputed field

(Source: vtc.com.vn)
The villagers’ collective resistance
In May 2015, the city government authorized the My Duc district government to
acquire 50.03 ha of land and assigned the land for Viettel Co. The original source of the
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land-taking dispute in Dong Tam case that took place from 2015, was the question of the
boundary lines between defense and non-defense land. While the government asserted
Dong Tam farmers illegally used defense land, villagers showed evidences that the land
area assigned for the airport construction did not covered the disputed land. Defense or
non-defense land was important because the exact boundary could determine if the
government could take the land for defense purposes which would minimize
compensation. According to Articles 64 and 65 of the 2013 LOL, the State does not
compensate landholders for the defense land. This means that Dong Tam villagers might
have to give up their land without any compensation (Nghia Hoang, 2017).

Figure 12. Police hostages in village’s cultural house
(Source: bbc.com)
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As required by the LOL, land-taking was conducted by the district BCGC. From
the city’s point of view, the land-taking was legitimate because villagers occupied
defense land without permissions from government. According to the city, in 1980, the
central government acquired a land from four communes: My Luong, Tran Phu, Đong
Lac (Chuong My district) and Dong Tam (My Duc district), in order to build a military
airport. In 2014, the Ministry of Defense assigned the land area for a military unit for
their use. In 2015, to have land for Viettel Co., the Ministry of Defense and My Duc
district government announced a recovery of 50.03 ha of defense land, including 46 ha
where Dong Tam farmers were doing agriculture. Both the city and district governments
asserted that since Dong Tam residents illegally used the defense land for farming
purposes, they had to leave the land (Nghia Hoang, 2017).

Figure 13. Villagers’ preparations to deal with government’s potential attack

(Source: bbc.com)
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Local villagers resisted the land-taking plan because, as they asserted, 46 ha out
of 50.03 ha was not land used for defense purposes. In other words, most of the acquired
land is non-defense land that should still belong to Dong Tam commune (Hai Long,
2016). According to land holders, in 1980, a land area of 47.36 ha in Dong Tam was
acquired by the central government to construct a military airport. However, because the
airport construction plan was canceled in 2007, the military unit managing the land
returned the total acquired area of 47.36 ha to Dong Tam commune. On July 30, 2007,
the district and commune governments certified the borders separating defense land from
non-defense land that latter was reverted to land users. Local villagers hoped they would
then be able to use the land for agricultural production. However, year after year, the
local land holders were not able to access the land. Whereas, some large land transactions
were made under the support of district and commune governments. More importantly,
Dong Tam farmers found that the transacted land area was not defense land; it belonged
to the acquired land area of 47.36 ha that should have been returned to Dong Tam
residents.
“As far as I know, all land area here was originally used by Dong Tam residents
from the early 1960s. On April 14, 1980, the vice premier signed executive order no.
113/TTg collecting 47.36 ha for an airport construction. Dong Tam villagers remained
farming on the area of 59 ha in the East side of the airport. Only 14 households were
allowed doing agriculture on the airport land (47.36 ha). Villagers did not occupy or use
any other plots of airport land. On the other side of the planned airport, there was an area
of 6.8 ha tentatively used for the airport’s further development…called “project land”,
but this area was not included in the defense land area of 47.36 ha. In 2006, since the
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airport plan was canceled, the military unit managing 6.8 ha returned the land area to
Dong Tam commune. Dispute took place when Viettel.co started construction in 2015
while Dong Tam villagers were not able to access the land (Le Dinh Kinh, former
secretary of the commune government, leader of noncompliant villagers).

Figure 14. Dong Tam villagers met with Hanoi city’s mayor on April 22nd, 2017

(Source: vtc.com.vn)
Claims and petitions were sent to the Ministry of Defense, the district government
of My Duc, and to the city government of Hanoi. However, land holders’ claims were not
accepted by local governments and the Ministry of Defense. In 2015, Viettel Co. started
their construction on disputed land. Dong Tam villagers disagreed. From late 2016 to
February 2017, they camped and occupied the land area of 46 ha to keep delay the
construction. In early March 2017, the district government sent delegations to talk to land
users. Villagers, however, did not cooperate with government officials. Tensions
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continued to increase when land users occupied the commune government’s offices and
did not allow government delegations to leave. In order to protect the disputed land and
solve the conflicting situation, the city government sent police. On April 15, 2017, Hanoi
police arrested four noncompliant land users, including Mr. Le Dinh Kinh - .82 years old,
former party secretary of the commune government, leader of affected land users, who
severely got injured in the arrest (Bbc.com, 2017).Government’s aggressive actions
resulted in a serous clash between land users and law enforcement force: villagers
damaged police cars and detained 38 public officials to request a dialogue with the city’s
mayor. Noncompliant villagers stated that they are willing to use violence if the city
government attacked them to free the hostages. Local villagers’ grievances and tensions
were only reduced after the city promised a meeting between villagers and the city’s
mayor (Ives, 2017).

Figure 15. Hostages were freed on April 22nd, 2017

(Source: vtc.com.vn)
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Authority based settlement
The high-profile conflict finally was solved by several public meetings and
dialogues between the city’s mayor and the villagers in April and May 2017. Tensions
were minimized; the construction of Viettel. Co was delayed and some corrupt land
officials were prosecuted. The city government’s inspectorate was required to inspect the
land acquisition project in Dong Tam. In late July 2017, city’s inspectorates confirmed
that the total area of defense land assigned for the airport construction was 236.7 ha that
covered disputed land (Vo Hai, 2019). Noncompliant disagreed and sent a petition to the
central government’s inspectorate. In April 2019, after reviewing the inspection report
published by the Hanoi government’s inspectorate, the central government’s inspectorate
asserted conclusions made by the Hanoi government were correct and legal. The disputed
land was defense land. Dong Tam villagers were not invited to information sessions
organized by the city government. They were required to give up the land and the city
might consider compensate 14 land users who had properties on the disputed land.
4.5. Summary of the Chapter
The history of land acquisition in Vietnam officially started with the Land Law
of1993. Between 1993 and 2003, compulsory land acquisition by the State was the only
form of land recovery. The revised Land Law of 2003 allowed two forms: voluntary and
compulsory recoveries/acquisitions that remained in the latest LOL of 2013. All three
land-taking projects chosen for this study fall into the second category – compulsory
acquisition. This chapter provides a descriptive background of three cases under study.
Three selected land-taking cases represent different types of land-taking
noncompliance in Vietnam: if the involvement of private investors in a public – private
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partnership challenged the legitimacy of land acquisitions in Bac Ninh province (Tu Son
incident), the unclear boundary of acquired defense land fueled a collective resistance
among villagers in Dong Tam (Hanoi city). Whereas, HCMC government confronted
with wicked challenges of a large land-taking plan for economic development. The three
incidents under study vary in terms of locations, time length, causes of noncompliance,
number of affected landholders, number of noncompliant landholders, and level of
intensity. A common procedural feature, however, shared by all three incidents is that the
government was willing to take land by force after failing in convincing landholders to
give up their land. Key facts about the three incidents are summarized in the table below:
Table 4: Facts about three land-taking incidents
Facts
● Acquired land area
● Main purposes
● No. of affected
landholders
● No. of noncompliant
● Time Length
● Types of
Noncompliance
● Types of
Compensation

Land-Taking Incidents
Thu Thiem
Dong Tam
Tu Son
930 ha
50.03 ha
86.9 ha
Economic
Defense
Infrastructure
Development
Development
14,351
All villagers
323
115
2005 - 2019

All villager
2015-2019

49
2015-2017
Daily
Petition & Dispute
Land occupation resistance,
& Violence
dispute,
and
land occupation
Cash and resettlement
Cash
apartments
No

Note: There was only 14 landholders who were farming on the affected land area
in Dong Tam incident and being required to give up the land. However, the Dong Tam
incident was a collective disobedience in which an unverified number of villagers
disputed the Hanoi government’s land acquisition.
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CHAPTER V: NONCOMPLIANCE WITH LAND ACQUISITION - A
POLICY TOOL FOCUSED ANALYSIS

“Tools define the set of actors who will be part of the cast during the
all-important

implementation

process

that

follows

program

enactment, and they determine the roles that these actors will play.
Since these different actors have their own perspectives, ethos,
standard operating procedures, skills, and incentives, by determining
these actors the choice of tools importantly influences the outcome of
the process” (Salamon, 2002: 10)

5.1. Introduction
The fifth chapter of the dissertation presents a tool-focused analysis of three landtaking noncompliance. The researcher aims to explore if implementation tools contribute
to land users’ noncompliance. How? This key research question requires a differentiation
between the institutional design of land-taking policy (embedded in land legislation) and
actions of implementers in practice. This study, th us, will only be concerned
characteristics of tools and local officials’ actions (e.g. tool choice, use, and management)
in order to acquire land. The researcher proposes that since implementation tools
determine interactions and relationships between implementers and target groups, tools’
choice and use might contribute to landholders’ policy noncompliance.
Adopting the cross-case analysis approach, the researcher will not present
analysis of single cases. Individual cases (incidents) instead serve as the evidentiary base
for the multiple case analysis. The analysis, specifically, was guided by sub-analytic
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questions: (i) what were tool mixes used by local implementers to acquire land in Thu
Thiem, Dong Tam, and Tu Son? (ii) what were common patterns of tool-based responses
to noncompliance? (iv) what were tools used to settle incidents? And (v) how, if any, did
tools’ characteristics (e.g. strengths, weaknesses, choice, use, and management)
contribute to policy noncompliance? Based on sub-questions, the researcher developed
three general themes to construct a theme-based analysis: (i) tool mixes in acquiring land,
(ii) tool-based responses to noncompliance, and (iii) tool choice to settle incidents. These
were common themes arose across three incidents. Each general theme then was divided
into sub-themes that covered specific tools such as organizational tools or authoritative
tools. With a tool focused perspective in mind, the researcher looked for evidence that
linked policy tools and tool adoption, with land users’ noncompliance.
This chapter, therefore, synthesizes lessons from all of three incidents under
study. The analysis consists of three theme-based sections: first, the researcher begins the
analytic discovery with an examination of implementation tools mixes used by local
governments to execute their land-taking projects. Patterns of tools choice and use will be
described and generalized in order to assess strengths, weaknesses, and inappropriateness
of each tool and tool mixes as well. Next, the second general theme is an exploration of
implementers’ tool-based responses in dealing with land acquisition noncompliance. The
researcher will identify tool preferences and patterns of tool choice/use that might
determine outputs and outcomes of the execution of a land-taking project. The third
section of this cross-case analysis describes major motifs of governments’ tool related
actions to settle disputes over land acquisition. The chapter finally ends with a concluding
summary of research findings that will be discussed in detail in the sixth chapter.
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Figure 16: Tools framework used to analyze land-taking incidents
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5.2. Implementation Tool Mixes
Based on policy tool literature, the researcher developed a theoretical framework
of tools used to direct the analysis of three land-taking incidents. The tool framework
consists of five major policy mechanism: (i) Direct Government, (ii) Indirect
Government, (iii) Authority, (iv) Finance; and (v) Information (as summarized in Figure
2 on page 120). However, the tool based theoretical framework used in this study
excludes the “Indirect Government” because Vietnam’s current land legislation does not
recognize “Indirect Government” as a land-taking policy implementation mechanism.
The remaining four mechanisms define a set of tools available for choice by
implementers to execute land acquisition projects (see figure 3 on page 140). The
following analysis of tool mixes is structured based on four sub-themes: “Organizational
Tools”, “Authoritative Tools”, “Financial Tools”, and “Information-based Tools”.
5.2.1. Organizational tools
Organizations are a key component of governing institutions (Scott, 2014). As a
policy tool, organizations are not only limited to institutional model, structure, and
decision-making rulesbut also include human and financial resources. Forms of
organizations, therefore, might reflect cultural beliefs, political contexts, and the level of
socio-economic development of a nation. From a tool perspective, organizations are
viewed in terms of the extent by which the government gets involved in the realization of
policy ideas in practice. Organizational tools that refer to government, quasi-government,
or nongovernment organizations will be assessed in relation to interactions between the
government and policy targets; effectiveness, efficiency, and consequences of types of
organizations used to change targets’ behaviors and achieve policy goals.
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Table 5: Members of BCGC - Tu Son Incident
Members of BCGC
1. Tran Duc Quyet – DPC’s Vice Mayor, Head of BCGC
2. Nguyen Manh Cuong – Head of DONRE
3. Ngo Dong Vui – Deputy Head of Tax Agency
4. Nguyen The Tuan – Head of Finance and Planning
5. Nguyen Duc Quang – Deputy Head, Office of Urban Management
6. Tran Van Ngoc – President of PCU, Trang Ha ward
7. Tran Khanh Uan –Mayor of Trang Ha ward’s PC
8. Ngo Huu Tu – Vice Mayor, Trang Ha ward’s PC
9. Tran Quang Hung – President, Mother Front Committee, Trang Ha ward
10. Nguyen Hoang Thao – Land Official, Trang Ha ward
11. Ngo Quang Sang – Financial Official, Trang Ha ward
12. Tran Quoc Hoi – Party Secretary, Binh Ha residential unit, Trang Ha ward
13. Ngo Quang Tuong – Head of Binh Ha residential unit, Trang Ha ward.
14. Tran Van Mau – Mother Front Committee, Binh Ha residential unit
15. Nguyen Trong Cai – Land Official, Binh Ha residential unit.
16. Nguyen Dang Toan – Agriculture Official, Trang Ha ward
17. Tran Van Thanh – Representative of affected household
18. Nguyen Ngoc Tan – Investor
19. Le Thi Lan – Investment project official
Source: Executive Order No. 879/QD-UBND, People’s Committee of Tu Son
Issue Date: November 18, 2016

According to Vietnam’s land legislation, direct government is a required
mechanism to implement land acquisition. Articles 61, 62, and 73 of the 2013 LOL
specify a set of government organizations involved in land-takings. If provincial people’s
committee (PPC) has authority to approve land-taking proposals, line departments,
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district and commune governments responsible for carrying out land-taking procedures.
Currently, there are two types of organizations that have functions of land acquisition: at
the provincial level, the “Center for Land Development” (CLD) operates as a service unit
that assists PPC in acquiring land in accordance with land use planning or land being
used by organizations. At district level, the “Board for Compensation and Ground
Clearance” (BCGC) is temporarily established by the district government to take land
from households. Each BCGC is responsible for one land-taking project. BCGC is also
dissolved right after a land-taking project is completed. In practice, as informed by a
manager at Bac Ninh’s CLD, noncompliance rarely occurs in land acquisition managed
by CLD. This is because of two main reasons: (i) CLD often carries out land recovery in
accordance with land use planning approved by the provincial government; and (ii) the
acquired land area then is sold at a public auction. CLDs function as a service unit
connecting land users (mostly organizations) with land developers based on market
mechanism.
All three land-taking incidents under study were executed by district BCGCs: the
2nd district’s BCG executed the Thu Thiem project; land-takings in Dong Tam commune
and Tu Son district were conducted by the My Duc BCGC and Tu Son BCGC,
respectively. To have more information about working principles and membership of
BCGCs, the researcher searched for instructions and rules used to establish BCGC in Ho
Chi Minh City and reviewed the list of BCGC members responsible for the Tu Son
incident. In both province/city, as required by the LOL and instructed by the
provincial/city government, a vice mayor of the district government served as the head of
BCGCs; other members included heads of technical offices and units such as office of
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finance, office of urban management, office of agriculture, district center for land
development. Leaders and officials of the commune government, a head of residential
unit, representatives of investors and affected landholders also participated in the district
BCGC (see table 5). Document review showed that BCGCs were a heavily governmentbased unit. Giving most members of BCGCs were government officials and leaders; the
organization operated as an administrative unit. A land official in Dong Ky commune (Tu
Son incident) commented that district government’s leaders, managers, and officials
played the most decisive role in BCGC: “Representatives of the commune government
consisted of leaders only; some compliant land users were selected to serve in BCGC.
They (selected landholders) were not really representatives of the affected people” (see
details in tables 5 and 6). The head of DONRE (Tu Son district) clarified the role of
representatives of land users that they were expected to voice land users’ demands and
preferences. They were also expected to enable fair and transparent decisions over landtakings. However, he asserted, “land users’ participation is for transparency purpose, not
to change government’s decisions”. This was also evident in the HCMC’s instructions on
establishing BCGC: the majority rule was the principle to make land-taking decision.
This rule allowed government officials who outnumbered non-government actors made
decisions as they expected. In addition, steps of land-takings described by land officials
suggested that affected land users could only engage in policy implementation once a
land-taking project was enacted. In addition, as shared by land officials in Tu Son district,
the role of investors in BCGCs was mainly to provide funding for ground clearance. One
investor shared with the researcher at the dialogue in Dong Ky ward on September 5,
2018 that their primary responsibility was to make funding available for land acquisition
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and infrastructure construction. Otherwise, they did not play any significant role in
convincing land users give up their land. All land-taking activities were conducted by
local government officials. While sitting in the meeting, the researcher observed two
investors and found that they almost kept silent; situationally, they only talked few
words. Both did not respond to landholders’ questions though those questions targeted at
them. Representatives of investors encouraged disobedient landholders to accept
compensation, so that they could complete investment projects on time. All these make
BCGC become a short-term and task-based government’s administrative unit.
Table 6: Principles of BCGCs
a) Each BCGC consists of 1-2 representatives of affected landholders. If the landtaking project affects 100 households or more, the maximum number of landholders’
representatives is not more than 4.
b) Only affected landholders can participate in BCGCs as representatives who are
voted by landholders. If affected landholders cannot select anyone for their
representatives, the district government will introduce some selected people for voting.
c) Representatives of affected landholders have responsibilities to: (i) voice
landholders’ demands; (ii) convince landholders to accept land acquisition policy,
move out and give up their land on time.
d) Working mechanism of BCGCs is collectivism: decision-making is based on the
majority rule. In case the majority rule cannot determine an option/decision, the head
of BCGCs will make the final decision.
Source: Article 39, Executive Order No. 28/2018/QD-UBND (HCMC, 2018)
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Since the sole role of direct government organizations in executing land-takings is
clearly stated in land legislation (article 66, LOL of 2013), field interviews and focus
groups with land officials and the local government’s managers/leaders aimed to find out
weaknesses, strengths, and implementers ‘organizational preferences. Field visits in Bac
Ninh and Vinh Phuc province revealed implementers’ preference over the direct
government organization. They believed that the government is the only legitimate actor
who can take land in Vietnam’s current context. Government organizations are the most
effective and efficient devices to carry out land acquisition. A Deputy Director of the
Center for land development (Bac Ninh province) asserted: “we must first follow legal
procedures as required by the LOL that emphasizes the role of the government…we
adopt articles 61, 62, 63, and 66 of the 2013 LOL”. Accordingly, he clarified, the
government has authority to convert land for important purposes such as serving defense
and security purposes, economic development and infrastructure; or serving large
projects invested by foreign investors. Depending on the size of investment projects,
land-takings will be conducted by either the district government or the provincial center
for land development. In either way, the government agencies, officials, and managers at
every level are premier actors responsible for land-taking enforcement.
Local managers and leaders in both Vinh Phuc and Bac Ninh provinces where the
researcher visited multiple times to experience policy implementation in real settings also
believed that, considering current context of Vietnam, without the direct involvement of
the government, investors and landholders are hardly to achieve agreements for land
recovery. In their explanations, giving land is owned by the State, government agencies
have legitimate authority to take land for public purposes. In disputed situations, the
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government can apply compulsory form of land acquisition. In addition to political
legitimacy of public authority and institutions, land management agencies and
government officials have technical expertise and experiences in local land sector. They
know the history of even a small piece of land within their management responsibilities.
A high-ranking land manager in Bac Ninh province (Deputy Director, Department of
Natural Resources and Environment) stated: “I think the central government should only
adopt compulsory land recovery. The practice of land-takings in Bac Ninh province
indicates that there have been few land transactions of small land plots that investors
directly discussed compensation with land users. Some could reach agreements because
their projects just affected a very small number of landholders. For bigger projects, for
example, that affected several dozens or hundreds of households, land acquisitions were
impossible without the involvement of government authorities”. Similarly, the head of
DONRE in Binh Xuyen district (Vinh Phuc province) shared that: “we have conducted
lots of land-taking projects because our district has been rapidly industrialized in the last
two decades. We constructed many industrial zones that affected farming land owned by
many landholders. Without the government, no investor could deal with numerous
landholders for land recovery. To attract investors, the government must go first to make
land ready for use”.
However, from landholders’ perspective, many people preferred non-government
actors that operate in accordance with market mechanism. When were asked about
reasons that made non-state actors a preferred choice, some land users in Tu Son (Bac
Ninh province) and Vinh Yen city (Vinh Phuc province) said they did not resist the
government but they wanted fairer land prices and higher compensation. That was why
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they requested to directly deal with investors for land conversion. Corruption was another
common worry emerged in discussions with land users. Since the unrealistic land price
resulted in very low compensation; landholders doubted that government officials could
abuse land-takings for their private interests. In the eyes of affected landholders, both
local businesses and government greatly benefited by exploiting the cheap land price
system. This made landholders untrusted in government. Similar situations also occurred
in Thu Thiem.At a dialogue with city’s top leaders, Mr. Hinh, a landholder, stood up and
talked to the city’s leaders: “the city government must clarify why only a road of 12 km
in length costs 12.000 billion VND” (Zing, 2018b). The researcher found that landholders
supported market-based negotiations because without the involvement of the government,
they could leverage their power in dealing with investors. Non-government actors could
help landholders balance power relationship with the government and investors. Such a
power relationship would enable a fairer compensation for affected land users.
The researcher also interviewed government managers and leaders working in the
land sector in provinces of Vinh Phuc and Bac Ninh for “indirect government” as an
alternative land-taking mechanism. Currently, as they reported, there is no legal provision
for land-taking policy implementation by non-government organizations. In other words,
land conversion is the sole function of the government. The head of DONRE (Tu Son
district) clarified that non-government organizations could only participate in land
valuation. Article 115 of the 2013 Land Law allowed eligible and qualified nongovernment actors to provide land valuation services. This type of organizations,
however, did not represent the indirect government mechanism because non-government
organizations were not offered funding for service provision: “Eligible private
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organizations can conduct land valuation services, but their results can be used only for
reference by government agencies. This means that land valuation by non-government
organizations is only a factor that we consider when we value land and calculate
compensation. In actuality, all land valuation activities are undertaken by government’s
agencies and staff” (head of DONRE, Tu Son district).
5.2.2. Authoritative tools
A unique characteristic of authoritative tools is the “threat of state-enforced
sanctions” (Howllet, 2011: 83). This is because authoritative tools such as regulations and
executive orders are “backed by the legitimate authority of government that grant
permission, prohibit, or require action under designated circumstances” (Schneider and
Ingram, 1990).Target groups will be punished if they violate regulations or disobey
policy decisions as stated in executive orders. The use of authoritative tools, thus,
involves significant coercion. Unlike institutions and laws, themselves, authoritative tools
are embedded in the institutional and legal framework of land policy. Authority based
tools represent the actions rather than rules. They are not the same things as rules and
laws as written. They instead are implemented rules and laws in practice. For instance,
while land prices are established by the LOL as having to be determined by the provincial
people’s council, but in practice, land prices are determined by regulatory tools and
through those tools the setting and change of land prices are often determined by local
context and government officials. The institutional perspective might point out the
unrealistic land price system that results in low compensation as a key cause of landtaking noncompliance. It, however, is impossible to explain why, for any land-taking
instance, the percentage of resistant land users only account for around 15 to 20% of the
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total number of affected landholder (as estimated by a land official in Bac Ninh
province). Therefore, the tool approach adopted in this study is not interested in
authoritative tools themselves (e.g. specific land price regulation). The researcher instead
is more interested in strengths, weaknesses, and the use of tools in real context; how are
authoritative tools mixed with other tools and linked to noncompliance (e.g. the use of
regulation to determine land value).
Table 7: Land Valuation and Land Price Framework
Article 112: Land valuation must comply with following principles: (i) based on land
use purposes at time of valuation; (ii) based on land use time; (iii) equal to common
land prices on the market. The government determines methods of land valuation.
Article 113: The central government issues a five years land price framework for each
type of land in each region. When a land price framework is effective, the central
government will adjust the land price framework if land price on the market increases
by 20% of the highest land price or decreases by 20% of the lowest land price as
regulated in land price framework.
Article 114: PPC develops land price system and send to PPCU for approval. PPC
issues land price system on the first day of five-year timeframe.
Source: Law on Land of 2013

To explore the use of authoritative tools, the researcher reviewed background
history of three incidents and discussed the choice and use of authority-based tools with
land officials in research sites. In addition to reviewing government’s documents,
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interviews and focus groups revealed that land-taking policy implementers largely relied
on authoritative tools to achieve land-taking goals. “Executive orders” and “Regulations”
played a prominent role in land-taking enforcement. While “executive orders” were used
to legalize the government’s land-taking decisions, implementers’ activities in specific
situations were guided by rules and regulations issued by both the central government
and provincial/city government. Law on Land, land price regulation, and regulations
regarding land valuation, land price, compensation, support, and resettlement were the
first authoritative tools mentioned by implementers. As shared by the head of the
DONRE (Tu Son district): “We have to strictly adopt rules as stated in the LOL and
executive orders issued by both the central government and provincial government. As
you mentioned, we know there are unrealistic aspects of land-taking regulations and
rules, but we have to act in accordance with those regulations and rules”. The head of the
DONRE (Binh Xuyen district, Vinh Phuc province) emphasized the effect of local
contexts on the province’s regulatory institutions. Each province issued its own
regulations relevant with the provincial context. Provincial regulations were used to
specify general rules stated in LOL and localize the central government’s directives and
executive orders over land-takings: “Though we must comply with the same regulations
issued by the central government, provincial contexts make land-taking regulations differ
between provinces. As you shared, Bac Ninh provincial government could offer higher
compensation than Vinh Phuc government. Land users of course knew the difference
because the two provinces shared the border. Land users also reported to us that the
compensation in Ha Noi city was much higher than compensation in Vinh Phuc province.
We all knew the difference, but we here were not able to do as in Bac Ninh and Ha Noi.
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We must follow our own regulations”. The head of land management agency (PDNRE,
Bac Ninh province) specifically listed a set of regulatory tools available for policy
implementers to act in practice: “when a land-taking project is enacted, we are required to
refer to 2013 LOL, Circular 37 of the ministry of finance, the central government’s
decrees 01 and 47, Bac Ninh PPC’s executive order no. 528 regarding the land price
system that is valid from 2015 to 2019”.
Table 8: Rules of Compensation, Support, and Resettlement

1. Compensation for land: 70,000 VND/m2
2. Compensation for groceries: 9,000 VND/m2
3. Financial aid for stabilizing livelihoods and production: 10,000 VND/m2
4. Financial aid for seeking job and changing career: 350,000 VND/m2
5. Total compensation for 1m2: 439,000 VND/m2
6. Total compensation for a plot (360m2): 158,040,000 VND
Source : ONRE, Tu Son district (2017)

The most disputed authoritative tool regarding land acquisition in Vietnam is the
land price system. From the tool approach, land price system is a ‘regulation’ that directs
behaviors of both implementers and landholders. Implementers are required to develop a
land price equal to common land price on market at time of compensation. However, how
to determine a ‘market price’ is still an unclear issue. This method of price calculation
resulted in large difference between land price controlled by the State and land price on
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market (World Bank, 2009 & 2011a).In Bac Ninh province, implementers adopted
executive order no. 522/2014/QD-UBND about land price and executive order no.
528/2014/QD-UBND about compensation, support, and resettlement (see table 7). Based
on these two executive orders that have been valid from 2015 to 2019, the district
government of Tu Son issued an administrative document notifying landholders about
level of compensation that they would receive. According to land officials involved in Tu
Son incident, in order to compensate landholders, BCGC first had to value land and land
embedded properties such as houses, trees, and groceries. “Small pieces of land,
normally, are valued by the government’s technical officials but if a land area values
above 20 billion VND (around 900.000$), we are required to use land valuation service
provided by an independent organization” (Head of ONRE, Tu Son). Though Tu Son
government adopted the highest land price, the real compensation was much lower than
land value on market. “But we could not violate the land price regulations”, he
concluded. In big cities such as the Ho Chi Minh City where the value of land has
continuously changed over time, the researcher found that land officials had to deal with
a complex system of authority-based rules and orders directing land valuation and
compensation. Before 2003, the Ho Chi Minh city applied LOL of 1993, amendments of
LOL (1998&2001), PPC’s executive order no. 135/2002/QĐ-UB (2002) regulating
compensation and support for residents affected by the Thu Thiem project. After 2003,
the city enforced compensation rules based on executive order no. 123/2006/QĐ-UBND
(2006) and then executive order no. 06/2009/QĐ-UBND (CGI, 2018). Overall, the
analysis of government documents and field experiences suggested that land acquisition
was a highly regulated process in which implementers were required to strictly follow
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land legislation, administrative rules, and executive orders. This was a major cause of
land-taking problem in Vietnam. According to Dang Hung Vo, a land policy official,
“land price system issued by PPCs is much lower than land price on market. Local
implementers often explain that low compensation is because of PPC’s land price system.
This is original cause of risky situations regarding land acquisition. We need to modify
the land price regulation” (Thu Ha, 2019).
A common feature of the three land-taking incidents in Thu Thiem, Dong Tam,
and Tu Sonis the use of “executive order” by local governments to execute land-taking
projects. In Tu Son, each affected landholder received a package of documents
(proclamation) from the district government. Of those documents, two executive orders
issued by PPC and DPC informed landholders the land-taking project and they were
required to collaborate with the district BCGC to enforce the orders. In Dong Tam
incident, the district government of My Duc responded to land claim made by villagers
by issuing an executive order to take the disputed land. Le Dinh Kinh, leader of resistant
villagers in Dong Tam, recalled: on October 20, 2016, mayor of the My Duc district
government signed an executive order to acquire the land area of 6.8 ha. Dong Tam land
users notified the district government that the land was in dispute, but the land acquisition
continued. Eleven days later, while the city inspectorate’s inspection report (released on
October 31, 2016) only concluded that defense land would be transferred between
military units, the My Duc government employed inspection conclusions to legitimate
land-taking actions. According to the city’s inspection report, only 14 households
farming on the airport land were required to leave. However, the district government
enforced land-taking with households farming on the area of 6.8 ha that was not covered
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by the airport land. On this area of 6.8 ha, land users made land transactions that were
certified by the Dong Tam commune government. Villagers paid government for land use
fee. These indicated that the area of 6.8 ha was not land for defense as claimed by the My
Duc district government (Luan Nguyen, 2017).
In Ho Chi Minh City, the Thu Thiem incident was a consequence of a serial
abuses of authoritative tools. The city government issued multiple executive orders to
undertake land-taking projects and modify land-taking plans. The researcher reviewed the
history of the city government’s actions and found that, on June 4, 1996, the Thu Thiem
planning proposal was approved by the premier, with total area of 930 ha, including 770
ha of new urban area and 160 ha used for resettlement. On September 16, 1998, chief of
the city’s office of architecture issued order no. 13585/KTST-QH approving the land
planning of Thu Thiem, with an area of 748 ha. On December 27, 2005, the city’s vice
governor signed the executive order. No 6565 in which article 2 stated: “this order
replaces the order no. 367 dated April 6, 1996 by the premier”. On the same day, the city
people’s committee also issued the executive order no. 6566 and article 2 of this order
also noted: “this order replaces the order no. 13585 issued on September 16, 1998 by
chief of the city’s office of architecture”. The executive order no. 6566 also specified
land planning of Thu Thiem as developed by Sasaki Associates - a Japanese Consultant
in collaboration with the City’s Institute of Architecture and Planning (Huu Nguyen,
2018). Two years later, in 2007, the city people’ committee issued executive or no.
5945 canceling amendments as stated in the two orders above. According to the central
government’s inspectorate (CGI, 2018), the city government’s executive orders
dramatically changed the original land use plan of the Thu Thiem project. These changes
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resulted in serious violations that caused long lasting disputes and tensions between the
government and affected landholders.
With executive orders, implementers could take land by force. The main cause of
noncompliance in Thu Thiem incident was the unclear boundary of the affected land
areas. Disobedient landholders reported that they were required to move out even though
their land was not covered by the Thu Thiem project. In order to figure out how the city
government’s acts resulted in land users’ disobedience, the researcher reviewed some
“case profiles” and found evidences indicating a serious abuse of authority-based tool of
executive orders. As an affected landholder, Mrs. Mao questioned the city about the
project of 87 ha in An Phu ward. As she remembered, the project was first approved with
a land-taking project of 87 ha. The city then expended the land-taking area to 88 ha and
issued multiple executive orders of land acquisition. (Zing, 2018b). In the same situation,
one of her neighbors whose small house was destroyed on April 7, 2016, reported: “I just
opened the door and saw lots of cars, trucks, and government officials surrounding my
house. They then asked me to move out and destroyed my house. If I were wrong, please
shoot me. Why did the city remove my house without any official order? They took my
properties away and I do not know where they are now”” (Truong Minh, 2019a). Nguyen
Dung (Binh An ward) recalled her compulsory land acquisition taking place at 8.00 am,
March, 1, 2012: “I have not ever seen land-taking order…I have not received any
compensation… but they forced me to leave. I did have properties and incomes, but I lost
everything (Zing, 2018b).
The researcher’s visits to research sites also suggested that BT and BOT
constructions and land acquisition often started at the same time. This put time pressure
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on local governments that often led to forced acquisition. The abuse of land-taking
authority was evident in the Thu Thiem incident. Vo Viet Thanh, vice governor (19961997) and governor (1997-2001), recalled: “Regarding Thu Thiem, about 4-5 years ago
(2013-2014), I used to talk to the city leaders that why the city destroyed all people’s
houses…why it looked like a bombing in a war. The city acquired only 20-30 ha but the
land-taking affected thousands of households. The people here were acquainted with
traditional ways of living…how they earn for living after being moved to apartments
(Zing, 2018a). Some land developers and policy experts figured out that while land
acquisition was strictly regulated, the lack of clear regulations regarding the authority of
land assignment was the main contributor to land users’ resistance over land-taking
projects in BT and BOT designs. Mr. Tran Ngoc Hung – Chairman of the Vietnam
Construction Association commented at a recent national conference on the land market:
“investors often receive land from provincial governments at a much lower price in
comparison with the land price on the market. They, government leaders, and land
managers can benefit from cheap land price because investors often are assigned land
without auction (Anh Phuong, 2018). According to Mr. Dang Hung Vo, former vice
minister, Ministry of NRE, the loosely regulated authority of land assignment motivated
the abuse of land-takings that resulted in the increase of policy noncompliance in recent
years: “the biggest gap of LOL is the way to exchange land for investors as a matching
capital. For building and transfer projects, the Land Law only defines the authority to
assign land but no regulation regarding land valuation. In practice, the most important
issue of building and transfer projects is not the authority of land assignment. It instead is
the authority to value land. Land Law, however, does not state who has responsibilities to
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audit values of land and constructions developed by investors. This is a big gap in the
management of building and transfer projects” (Anh Phuong, 2018). Mr. Vo’s argument
was supported by evidence collected from the Thu Thiem incident: while the central
government approved a resettlement area of 160 ha, the city people’s committee allocated
144.6 ha for 51 investors to construct apartments, office buildings, and public
infrastructure…As a consequence, the city did not have enough land for resettling
affected landholders (Truong Minh, 2019b). It was estimated that 71% of land plots in
Thu Thiem was officially assigned for investors. Currently, 45% of useable area of land
was officially transferred to developers through the form of public-private partnership
(Ha Thanh, 2018). This reality explains why recent noncompliance mainly took place
with land acquisitions in BT and BOT designs, as a statement of the head of Tu Son’s
DONRE.
In the inspection report released in 2018, the central government’s inspectorate
pointed out the Ho Chi Minh City government’s violations: “The city government,
especially the 2nd district government, did not follow legal procedures and requirements
regarding land-taking enactment. The government did not develop compensation
proposal. The BCGC relied on the city’s executive orders no. 135/2002/QĐ-UB, no.
123/2006/QĐ-UBND

and

no.

06/2009/QĐ-UBND

to

calculate

expenses

for

compensation, support, and resettlement instead of preparing an overall proposal to
compensate all affected landholders” (CGI, 2018). Regarding land acquisition and
assignment, the city government also abused public authority when issuing two executive
orders no. 1997/QĐ-UB (2002) and no.13585/KTST-QH (1998) that increased the land
acquisition area of 4.3 ha (CGI, 2018). The use of numerous executive orders changed
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the land planning in Thu Thiem and enabled effective land acquisitions. However, the
coerciveness of executive orders also increased land users’ resistance that led to long
lasting tensions.
5.2.3. Financial tools
A key feature of financial tools is the use of financial or financial-equivalent
incentives to alter target groups’ behaviors (Howlett, 2011: 101). The financial tools are
embedded in the political economy and economics of land policy in Vietnam. These
tools, however, are not the same as the political economy and economics themselves
because they represent the actions rather than the economic conditions. They are the
implemented financial and economic compensation rather than the economic valuations
in theory. For example, in any given land-taking instance, most households may accept
compensation below what they could rationally obtain, while others will resist if they
believe the government will offer more the longer, they do not comply. The economic
approach lacks the ability to explain how financial tools succeed or fail. Behavioral
economics, for instance, shows how it is the perception and social interpretation of
various economic rewards rather than their objective levels that often explain human
behavior, in this case meaning how financial compensation is managed in the governance
process. Instead of the economic and financial value of compensation, the tool-based
approach adopted in this study pays more attention to characteristics (e.g. forms of
compensation, strengths and weaknesses), the management of compensation, and how
those factors might contribute to land-taking policy acceptance or noncompliance.
Currently, as stated in the 2013 LOL, cash, land, and apartments are three forms
of compensation. From a tool perspective, those forms of compensation are three finance-
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based tools used by government to convince policy target groups give up their land. The
focus of tool approach is not the value of compensation. The main interest of the
researcher was if the use of three tools (forms of compensation) were effective to change
land users’ attitudes and behaviors. Were tools’ characteristics related to noncompliance
over land-takings? The researcher, more specifically, wanted to find out why, being
subjected to the same land-taking project and received compensation based on the same
land price system, some land users still did not accept compensation. Controlling the
level of compensation, could implementers increase land-taking policy compliance by
simply making changes of tool choice and use in practice? In addition to reviewing media
publications such as interviews and press releases available online, talks with research
participants during field visits in Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc provinces revealed the
ineffectiveness of finance-based tools. This was first because local governments had to
follow rules and regulations that resulted in unfair land valuation and low compensation.
The low compensation, however, was not the only prominent cause of noncompliance
considered in this study. The government’s bad management of finance-based tools (land,
cash, resettlement apartment) instead played a more critical role.
According to articles 74, 75, 79 of 2013 LOL, “land and resettlement apartment”
are the first financial-equivalent tools used for land acquisition. Implementers in HCMC,
more specifically, are required to compensate affected landholders with the same type of
land. Cash is only the second option if the government is unable to provide a similar
piece of land for landholders (HCMC, 2018). In practice, similar situations also
commonly occur in other provinces such as Bac Ninh: implementers rarely adopt landbased compensation due to their inability to find another land area. The head of land
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management agency (Bac Ninh province) reported that many affected landholders
preferred compensation in land. With a land plot within the same location, they could sell
it on the market for higher price or used for small business purposes. However, he added,
land-based compensation was unrealistic: “In the past, the Bac Ninh government could
offer compensation in land but now we cannot. The most common form of compensation
is cash. The government only construct resettlement apartments if land acquisition affects
a large number of households”.
In Ho Chi Minh City, for large project such as Thu Thiem incident, the city
government offers land and apartments to encourage land users’ policy acceptance.
However, as regulated by the city government, affected landholders will only be received
financial support for 30 m2 of the new apartment and 45 m2 of the new piece of land.
Landholders are responsible to pay for additional costs if they accept compensation in
land or apartment (HCMC, 2018). These regulations make land and apartments at the
same area less attractive because many affected people cannot pay for their new
apartments. Vo Viet Thanh, former governor, the Ho Chi Minh City government, pointed
out problems of compensation in land and apartment: “Landholders should be resettled
within the same location. Taking them far away from old places, so who will stay here?
New resettlements should be better than the old one. If they have a small shelter of 20m2
here and the city compensates them with the same 20m2 shelter in another place, who
will go? For people receiving another piece of land, the city requires them to build
standard urban houses within 6-12 month after receiving land. If they cannot build new
houses, the city will collect their land. But how poor people can build new houses as
required by the city” (Zing, 2018a).
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Figure 17. New apartments in Thu Thiem
(Source. news.zing.vn)
In reality, poor land users in Thu Thiem faced lots of challenges if they received
land or apartment in a new urban area. Tran Van Truyen (Binh An ward) whose house
was destroyed in 2015 recalled: “the government sent us the land-taking order in 2012
and we agreed moving to the city’s new resettlement apartment. We were compensated 2
million VND/m2 but in order to move in new accommodation, the city required us to pay
an additional amount of 40 million VND. As explained by the city government, new
apartments had better conditions and located near city center. However, we did not need
those better conditions because we were not affordable” (Zing, 2018b). Similarly, Mrs.
Nguyen Ngoc Thanh who received 94 million VND for her house was asked to pay 800
million VND for her new apartment (Zing, 2018b). Thao, a poor woman, said she did not
want to move in her new apartment. Her current location was more convenient for her
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low skill job. In the same situation, Phong (An Khanh ward) who wanted to get back his
old house, said: “Several generations of our family have been living here in Thu Thiem.
The land price now increases…everything has dramatically changed but local residents
have to move to other resettlement places…wedo not benefit from the development of
Thu Thiem. Is it an injustice? (Zing, 2018b).
Table 9: Failure of new apartments used for land acquisition

HCMC built 12,500 new apartments to resettle landholders affected by Thu Thiem
project. However, according to HCMC, up to June 2018, only 1847 affected
landholders moved in resettlement apartments in new urban area. Since landholders
were not interested in new apartments, the city government decided to sell apartments
by auction. Reasons for failure: expensive prices (same locations), poor living
conditions and inconvenient locations (new locations).
(Source: Ha Vy, 2019)

“Cash” was the most common financial tool used to compensate landholders
across three incidents. In Ho Chi Minh City, implementers adopted land-taking
legislation and rules (e.g. articles 75 and 114 of 2013 LOL, article 18 of Circular
no.44/2014/ND-CP, articles 31 and 32 of Directive no.36/TT-BTNMT). Accordingly,
landholders who subjected to land acquisition in Thu Thiem were compensated for
affected land, properties on land, and moving fees…Compliant landholders also received
financial support in cash prior the execution of a land-taking project. If landholders did
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not comply with land acquisition, compensation funding was transferred into a bank
account managed by the government, and landholders were still required to give up their
land. Landholders only received compensation based on the latest land price system if a
payment was delayed due to the government. However, in disputed situations like Thu
Thiem incident, violations always belonged to noncompliant landholders.
In Thu Thiem, for example, since landholders disputed with the city government,
they had to accept compensation at the same rate as the first installment. Nguyen Thi
Mao (An Phu ward) shared her situation: “I received compensation of 4 million VND/m2
in 1997…the project lasted until now, 18 years, but the compensation has not
changed…it is the same as 18 years ago” (Zing, 2018b). Mrs. Doan Ngoc Thuy (Binh An
ward) told her story: the city government promised to compensate 330 million VND for
her land area of 1000 m2, and a resettlement aid of 170 million VND. However, she has
not received the funding as promised: “the amount of money was not too much…we also
did not require additional funding. However, why the city government did not pay us for
the acquired land area? Why they took our land without payment?’ (Zing, 2018b).
Nguyen Thi Tam (An Khanh ward) was in another situation. Her house was removed
from 2003 and she received compensation in three installments but now nothing
remained (Truong Minh, 2019d). The researcher discussed compensation in cash with
land officials in Bac Ninh and found that the government often make installments based
on progress of land acquisition. A landholder could own several small land parcels. He
thus would receive multiple installments because his land is not acquired at a time.
Another reason is that the government cannot arrange enough funding. This might result
in late compensation.
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Another theme mentioned in group discussions and interviews in Bac Ninh and
Vinh Phuc provinces was the prospect of the “market mechanism”. The researcher was
interested in exploring if the market can be used as an effective alternative for land-taking
policy implementation in Vietnam’s context. As a policy mechanism, the market allows
investors to directly deal with land users for land conversion. Instead of engaging in land
negotiations and transactions (ex. transfer, lease, or land as a capital contribution), the
government only certifies if market-based land conversions comply with administrative
rules and LOL. All interviewed land officials in the two provinces of Bac Ninh and Vinh
Phuc shared that the market mechanism was encouraged by the government. Land
legislation did not prohibit market-based transactions of land rights. In practice, however,
the market mechanism was not really an effective measure for land-takings. The deputy
director of the provincial center for land development in Bac Ninh explained: “A
characteristic of the land sector in Northern provinces like Bac Ninh is that each
household only owns a small area of land; and this area can consist of multiple plots or
parcels. All investment projects, whereas, often require large area of land that affect
many land holders. These characteristics make direct negotiations with land users become
very complicated. Market based negotiations are impossible for big investment projects”.
Though investors were not interviewed, informal conversations at the community
meeting in Tu Son district suggested additional challenges that resulted in the rarely use
of the market mechanism. According to investors, they regularly confronted various
difficulties during direct negotiations with numerous landholders. Most commonly, land
users often requested high land price-based compensation that investors were not able to
afford. Unexpected situations that delayed progress of investment projects also took place
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regularly. An investor shared with the researcher: “we have to deal with many
landholders. Each of them has their own requests, especially land compensation. In
nature, direct negotiation is a measure that we buy land use rights from individual
landholders. It really takes time and we sometime cannot afford land users’ requests.
Some might change their mind even if we did reach agreements before”.
5.2.4. Information based tools
Information-based tools refer to devices used by the government to communicate
information or knowledge to policy target groups (Howlett, 2011: 115). Unlike
authoritative tools that involve coercion, a key feature of information-based tools is
persuasion. Implementers provide information to influence target groups’ thinking and
attitudes that might result in behavioral changes. To get expected results, implementers
are not necessarily required to provide correct, true, and accurate information. They
instead can influence target groups by persuasive justifications and messages regardless
of whether their claims have cognitive and normative contents (Weiss, 2002: 219). This
tool focused study did not survey information availability, land users’ ability in accessing
information, or transparency. The researcher instead examined specific communication
devices used by implementers to interact with landholders, how effective those devices
could make information available to landholders, strengths and weaknesses of different
devices, and their capability in altering target audiences’ behaviors. The researcher also
looked for implementers’ preferences over information-based tools and linkages between
preferred forms of communication and behavioral changes among landholders.
At the beginning of data collection, the researcher proposed that communication
means might relate to policy target groups ‘noncompliant attitudes and behaviors. To
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identify information-based tools, the researcher reviewed administrative and legal
procedures required to implement a land acquisition project in research sites. There were
no differences regarding the procedural enactment of a land-taking project between the
two provinces (Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc) where the researcher spent time to get real
experience of policy implementation. According to land officials, implementers were
required to follow the same procedures. Typically, the execution of a land-taking project
at district level followed steps as required by the LOL:
(i)

PPC issues executive order approving DPC’s land-taking request.

(ii)

District government (DPC) establishes BCG

(iii)

BCGC develops land-taking proposal in detail

(iv)

BCGC submits land-taking proposal to PPC for approval

(v)

BCGC establishes propaganda and land valuation units

(vi)

BCGC meets with affected land users to clarify land-taking plan

(vii)

BCGC conducts inventory of properties and land for compensation

(viii) BCGC meets with affected landholders to verify all issues regarding
compensated properties and land areas.
(ix)

DPC submits compensation proposal to PPC for approval

(x)

Report to PPC noncompliant cases

(xi)

District government conducts coercive land acquisition over noncompliant
landholders.

“Proclamation “was the first information-based tool used by BCGCs to inform
landholders about land-taking project. In Tu Son incident, each affected landholder
received a document package that consisted of all official information regarding the land
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acquisition plan. Those documents included “PPC executive order” approving DPC’s
land-taking request, “DPC executive order” establishing BCGC, a list of affected
households accompanied by a map, and compensation rules approved by PCC. After
receiving the “land-taking proclamation”, landholders subjected to land acquisition had
right to ask BCGC for further clarifications on any issues that they were concerned.
Interviewed landholders, however, said they were only concerned compensation,
acquired land area, and time that they had to hand over their land. Land officials in Tu
Son district also commented that landholders often did not really care about the landtaking proclamation until the government began listing properties on land and measuring
their acquired land areas. “The proclamation aims to officially inform affected
landholders that the government is going to take part of their land. They are required to
be ready to hand over the land to government”, the head of Tu Son ONRE said.
“Public poster” is a tool displaying all information regarding land-taking plans in
public places. According to land officials involved in the Tu Son incident, public posters
showed details of land acquisition project such as name and address of affected
landholders, land-taking purpose, acquired land area, types and origin of land, basis for
calculating compensation, time frame for land acquisition…etc. Such a public poster was
required to be publicly hung at communal committee’s office or public places such as
village’s cultural houses. Communal authorities, representatives of community, affected
landholders, and investors were also required to confirm the availability of public posters.
All public posters showing land-taking project remained in public places for at least 20
days. The researcher, however, did not find any public poster in Dong Ky and Trang Ha
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wards. As reported by local land officials, someone took them off because the land-taking
project started for a long time and people did not care about public posters.
“Government’s information portal” is an official device that landholders could
access for information about three incidents. The researcher, however, was not able to
find any information about the land-taking projects in Dong Tam and Tu Son on district
governments’ websites. There was some news regarding the two projects posted on
information portals of Hanoi city and Bac Ninh province’s governments. When was
asked about the role of the government’s information portal as a policy implementation
tool, the head of Tu Son district’s ONRE explained that online sources of information
such as government’s websites were not a useful tool because most people did not have a
habit for searching online information: “Tu Son district in nature is still a rural area.
Though the urbanization process has taken place over the last two decades, most people
are still living in former rural villages. So, they prefer face to face meetings for landtaking information. We send all information to them once we start a land acquisition
project”. Only the Ho Chi Minh city government created a separate section for the Thu
Thiem project on the city’s information portal. The availability of an online source of
information, however, was not necessarily associated with transparency. This was
because all land-taking information was controlled by the government. The government
was the only actor who could decide what type of information available to the public. In
Thu Thiem, for example, landholders were most concerned the original map, but such a
map was never found on the city’ websites. Le Van Lung, a Thu Thiem resident, said he
consistently requested the city government to show the map, but the government refused.
Finally, he got news about the map at a dialogue with the city’s leaders: “we asked them
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for the 1/5000 map to verify boundaries, but they said the map was lost. This pushed us
into long lasting disputes and petitions from 1996 until now (Vietnamnet, 2018).
“Public dialogue” is a required information session to clarify affected land areas
and compensation with landholders. According to the head of the center for land
development (Tu Son district): “the district BCG is required to conduct at least 01 public
dialogue to inform affected land users about details of land-taking plan”. Additional
public meetings and dialogues could be organized if disputes took place. However, it
depended on particular situations, he added. In reality, BCGC members did not preferred
public meetings and dialogues because such an information session often made situation
became more complicated. As the researcher observed at the meeting and dialogue in
Dong Ky ward (Tu Son incident) on September 5, 2018, government officials tried to
convince land users calm down while affected land users aggressively criticized BCGC
members. Some land users stood up and said they did not sell land; compensation was too
low. Some others blamed the government and investors for telling lies. Whereas,
representatives of investors did not say anything though lots of questions were sent to
them. In Thu Thiem incident, public dialogues became a nightmare with HCMC leaders
and managers because they not only received aggressive criticism but also could not
clearly answer landholders’ questions regarding land-taking plan. Nguyen Thi Bach
Tuyet spoke loudly at a meeting with top leaders of the Ho Chi Minh City’s government:
“over the last ten years, we now only can talk in five minutes…give us more time to say”.
Another landholder, Tran Thi My, 77 years old, insisted: “let me say, I am old and going
to die soon” (Zing, 2018b).
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Moral suasion, exhortation, and intrusive propaganda emerged from discussions
between the researchers and local implementers in Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc as the key
information-based tools. The researcher differentiated moral suasion and exhortation
from intrusive propaganda. Both moral suasion and exhortation were unofficially
conducted by individual government officials who could employ any means, at any time,
and in anywhere to persuade landholders, urging them to follow government’s decisions.
Whereas, intrusive propaganda was an official means in which government authorized
agencies and officials to formally conduct persuasive communications with landholders.
All three means relied on persuasion schemes to convey messages which may or may not
contain factual information to motivate target audiences and modify their behaviors
(Adler and Pittle, 1984: 160). The emphasized role of moral suasion, exhortation, and
propaganda was evident in Tu Son DPC’s land acquisition documents. Once an executive
order for land-taking was issued, landholders were expected to accept the government’s
executive orders. Persuasion, thus, was the most important communication strategy that
BCGC members were required to do. Tu Son district government asked individual
members of BCGC and the unit of propaganda for efforts to persuade landholders. In Tu
Son district, propaganda unit that consisted of government officials and community
leaders was a key component of BCGC. At the beginning of the land-taking project, their
responsibility was to communicate with landholders, either through public dialogues or
face to face meetings at land users’ home. According to land officials, because land price
was controlled by the State, most landholders were not willing to give up their land.
While the government was not able to increase the compensation or offers other
financial-equivalent compensations, the only way to convince landholders was moral
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suasion, exhortation, and propaganda. “We encouraged them to cooperate with the
government for public benefits. We had to come to their home at any time, often in the
evening. We shared with them that compensation was regulated by the State. The district
government simply implemented the provincial government’s executive orders”” (Head
of Tu Son’s ONRE).

Figure 18. A public dialogue in Thu Thiem on May 9, 2018
(Source: vtc.vn)
However, though following the same procedures, local governments did not
always act as required by the LOL. In Thu Thiem incident, the city government
conducted land-taking while affected landholders were still unclear about the land-taking
plan. Le Thi Hong Van, a Thu Thiem resident, reported: her house was not covered by
the Thu Thiem project. The city destroyed her house and acquired land without land-
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taking order. Mrs Nguyen Thi Tam (Binh Khanh ward) questioned: “without project map,
why did the city destroy my house? (Zing, 2018b). Mr Nguyen The Vinh (Binh An ward)
did not leave his house because he strongly believed that his house was not affected by
the Thu Thiem project. He requested the city government showing the original map to
support the city’s land-taking plan. He emphasized that he did not resist the city
government, but he asked for transparency (Minh Hai, 2018). In the inspection report
released in 2018, the central government’s inspectorate concluded that the Ho Chi Minh
city’s official documents did not display properly boundaries and locations of land-taking
plan. The additional area of 4.3 ha in Binh An ward was not included in the land planning
of the new urban area (CGI, 2018). This in part explains why the city government
ignored landholders’ request for information about land acquisition plan.
The heavy reliance on propaganda, exhortation, and moral suasion resulted in
negative attitudes among landholders. This was because instead of providing clear
information, the government tried to morally convince landholders. In Thu Thiem
incident, for example, according to Decree no. 91/ND-CP issued in 1994, only the city
people’s committee has authority to approve master plan (1/2000) for Thu Thiem project.
However, the city government could not explain why the Thu Thiem’s master plan was
approved by the head of architecture department. More importantly, organizations and
individuals affected by the Thu Thiem project were not publicly informed about the
master plan (1/2000). In addition, another pattern of using moral suasion, exhortation,
and propaganda was that HCMC government officials and leaders always promised
economic and infrastructure development once they met with landholders. What
happened in practice, however, reduced landholders’ trust in government. Mr. Hinh, a

162

Thu Thiem resident, got shocked because he did not see square, recreational structures,
hospitals, or schools as promised by the city’s leaders and investors. He instead only saw
skyscrapers and luxury apartments while he was required to move. In a similar situation,
Mr. Quang questioned: "we have map showing that we are not covered by the Thu Thiem
project. We comply with government’s decisions if the State needs land to expend the
city and develop new urban complexes. However, after 20 years, we have not seen
anything except land transactions and luxury apartments” (Zing, 2018b).
5.3. Tool based Responses to Noncompliance
A major research interest of this qualitative study is to find out patterns of the
government’s tool-based responses to noncompliance. The researcher was interested in if
implementers changed tool choice and use in order to reach a settlement. How effective
were tool-based responses? What arose from three incidents was the role of authoritybased tools and information-based tools such as moral suasion and propaganda used by
government in responding to noncompliance.
5.3.1. Information-based responses
As disputes and tensions progressed, local governments first relied on
information-based tools such as moral suasion, propaganda, and public dialoguesas the
most preferred tools. The government’s preference over information-based tools was
evident in the Dong Tam and Thu Thiem incidents. Prior and during the dispute in Dong
Tam, the city consistently conducted a propaganda campaign on public mass media
asserting that the disputed land was defense land; Dong Tam villagers illegally occupied
defense land. On April 18, 2017, Hanoi’s CPV publicly asserted that Dong Tam villagers
violated LOL, illegally occupied defense land, threatened public safety, prevented
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people’s daily works, resisted law enforcement force, and illegally held hostages. The
government asked villagers to free hostages and leave the disputed land (Ngoc Huyen,
2017). The propaganda campaign, however, did not reduce tension. It instead increased
landholders’ grievances.

Figure 19. Handwritten commitments by Hanoi’s governor on April 22, 2017
(Source: vov.vn)
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After villagers held hostages on April 15, 2017, the city government started a
moral suasion and exhortation campaign in Dong Tam. The city’s governor was assigned
by the Hanoi’s CPV for seeking a settlement. On April 17, 2017, the governor
communicated by phone with noncompliant landholders. On April 19, a Hanoi’s
representative to the National Congress met with villagers in Dong Tam. The city’s
mayor, on April 20, invited representatives of villagers to My Duc district government
for a dialogue. Villagers, however, refused. They asked the governor coming to Dong
Tam commune for a public meeting. In response, the governor asserted the government
would not attack villagers to free hostages; and all land issues in Dong Tam would be
inspected. After numerous communications by phone, the city’s governor came to Dong
Tam on April 22 for a public dialogue. At the public meeting, he received villagers’
complaints and requests. He also signed a document written by hand committing that (i)
the government would monitor the inspection of land issues in Dong Tam, (ii) the
government would not arrest and prosecute noncompliant landholders; and (iii) the
government would investigate the illegal arrest of Le Dinh Kinh, the leader of
noncompliant villagers. Per request of villagers, the city also stopped propaganda
campaign that labeled villagers as deviant citizens who illegally occupied land for
defense. On July 7, 2017, the city’s inspectorate released the draft of inspection report.
As committed with villagers on April 22, 2017, the governor came to My Duc district on
July 7, 2017 to inform Dong Tam villagers about the inspection report. At a meeting that
limited the number of participants, the city’s governor confirmed that the land area
assigned for defense purpose in 1980 was 239.9 ha. After the government used land for
constructing a road, the remaining land area for defense was 236.8 ha. Total land area of
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Dong Tam commune acquired for the airport project in 1980 was 64 ha, not 96 ha or 106
ha as claimed by Dong Tam residents. The governor said at the information session: “I
assert the city’s land acquisition is legal. If you still dispute, the city government will
assign inspectorate agency to dialogue with villagers”. The governor emphasized that
defense land was for defense. The government was not required to make the total defense
land area public. He added: “It is not necessary to tell everyone about what belongs to
national secrets. If the people know everything, our enemy knows, too. So, how can we
defend our nation?” He asked Dong Tam commune government to continue dialogues
with landholders, listen to villagers, and encouraged landholders send requests, if any, to
the city’s inspectorate. The city government would clarify every issue regarding
noncompliant villagers’ requests (Cong Khanh, 2017). Although villagers really wanted
to participate in the information session, they were not invited. Only Dong Tam
commune government’s leaders and officials, heads of residential units, and 10 residents
selected by the city government participated in the information briefing.
“Press conference” was a tool used by HCMC and Hanoi governments when land
disputes lasted long and attracted public concerns. Responding to landholders’
information requests about the resettlement area of 160 ha, the HCM city government
was not able to provide clear information. According to the original land planning, Thu
Thiem new urban complex consisted of two sections: (i) a new urban area – 770 ha; and
(ii) a resettlement area – 160 ha. The city government, however, did not use 160 ha for
resettlement purpose. Affected land users in reality were moved to four different places:
An Phu (90ha), Cat Lai (50ha), Thạnh My Loi (6,4ha) and Binh Khanh (15,5ha). Among
these four resettlement areas, only Binh Khanh was inside the boundary of Thu Thiem
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project. However, before the central government’s inspectorate released the inspection
report on land disputes in Thu Thiem, the city’s leaders always asserted at public dialogues
with landholders that the city government acted in accordance with the original plan
approved by the central government. All resettlement areas were within or nearby the Thu
Thiem project. Since landholders did not accept this explanation, disputes lasted long and
tensions increased (Quoc Phong, 2017). Public pressure forced the HCMC government to
organize a press conference, informing the public about the original map. However,
Nguyen Thanh Nha, Director of HCMC Department of Planning and Architecture talked
at the press conference on May 2, 2018: “the city people’s committee currently is looking
for the map. We check with city departments and central government’s agencies.
Documents stored at our department do not include the map” (Thy Hue, 2018).

Figure 20. Dialogue between the city’s mayor and Thu Thiem resident on Oct. 18, 2018
(Source: tuoitre.vn)
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Table 10: Commitments by Ho Chi Minh City’s Government
At press conference on September 21, 2019
● Meet with noncompliant households by October 30, 2018
● Complete legal procedures regarding urban planning of Thu Thiem by October 15, 2018
● Develop compensation and support proposal for affected households in area of 4.3 ha by
November 30, 2018.
● Review responsibilities of individuals and organizations and prosecute violations by October
15, 2018.
● Review and monitor investment projects in resettlement area by November 1, 2018
(Source: Zing.vn, 2018c)

Mr. Nguyen Thien Nhan – CPV’s general secretary in HCMC
Compensation options for affected landholders

By January 15, 2019, government agencies will meet all 321 households in the area of
4.3 ha to figure out specific solutions. 155 landholders whose land were coercively
acquired and 114 landholders who already moved out will be offered three options if
they want to get back Thu Thiem:
● Receive an apartment in the resettlement area of 4.3 ha
● Receive a piece of land nearby Thu Thiem
● Resettle by their choice in another place
(Source: Thien Ngon, 2018)

Tensions in Thu Thiem was only reduced after the central government’s
inspectorate issued the inspection report on September 7, 2018. Multiple dialogues and
moral suasions then were conducted by the city government’s top leaders to convince
landholders that the government would review every affected case for interests of the
people. Late September 2018, at a press conference, representatives of HCMC
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government excused affected landholders and committed that the city would complete a
set of goals by the end of 2018 to solve disputes in Thu Thiem (see table on page). In
early 2019, Mr. Nguyen Thien Nhan – CPV Secretary of HCMC, talked to the public that
“It has never been more convenient like now to properly solve land disputes in Thu
Thiem, after the central government released the inspection report. We have to make
challenges become opportunities to re-gain trust from the people” (Thien Ngon, 2018).
5.3.2. Authority-based responses
One unifying pattern of government’s response to noncompliance emerged in
three incidents was the use of public authority-based tools(e.g. executive orders)to solve
land-taking disputes. According to article 71, LOL of 2013, after failing in convincing
landholders to give up their land, local governments could take land by force. This
resulted in tensions between affected landholders and government but not necessarily
settled disputes. Bac Ninh provincial authority was the only government among three
local government that was not confronted by angry crowds who resisted coercive land
acquisition. This was because Tu Son incident only affected small number of affected
landholders and small acquired land area.
Coercive land acquisition led to more serious consequence in Dong Tam incident.
When disputes began in 2015, Hanoi government relied on the city’s inspectorate agency
to investigate Dong Tam incident. On October 31, 2016, the city inspectorate released the
inspection report no. 47/KL-ƯBND stating that there was no evidence to consider land
claims made by Dong Tam residents. On November 14, 2016, the My Duc district
government sent a law enforcement force of around 600 public officials, including police
and military forces, to surround the area of 6.8 ha. Local villagers were prevented from
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accessing the disputed land. The district government claimed 6.8 ha for defense land and
started counting properties for compensation. This, however, was unrealistic and injustice
in the eyes of Dong Tam residents. As explained by Mr Kinh, leader of noncompliant
villagers, if the area of 6.8 ha was the land for defense purpose, military units could
easily make transfers without compensation. Why did the district government of My Duc
list properties and calculate compensation? In contrast, 14 households farming on 47.36
ha of airport land stopped their farming and left the land without any disputes. It was
because the area of 47.36 ha apparently was defense land. Tensions increased in early
2017 when villagers occupied the disputed land to prevent Viettel. Co.’s constructions. In
order to stop the dispute, on April 15, 2017, the city’s police arrested four disobedient
land users, including Le Dinh Kinh – an elder villager who seriously got injured in the
arrest (Ngoc Huyen, 2017). This government’s coercive action unleashed villagers’
grievances. They held 38 public officials, being ready for an attack from the city
government, and demanded a dialogue with the city’s governor. Tensions were only
reduced after a face to face meeting and dialogue between the city’s governor and
villagers held on April 22, 2017.
Together with the investigation of land dispute in Dong Tam, in August 2017, the
city’s court prosecuted 14 government managers and land officials for violations of LOL
and land management rules. The trial was a signal sent by the city to Dong Tam villagers
that the dispute over land acquisition in Dong Tam was originally because of violations in
land management. The disputed land was defense land. On July 27, 2017, the city’s
inspectorate issued the inspection report no. 2346/TB-TTTP (P5), concluding the Dong
Tam incident: “the disputed land is defense land. The land area serving the airport
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construction previously used by Dong Tam residents belongs to the Mistry of Defense.
There is no agricultural land within the disputed area as claimed by Dong Tam villagers”.
According to the city government, between 1981 and 2012, due to loosely land
management of the military units and the Dong Tam commune government, some
villagers used the defense land for farming purpose. Between 2003 and 2010, some land
transactions were illegally certified by the Dong Tam commune government. Regarding
14 households claiming land use rights for compensation, the city inspectorate also
notified that the district government of My Duc canceled land-taking proposal that
intendedly compensated affected land users. This indicated that these 14 landholders
would not be compensated as the land-taking plan previously implemented by the My
Duc district government. The city inspectorate asked the Hanoi city to work with the
Ministry of Defense in order to recover all 236.7 ha serving the construction of the
military airport (Anninhthudo.vn, 2017). Dong Tam villagers, however, disagreed with
the city inspectorate’s conclusions. They sent petitions to the central government’s
inspectorate. On April 25, 2019, after reviewing the Hanoi inspectorate’s inspection
report, the CGV’s inspectorate officially confirmed that conclusions made by Hanoi
city’s inspectorate was correct and legal. The disputed land (6. 8 ha) was included in
236.7 ha of defense land (Hanoi, 2019). Dong Tam villagers were not invited to attend
the city’s information session and later press conferences.
Similarly, authority-based responses made compulsory land acquisition became
daily worries of Thu Thiem residents. Mrs Hong shared that after receiving coercive
land-taking announcement in 2012, she could not sleep: “We could be forced to move at
any time because our neighbors had to go already” (Manh Doan, 2018). Mr Tuan, whose
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family consists of 30 people said his family had to move to a new temporary apartment
after being notified by the city government that our houses and land could be coercively
acquired (Manh Doan, 2018). According to Khoa (Binh Khanh ward), on March 9, 2011,
the city’s vice governor signed executive order no. 1089/QĐ-UBND claiming his land for
the Thu Thiem project. Khoa could send petition to the city’s court but if he did nothing
within 30 days, HCMC’s executive order would be effective. Khoa had two options of
compensations (apartment or cash) but he did not accept. On January 8, 2010, the 2nd
district government issued executive order no. 1067/QD-UBND compensating him 723
million VND. On June 8, 2010, hundreds of public officials came to his home, destroyed
house while none was at home. They took away everything (Truong Minh, 2019a).
5.4. Summary of the Chapter
This chapter presents a cross case analysis of three land acquisition incidents
taking place in Tu Son (Bac Ninh province), Dong Tam (Hanoi city), and Thu Thiem (Ho
Chi Minh City). The analysis relies on two types of data: (i) primary data collected by the
researcher in Bac Ninh (and Vinh Phuc) provinces and (ii) secondary data published by
other authors and agencies. The theme-based analysis covers similarities and variations
about tool choice and their use in executing land acquisition. Following are the
summarized research findings drawn from three land-taking incidents under study.
Qualitative evidences revealed a similar tool mix used by local implementers in
Hanoi, HCMC, and Bac Ninh to acquire land. The tool mix included a direct government
organization (BCGC), authoritative tools (most importantly, executive order and land
price regulations), information-based tools (e.g. proclamation, public poster, moral
suasion and exhortation, propaganda, public dialogue, information portal) and three
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financial or financial equivalent tools of cash, land, and resettlement apartment. All three
local governments in Hanoi, Bac Ninh, and HCMC relied on BCGC as the only
organizational tool in implementing land-taking projects. BCGCs were a temporary taskbased unit established by the DPPC, recovered land assigned for households. Though
representatives of affected land users and investors could serve in BCGCs, their role was
minimal. They were largely expected to support government in convincing other affected
landholders giving up their land. The fact that BCGCs were outnumbered by government
leaders, managers, and officials made it like a temporary government agency.
Another shared feature across three incidents was the prominent role of
authoritative tools and information-based tools. In order to execute land-taking projects,
implementers used a same set of authority-based tools such as LOL, land price system
and land valuation rules issued by city/provincial governments, executive orders issued
by PPC and DPPC, central government’s land price framework. The heavy use of
authoritative tools helped implementers acquire land as scheduled. On the other hand,
moral suasion, exhortation, and propaganda were most popularly used by implementers
to convince affected land users. BCGCs organized public meetings and dialogues as
required by LOL. Press conference was only used when tensions increased such as in
Dong Tam and Thu Thiem. Field visits in Bac Ninh and Vinh Phuc provinces also helped
the researcher further understand limited influence of proclamation, public posters, and
government’s information portals on landholders’ attitudes and behaviors. Overall, the
combination of authoritative tools and information-based tools helped implementers
completed land-taking projects on time and, thus, enabled implementation effectiveness
and efficiency.
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Three financial or financial-equivalent tools used in land-takings included: cash,
land, and apartments. Dong Tam incident became an outlier because villagers did not
dispute compensation. Their primary concern was whether the acquired land is defense
land or not. Only the Ho Chi Minh City’s government compensated Thu Thiem
landholders with another plots of land and new apartments. However, affected
landholders’ responses and statistics showed that land and apartments were not an
effective means of land acquisition. Most affected residents in Thu Thiem did not choose
to move in new apartments because they were not able to afford expensive land and
apartments. Noncompliance was more likely to increase if resettlement areas located far
from landholders’ old locations. Cash, thus,becamethe financialtool used in both
incidents of Thu Thiem and Tu Son. Affected landholders in Tu Son incidents had only
01 option of cash because their acquired land area was small; the government was not
required to resettle them in another location. Like other land disputes, residents in Dong
Ky and Trang Ha wards did not comply with the government’s land acquisition because
of low compensation. Form of compensation did not play any role in Tu Son incident. A
significant finding regarding compensation in cash in Thu Thiem was that compensation
management did matter. Delayed payments and splitting cash-based compensation into
several installments discouraged landholders’ compliance with land acquisition. The fact
that noncompliant landholders mainly disputed compensation showed the very limited
role of financial and financial-equivalent tools in altering landholders’ behaviors.
Dealing with policy noncompliance, implementers largely relied on “executive
order”, “propaganda”, and “moral suasion and exhortation”. Once disputes took place,
implementers’ first choice was information-based tools. Members of BCGCs first were
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sent to each household to individually convince noncompliant landholders. BCGC
members mainly relied on ideological and moral justifications to persuade landholders
giving up their land. Public media controlled by the State was used as the key propaganda
device to create public opinion that encouraged Dong Tam landholders’ acceptance over
land acquisition. Public dialogues between BCGC members and disobedient landholders
were situationally organized when disputes lasted a long time; landholders’ grievances
and tensions increased.

Another shared pattern of three incidents was that after

information-based tools failed in persuading landholders, the government was willing to
coercively take land using executive orders and government agencies such as policy and
military forces.
Factors affecting tool choice and use varied across province/city and depended on
specific context of land-taking projects. Although governments in Hanoi, HCMC, and
Bac Ninh used the same tool mixes to start land acquisition, they differed in tool choice
when disputes took place. Hanoi authorities relied on direct government organizations
(e.g. city’s inspectorate, city people’s committee, city court) and authoritative tools such
as city PC’s executive order and city inspectorate’s inspection report to resolve the
dispute. This was because Hanoi authorities could legitimately justify land-taking by
defense and national security purposes. In contrast, HCMC and Bac Ninh governments
largely relied on information-based tools such as propaganda, public dialogues, and press
conference to reach settlements. Overall, land legislation, scope, intensity, and purposes
of land acquisition projects were among the most significant factors influencing
implementers’ tool choice and use.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

“Another reason for its attraction (tools approach) is that
it suggests a solubility to policy problems, just as most
problems around the house can, actually, be fixed with a
reasonably simple tool box that may be purchased at DIY
store, or most dental problems be fixed by a dentists
wielding a limited range of custom-built instruments”
(Margetts and Hood, 2016)

6.1. Introduction
Globally, land disputes and conflicts are inevitable in rapidly urbanizing and
industrializing nations (Wehrmann, 2008). Vietnam is no exception. In the last three
decades, the implementation of land acquisition policy has created contested relationships
between the government, investors, and landholders (World Bank, 2009 & 2011a). To
conduct study on land acquisition problems, the researcher defines disputes and conflicts
over land-takings as manifestations of policy noncompliance. The general research
problem is: why Vietnamese landholders do not comply with land acquisition? Unlike
other influential theories (e.g. intuitional, economic, and good governance approach), this
study is motivated by a research puzzle about potential linkages between policy tools and
policy noncompliance. The main research questions is: “when and how do
implementation tools help to explain noncompliance with land acquisition in Vietnam”?
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To address this question, the researcher treats government as “a black box and focusing
on how it interacts with society” (Margetts and Hood, 2016). A tool-centered research,
thus, allows the researcher to explore process dimensions of land-taking policy
implementation. More specifically, the researcher’s attentions turn into “the mechanisms
of rule and the relationship between government and the governed” (Le Gales, 2011).
The primary research interest, thus, involves policy tools that define interactions and
relationships between implementers and target groups. Three land-taking incidents taking
place in Hanoi city, HCMC, and Bac Ninh province are used as instrumental cases for a
discovery of those means of interactions and relationships.
This concluding chapter consists of three main sections: (i) discussion of research
findings; (ii) conclusions; and (iii) policy implications. In the first section, research
findings drawn from three incidents will be placed in available literature for an in-depth
discussion. The tool centered discussion will clarify and assess research findings.
Noncompliance with land acquisition will be explained in relation with characteristics,
strengths, and weaknesses of implementation tools used by local implementers. The
researcher will also point out contributions of the tools approach to literature of landtaking policy problems in Vietnam. The concluding section summarizes this study and
provide an answer to the research question. From a tools perspective, the last section
presents implications for Vietnamese policy makers, implementers, professionals, and
academic researchers who are interested in policy tools.
6.2. Discussions of Research Findings
In policy literature, looking at tools is helpful to understand the change in service
provision (Weaver, 1989), the improvement of policy implementation (Bertelmans-
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Videc, Rist and Vedung, 1998), or the identification of policy change (Le Gales, 2011).
However, the most attractive feature of tools approach is its capability to break down the
complex policy problems into constituent components and provide alternative options for
public choices (Margetts and Hood, 2016). By looking at a tool mix and its results, we
can find out what works and what does not work in particular context. The selection of
instrument, thus, can impact policy success or failure. From a tool perspective, argued by
tool supporters, primary concerns of policy makers and implementers is whether tool
choices are “the best possible ones for meeting the objective set; and the central set of
issues is around the effectiveness of instruments” (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007).
What arises from the three incidents analyzed in this study isthe role of
government organizations as the only organizational tool used in executing land
acquisition policy. This research finding is consistent with the World Bank’s research on
the organizational structure responsible for land-taking policy implementation (World
Bank, 2011a). The use of direct government organizations offers implementers with some
advantages. The government first can save budget because land-taking policy
implementation relies on available employees and resources. Most BCGC members are
government officials and managers who already get paid from the government for their
daily works. Second, the direct involvement of government organizations allows the
exercise of legitimate force when implementers confront resistance. This ensures that the
execution of a land-taking project is not left for chance. The government, therefore, can
reach desired land-taking objectives as scheduled. However, as pointed out by numerous
researchers, the fact that public officials dominate BCGCs make this type of
organizational tool less responsive to emerging needs (De Wit et al, 2012; World Bank,
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2011a; T&C, 2014). This is because BCGCs are not independent organizations that
operate based on the market mechanism. As a temporary task focused unit, BCGCs
represent the State’s interests that might conflict with target groups’ interests. BCGCs
first act in the interests of the State. Due to limited participation of non-State actors such
as landholders, legal experts, and land policy professionals, BCGCs can make decisions
that do not meet affected landholders’ demands and preferences. In practice, direct
government organizations are more appropriate where no effective market exists to
supply service or good (Salomon, 2002: 61-62). For political consideration, tensions and
clashes between government and citizens are another consequence of the use of direct
government organizations in acquiring land. Landholders only dispute land price and
compensation – a purely economic dispute. They do not resist the government and the
policy. Landholders only act to protect their legitimate economic interests that the
government should also do. However, since government officials and agencies are the
only actors to implement policy, landholders target at them once their interests are
affected, and have a grievance against public officials. This easily turns economic
disputes over land-takings into political tensions that might threat Vietnam’s sociopolitical stability. Direct government organizations, thus, are not an appropriate choice,
especially when acquired land is then assigned for private investors.
This case study reveals an authority-intensive tool mix used in land-taking policy
implementation. Authoritative tools such as “executive order” and “land price
regulations” play decisive role. A key feature of authoritative tools is the threat of
sanctions backed by the State. Target groups will be punished if they do not comply with
the State’s policy. The use of authoritative tools, thus, involve a significant coercion
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(Howlett, 2011: 83). On the one hand, the coerciveness of authoritative tools might help
implementers achieve implementation efficiency and effectiveness. As evident in three
incidents under study, local governments in Hanoi, Bac Ninh, and HCMC largely relied
on executive orders to legalize land-taking decisions. The government also controlled
compensation through land price regulations. Affected landholders were expected to act
in accordance with the government’s desired ways: accept compensation based on a fixed
land price system and leave their land. Landholders involved in three incidents had no
choice except receiving compensation. If they did not comply with government’s
decisions, executive ordersand government’s law enforcement forces were used to
forcefully take land as scheduled. Theoretically, a heavy reliance on authoritative tools,
on the other hand, will increase resistance over land acquisition. Landholders disobey
government’s actions because from their point of view, those coercive actions are not
legitimate. The use of executive order makes land-takings legal, but it is not necessarily a
legitimate action of government. Legality is only one element of legitimacy (Gilley,
2009: 6-7). It only shows that government’s actions conform to political community’s
laws, rules, and customs. The use of public power or authority is recognized by
legislation. Citizens, however, may doubt rules followed by governing authorities or they
simply think that following rules is not enough. This might derive from insufficiencies of
legality or unclear information regarding land acquisition plans. In addition,
compensation refusal and coercive land acquisition indicate landholders’ non-consent.
Without their consent, landholders might act against government that often results in long
lasting disputes and tensions. Therefore, the use of public authority is only legitimate if
government’s actions are transparent and consistent with shared norms of conducts that
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reflect political community’s moral consensus. Government will only convince
landholders voluntarily give up their land if actors (government)“holds and exercises
political power with legality, justification, and consent from the standpoint of its citizens”
(Gilley, 2009: 11).
This qualitative study shows the inappropriate choice of land price regulation as
an implementation tool. Article 112 of LOL (2013) requires implementers to develop
land price equal to common land price on the market at time of land acquisition.
However, land price regulations issued by PPC set price ceiling applied for land
acquisition. Regardless of land price calculation formularies, there are no way
implementers can offer landholders with land price and compensation that are equal to
market-based value. This is because regulations are “rules written by appointed public
officials to implement often vaguely worded statutes that delegate rule making authority
to an agency” (Salamon, 2002: 119). In other words, regulations are agency-made law
backed by legislation and judicial decisions. Government relies on regulations to govern
private behaviors or set price ceiling as in land acquisition. In practice, land price systems
issued by city/provincial governments aim to control implementers’ land valuation
behaviors. By using land price regulation, government can control compensation in a
desired way. This, however, conflict with a requirement as stated in Law on Land that
land price and compensation should be close to land value on market. Local
implementers, in practice, are unable to develop a market-based land price because they
cannot violate the fixed land price ceiling as stated in land price regulations. This
research finding demonstrates shortcomings of economic explanation that unfair land
price and low compensation are two key contributors to noncompliance with land
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acquisition (World Bank, 2009&2011a). It becomes clear that unrealistic land price and
compensation are only consequences of a wrong tool choice. The fixed land price
regulation is the first factor causing disputed compensation, leading to noncompliance.
What government needs to do is not simply to increase land price and compensation.
Government instead needs to create a more stable tool that can be flexibly used in
different situations. Such a tool will help implementers determine real value of land that
is associated with local contexts.
Dealing with noncompliance, this study discovers governments’ enforcement
efforts using authoritative tools and information-based tools. Once noncompliance took
place, local governments did not change their decisions. They tried to enforce land-taking
procedures and rules as stated in LOL and people’s committee’s executive orders. Public
policy literature has documented the important role of financial incentives in
government’s policy enforcement efforts (Gofeng, 2015). This research, however,
suggests minimal role of financial incentives in government’s efforts to solve
noncompliance with land acquisition. There were no changes of compensation (e.g.
increased payment in cash). Landholders had to accept the same rate of compensation
even if their land had been acquired long time ago. While the researcher did not find
significant evidence regarding relationship between forms of compensation (e.g. cash,
land, and apartments) and noncompliance, the management of compensation did
contribute to landholders’ disobedience. The fact in Thu Thiem that local governments
began land-takings while resettlement apartments were not ready for landholders to move
in increased noncompliance. Also, delayed payments or paying compensation in multiple
installments affected landholders’ policy compliance. Field interviews and observations’
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evidences also indicate implementers’ tool preferences over information-based tools such
as moral suasion and propaganda. However, information-based tools are not helpful tools
in noncompliant situations. This is because, by using of information-based tools,
implementers are not required to provide clear and exact information. They can inform
landholders anything that might alter target groups’ thinking and behaviors (Weiss, 2002:
217; Howlett, 2011: 115-118). As shown in Thu Thiem and Dong Tam incidents, despite
governments’ efforts, moral suasion and propaganda failed in reaching a settlement. The
more governments talked; the more landholders got angry because they did not know
what they really wanted to know. After information-based tools failed in convincing
landholders’ compliance, executive orders issued by district government became
implementers’ final tool choice to forcefully take land. The use of government agencies
and executive orders to acquire land by force was a common pattern of tool-based
response across three land-taking incidents. This pattern of coercive response to
noncompliance did not conclude disputes. It instead increased target groups’ grievances
and tensions between government and affected landholders.
It becomes clear that “coercion”, “instrumentality”, and “routinization” are
common features and patterns of tool choice and use in land acquisition in Vietnam. By
instrumentality, according to Capano and Lippi (2017), implementers select tools to
“keep with the policy makers’ pursued goals”. Whereas, routinization is a pattern that
implementers adopt “the same policy instruments in the same way”. Previously adopted
instruments are preserved by implementers, without any change. These patterns of tool
choice and use ensure implementation effectiveness but not necessarily result in a shared
sense and a common acceptance that construct policy legitimacy. Form a tool
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perspective, three features of coercion, instrumentality, and routinization might help
government achieve policy effectiveness and efficiency. However, such a model of tool
choice and use is not necessarily responsive to policy target groups’ demands. Current
tool mixes and tool preferences instead would be associated with two negative
consequences: (i) low responsiveness and (ii) direct confrontation between the
government and citizens.
6.3. Research Conclusions
A challenge for the policy tools approach as a new research direction within the
context of Vietnam is how does it help to understand noncompliance with land
acquisition? Research results suggest that implementation tools do matter. Tool choice
and use might contribute to policy noncompliance. The tools lens sheds light on noneconomic and non-institutional aspects of policy noncompliance. It supports an
explanation of policy noncompliance that goes beyond institutional and economic
conditions. Accordingly, policy noncompliance will be minimized if government acts
legitimately. This requires government to take into account legitimate voice, demands,
and interests of various actors involved in land acquisition.
Tools approach, thus, further explains landholders’ noncompliance that current
tool mixes are not associated with legitimate actions. Available tools allow preferences
over direct government organizations, authoritative tools, and information-based tools
while ignore financial incentives to acquire land. This tool preference not only define a
one-way relationship between government and target groups but also legitimate coercive
actions in land acquisition. As can be seen in Thu Thiem incident, the availability of tools
encourages the abuse of public authority in coercive land acquisition. Implementers can
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recover land regardless the legitimacy of government’s actions. This is also clear in all
three incidents under study that government justifies compulsory land-takings by defense
purpose or economic development purposes and then assign land for private investors. In
theory, tools are institutions (Le Gales, 2011). However, tool choice and use are not
intuitional issues. They are actions in practice. Tools approach, therefore, suggests, that
implementers can increase landholders’ compliance with land acquisition if they remove
inappropriate tools, change tool use towards more collaborative interactions, and consider
the legitimacy of government’s actions in practice.
Giving this dissertation research is in a qualitative case study design, research
conclusions are applicable to cases considered in this study only. This means that
implementation tools are not necessarily related to noncompliance in other land-taking
projects. Also, the tools approach needs to be tested with compliant land-takings. The
question for tools approach is why adopting the same tool mixes, many local
governments can successfully acquire land without resistance? Research in future, thus,
can further explore variations and patterns of tool choice and use in a large sample to
verify this study’s conclusions. More importantly, in order to confirm this dissertation’s
research findings, researchers should look for land-taking projects in which implementers
can settle disputes by only changing tool choice and use.
6.4. Policy Implications
Tool supporters might be questioned: to what extent can tool perspective be used
to improve policy implementation, make policy implementation more effective, more
efficient, more equitable, and more responsive? In other words, considering current tool
mixes used to acquire land in Vietnam, how do implementers minimize policy
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noncompliance by changing tool choice and use? This case study suggests some
implications and recommendations for policy makers, policy implementers, and
professionals and academic researchers who are interested in the tools approach. The
most general implication for all is that compulsory land-taking does not mean acquiring
land by force and at any cost. Policy makers and implementers should be aware that by
compulsory land-taking, the State has authority to recover land for legitimate purposes.
Landholders’ obligation is to return land to the State. However, policy makers and
implementers should not only think about implementation effectiveness and efficiency.
They instead need to consider responsiveness and legitimacy of government’s actions in
order to reach policy compliance.
Policy makers
To increase responsiveness of policy implementation, policy makers should
consider the role of “market” and non-state actors in land acquisition. Direct government
organizations should only take land for public purposes (e.g. defense and national
security). Non-state actors that operate based on market mechanism should have more
chance to participate in land acquisition for economic development. The central
government should limit the number of public officials participating in BCGCs and the
number of affected landholders that each BCGC can serve. Affected landholders should
be allowed to select anyone who has knowledge and prestige to serve in BCGC. The
requirement that only affected landholders can serve as landholders’ representatives
should be removed. The number of representatives should account for 5% of affected
landholders instead of only 1-2 people. To ensure fairness of compensation, land price
regulation should be replaced by other means of land valuation and price calculation.
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Instead of fixed land price regulations, the government should create a formula that can
be used to calculate land price in specific situations associated with variations of local
contexts and changes of land price on market.
For policy implementers
Considering institutional conditions of current land-taking policy, BCGC should
be more inclusive in order to operate as an advisory unit. Membership of BCG are not
necessarily limited to government officials, leaders, and affected landholders. Instead of
being solely decided by the government, the selection of non-government actors should
be voted by both affected landholders and representatives of the government. To develop
a land price system that reflect the latest value of land on the market, implementers
should consult with non-state actors who provide land valuation service. The authority of
district governments in land acquisition needs to be controlled. The provincial
government should not only approve land-taking proposal submitted by district
governments but also need to monitor every land-taking act of district governments. This
requires a more centralized process of decision-making for land acquisition: district
governments’ executive orders need to be approved by the provincial or city government
to prevent the abuse of authoritative tools. Implementers should start land acquisition
once funding, land, or resettlement apartments are available. This rule needs to be strictly
enforced, so that affected landholders are able to move in their new homes right after the
government starts land acquisition projects. New resettlement areas should offer better
living conditions than the old places. Giving cash is the most common financial tool,
funding transfer should be completed in one installment prior the time that landholders
are required to move out. Non-material losses such as job opportunity and the
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convenience of old living locations should be considered and added in compensation.
Public meetings should be used as the main information-based tool because of its
transparency and ability to force government officials be accountable for their actions.
The government, however, should not organize meetings with all affected landholders in
one time. Multiple meetings with different groups shared the same concerns might be the
most effective form of communication.
Policy professionals and academic researchers
Further research based on the tools approach is necessary to confirm the
relationship between policy tools and noncompliance with land acquisition. First, policy
professionals and academic researchers who are interested in tools approach to policy
noncompliance might also apply tool perspective in other policy fields. In the land sector,
the tools approach should be applied to examine government’s actions in different
contexts of land acquisition (e.g. scale of land-takings, purposes, actors, funding…).
Also, since public policy, after all, is “the business of understanding, dealing with, and
even changing the world outside government” (Margetts and Hood, 2016), an important
research direction is to discover the impact of changing context on interactions between
government and citizens. This is because, in recent two decades, internet and social
media has become widespread in Vietnam. Digital technologies not only have
transformed daily life of ordinary citizens but also the way they interact with government.
In a rapidly changing society, policy makers and implementers need to take into account
of challenges to governance brought about by technological changes. Vietnamese policy
makers should be aware of a reality that it becomes more difficult for the authority-based
tools to wield in society where citizens find internet, social media, and mobile
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communications a powerful device to voice their demands and preferences. Internetbased platforms provide citizens a network-based environment in which they are capable
to interact (e.g. receive, share, disseminate information) in large-scale spaces. This
context might challenge traditional perspectives in policy implementation.
6.5. Summary of the Chapter
This chapter concludes the dissertation study. The researcher argues that
implementation tools do matters. To clarify linkages between implementation tools and
noncompliance with land acquisition, the researcher discusses research findings in
relation with available literature. Qualitative research results suggest that tools contribute
to landholders’ noncompliance. This first is because available tools used in acquiring
land allow coercive land acquisition once implementers face resistance. Second, case
analysis shows unsuitable tool choices such as the land price regulation or inappropriate
tool use such as authority-intensive responses to solve noncompliance. Overall, tool
preferences over direct government organizations, authoritative tools, and informationbased tools define a one-way relationship between policy implementers and affected
landholders who have no choice except receiving compensation and giving up their land.
Coercion, instrumentality, and routinization are three prominent features of Vietnamese
implementers’ tool choice and use in land acquisition. These characteristics ensure
implementation effectiveness and efficiency but are not necessarily associated with
responsiveness and legitimacy of government’s actions. These, from a tool perspective,
explains why and how government’s actions contribute to noncompliance with land
acquisition in Vietnam.
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Appendix A: Interview Guides
Part I: Introduction
•

Researcher’s name, background, and research purposes.

•

Explain the informed consent to the participants, ask them to sign the form, and
ask for a permission to record an interview.

Part II: Background of Informant
•

Name, Position, and Working Experience

Part III: Land-Taking Policy Implementation
•

Please tell me an overview of land-taking policy implementation in your district
in recent years? Can you describe typical procedures and process to implement a
land-taking project?

•

Is district government flexible in implementing land-taking programs or must
follow fixed procedures and rules issued by central and provincial governments?

•

Please share with me the role of government agencies involving in land-taking
implementation? How do they collaborate with non-state actors to carry out landtaking programs?

•

What are roles of non-state actors (investors) and target group (land -users) in the
policy implementation process?

•

Can you tell me in detail the structure and operation of district BCGC? How it
works? What are strengths? Weaknesses?
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•

How does district government communicate with stakeholders during land-taking
implementation process? Can you tell me ways of communicating with
landholders? How effective? Which one is more effective?

•

By what ways do land users voice their demands? How does district government
respond to land users’ demands? Do land users’ voice play a role in district
government’s final decisions on land-takings?

•

How does the government conduct land price calculations and compensation for
appropriated land?

•

What kind of economic incentives offered by district government to encourage
land users’ compliance with government’s land-taking decisions? How effective?

•

In your opinion, what are problems of current land-taking policy implementation?
Considering Vietnam’s context, how can we improve those procedures for more
effective policy implementation?

•

Why affected land users disagree with local governments’ land-taking decisions?
Is it simply because of economic losses? Or what else explains land-users’ noncompliance with local governments’ decisions?
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Appendix B: Questions guiding
Analysis of Documents and Transcripts, Coding, and Theme Development
●What are mechanisms and tools available for land-taking policy implementers?
Direct or indirect mechanisms?
● Implementers’ tool preferences: direct or indirect government, economic
incentives, coercive authority, or persuasion and capacity building? Variations?
●What political, economic, institutional, and socio-cultural factors affect policy
implementers’ tool choice and use?
● Do non-state actors such as investors and land users play any role when
government officials select implementation tools? If not, why?
● In response to land users’ noncompliance, do implementers change their choice
and use of tools? How do they make changes? Similarities and variations?
●How effective are those tool changes? If they do not change tool choice and use,
why? Similarities and variations across three incidents?
● Factors affecting tool-based responses? Similarities and Variations?
● Patterns of tool-based responses to noncompliance? Similarities and variations?
●Linkages between tools and policy compliance? How?
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Appendix C: 2013 Law on Land – Selected Articles

Article 61: Land acquisition for security and defense purposes
The State has authority to acquire land for security and defense purposes in following
situations:
1. To construct military stations and office buildings
2. To construct military bases
3. To construct special units for national security and defense
4. To construct military ports and transportation stations
5. To construct industrial bases, science-technology-recreation units serving defense
purposes.
6. To construct logistics units for defense
7. To construct shooting practice and weapon testing fields
8. To construct training units, hospitals, and health recovery units
9. To construct public accommodations for defense force
10. To construct correctional centers and jails/prisons managed by Ministry of
Defense and Ministry of Police.
Article 62: Land acquisition for economic development and public purposes
The State has authority to acquire land for economic development and public purposes in
following situations:
1. To implement important projects approved by the National Congress
2. To implement development projects approved by the premier, including:
a. Industrial zones, manufacturing and exporting zones, high-tech parks,
economic zones, new urban areas, investment projects funded by ODA
sources.
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b. State’s office buildings, foreign organizations’ office buildings, historical and
cultural sites, public parks and squares, monuments, memorial sites.
c. Infrastructures at national level such as road, bridges, fuel transportation
system, national reservation sites, and public constructions at national level.
3. Development projects approved by provincial people’s councils, including:
a. State’s office buildings, historical and cultural sites, public parks and squares,
monuments, memorial sites.
b. Public infrastructures at provincial level such as road, bridges, historical and
cultural sites, memorial sites, monuments.
c. Public accommodations, new resettlement areas, sport and recreational sites,
religion units, markets…
d. New urban areas, new resident units in rural areas, industrial units,
manufacturing and exporting units, forest development projects.
e. Natural resource exploiting projects such as coal, sand…
Article 66: Authority to acquire land
1. Provincial people’s committees have authority to acquire land in following
situations:
a. Acquire land used by public organizations, religion organizations, Vietnamese
people living oversea, foreign organizations with diplomatic functions,
business organizations invested by foreign sources.
b. Agricultural land managed by ward/communes’ public land funds.
2. District people’s committees have authority to acquire land in following situations
a. Acquire land used by households, individuals, and community units
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b. Acquire land used by Vietnamese people living oversea
3. If the acquired land area includes both users as stated in (1) and (2), provincial
people’s committees can acquire land or authorize district people’s committees to
acquire land.
Article 67: Land acquisition announcement and compliance with land acquisition
plan
1. Public authorities have to inform affected landholders 90 days before acquiring
agricultural land and 180 days before acquiring non-agricultural land.
2. If landholders agree to give up their land earlier than the required time, people’s
committees can acquire land earlier than deadlines as stated above.
3. Affected landholders have responsibility to cooperate with agencies responsible
for land acquisition to execute land-taking plan.
4. Once land-taking decisions are effective, compensation and resettlement
proposals are approved by State’s agencies, affected landholders are required to
comply with land-taking plans.
Article 71. Compulsory land acquisition by force (selected important rules)
1. Compulsory land acquisition by force is implemented in accordance with Article
70 of this Law.
2. Compulsory land acquisition by force is implemented in following situations:
a. Despite propaganda and communication efforts, affected landholders do not
comply with land-taking executive orders.
b. Executive orders approving land acquisition by force are publicly displayed at
communes’ offices and public places in residential units.
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c. Executive orders approving land acquisition by force are effective.
d. Affected landholders are received executive orders approving land acquisition
by force.
If affected landholders do not accept executive orders approving land acquisition
by force, commune/ward people’s committees document their noncompliance.
3. Mayor of district people’s committees issue executive orders approving coercive
land acquisition and enforce land-takings by force.
4. Procedures and steps to acquire land by force:
a. Mayor of district people’s committees establish Unit of coercive land
acquisition before enforcing land-takings by force.
b. Unit of coercive land acquisition communicates with landholders to convince
them giving up their land. If landholders accept land-taking plan and
compensation, unit of coercive land acquisition documents landholders’
compliance. Landholders have 30 days to return their land to government.
If landholders do not accept executive orders of coercive land acquisition, the unit of
coercive land acquisition enforces executive orders by force.
c. Units of coercive land acquisition have authority to forcefully remove people
and assets out of the acquired land areas. If affected landholders do not
receive their assets, units of coercive land acquisition document and protect
their assets as required by law.

220

